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Glossary 
 
Asymmetric Warfare 
This is the warfare of ‘acting, 
organising and thinking differently 
from opponents to maximise relative 
strengths, exploit opponents’ 
weaknesses or gain greater freedom of 
action. It can be political-strategic, 
military-strategic, operational or a 
combination, and entail different 
methods, technologies, values, 
organisations or time perspectives.’ 
(Cassidy, 2003:8) 
Botnet 
A botnet, also known as a zombie net, 
is a group of computers infected with 
the malicious kind of robot software, 
known as bots, which present a 
security threat to the computer owner. 
Once the robot software (malicious 
software or malware) has been 
successfully installed in a computer, 
this computer becomes a zombie or a 
drone, unable to resist the commands 
of the bot commander. (Carr, 2009:13) 
Cache 
This is a hardware component that 
improves computer performance by 
transparently storing data so that future 
requests for that data can be retrieved 
faster. The data that is stored within a 
cache might be values that have been 
computed earlier or duplicates of 
original values that are stored 
elsewhere. 
C4ISR 
This acronym stands for Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance, which means a 
computer-based combat system able to 
command and control military troops 
from various services engaged in joint 
operations. 
 
 
Comprehensive National Power 
‘Comprehensive National Power’ 
(CNP) (綜合國力, zonghe guoli) is a 
term employed by the PRC’s 
leadership to represent the evaluation 
of possible variables for China’s 
national power, which includes 
‘natural resources, population, 
economy, military, and science and 
technology.’ (Li and Wang, 2010:257) 
DDoS / DoS 
This acronym stands for Distributed 
Denial of Service, also known as 
‘Denial of Service’ (DoS). This kind of 
attack is characterised by an explicit 
attempt by attackers to prevent 
legitimate users of a service from 
utilising it. Attacks can be directed at 
any network device, including attacks 
on routing devices and web, electronic 
mail, or Domain Name System (DNS) 
servers. (Carr, 2009:27) 
DNS 
This acronym stands for Domain Name 
System/Server. Technically, the 
internet Domain Name System (DNS) 
is a set of databases containing IP 
addresses and their corresponding 
domain names. Since each domain 
name is mapped to a particular numeric 
address, the DNS performs the 
transformation back and forth between 
the domain names and the numbers of 
the respective IP addresses. 
OSI 
This acronym stands for Open System 
Interconnection, a world-wide standard 
which defines a networking framework 
for implementing protocols in seven 
layers. These are, from top to bottom, 
the Application, Presentation, Session, 
Transport, Network, Data Link, and 
Physical Layers. 
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People’s War 
The term People’s War (人民戰爭, 
renmin zhanzheng) was coined by Mao 
in the 1920s. It is a strategic concept 
originally formulated to oppose the 
enemy during China’s civil war, which 
then became a general doctrine of 
mobilising the massive Chinese 
populace to achieve a political goal and 
to defeat a militarily superior opponent 
despite military inferiority. 
Strategic Culture 
Strategic culture is a conceptualisation 
for understanding the way that 
countries formulate and implement 
military-security policies. (Collins, 
2010:171) Culture is viewed as a 
value-added explanation of strategic 
behaviour. 
 
 
TCP/IP 
This acronym stands for Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. 
This is a functional transmission to 
correctly disassemble and reassemble 
data through small packages on the 
internet from the side of delivery to the 
side of reception. The function of IP is 
to arrange and lead the flows of 
information to their exact destination 
through the networks’ physical layers, 
namely OSI. 
Unrestricted Warfare 
This term is derived from a book on 
military strategy written in 1999 by 
two colonels in the PLA, Qiao Liang 
(乔良) and Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗). 
Its primary concern is how a nation 
such as China can defeat a 
technologically superior opponent such 
as the USA through a variety of means. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In recent years, the dramatic growth of internet usage has triggered an increasing 
interest in cyberspace, not only in terms of personal business but also on a governmental 
level. From 2000 to 2010, global internet usage increased from 360 million to over 2 
billion people. (US Department of Defense, 2011) According to a 2011 report of 
China’s Internet Network Information Center (CINIC), in 2010, Chinese netizens1 
numbered 457.3 million in total, up 73.3 million from just one year before. (CINIC, 
2011:13) Aside from users, the scale of cyberspace2 itself has also expanded 
exponentially: for example, the number of distributed TCP/IP addresses3 in China 
reached 278 million in 2010 – an increase of 19.4% when compared with the year 
before. (CINIC, 2011:23) This steep rise in internet usage and scale means people are 
quickly becoming accustomed to dealing with their affairs in virtual cyberspace rather 
than in a physical environment. This may cover banking, marketing, shopping, or 
communication; the range of functions relying on cyberspace multiplies with each 
passing day. Furthermore, fundamental sectors of state such as agriculture, electricity 
and water supply, defence, government administration, information and 
telecommunication, public transportation, banking and finance, mail systems and goods 
supply chains all already operate via cyberspace. 
Cyberspace has the potential to bind together the civil, government, and even 
military sectors as they are all constructed on this same intangible, indispensable 
information network platform. The network platform of cyberspace is physically 
structured by combining a large amount of hardware such as computers, servers, routers, 
converts and cables. The continuing growth of networked systems, devices, and 
platforms means that ‘cyberspace is embedded into an increasing number of 
capabilities.’ (US DoD, 2011) However, as the Chinese idiom states: ‘while water can 
carry a boat, it may also capsize it’. That is to say, while a state may benefit enormously 
from a heavy reliance on cyberspace, in doing so, it becomes more vulnerable to being 
‘capsized’ by the many attacks, crimes and terrorist acts generated through this medium. 
The task of securing cyberspace rates as one of the most serious challenges for national 
                                               
1 The term ‘netizen’ is defined in the report as people who are able to access the internet via broadband 
including both cable and/or wireless, and mobile devices. (CINIC, 2011:13-16) 
2 The definitions and concepts of cyberspace will be addressed in detail in Section 2.1. 
3 Please refer to Section 2.1.1 for a definition of IP addresses. 
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security, public safety, and the economy in modern times. Coping with the impact of a 
rapidly expanding cyberspace is an issue that states must unavoidably address in the 
digital era. 
Traditionally, a state is protected inside its geographic territory by physical 
borders, often consisting of natural barriers such as rivers, oceans, straits, mountains, 
and special terrain. However, the geographical protection of a state is far removed from 
cyberspace. Research points out that any fresh meat passing a physical border into a 
country will undergo inspection, but a malicious attack via cyberspace could be 
transmitted across 20 borders by the click of just one button. (Nykodym and Taylor, 
2004) Traditional physical borders cannot protect a state against attacks arising from 
cyberspace. Instead, each state must formulate new strategic approaches to meet such 
threats.  
Historically, a state’s power has largely been in direct relation to its territory, 
which, though land is a fixed resource with limited supply, could be expanded through 
competition and the occupation of other countries (Luke 1997). Once the territory of a 
state had been established, its power could be presented to the world. However, the 
digital age is transforming this tradition, manifested not only in civil society but also on 
the military field. As recent evidence suggests, the growth of the internet has 
transformed cyberspace from a societal platform into a potential battlefield in which 
states contest power. This will influence state security as government bodies no longer 
dominate communication systems and techniques in cyberspace. (Schwartz, 2001) 
This raises the question of how exactly cyberspace can be defined as a potential 
battleground and what differences there are with traditional battlegrounds in terms of 
warfare. Since the invention of the World Wide Web (WWW), states have built up their 
information infrastructure to cope with both domestic and international affairs. States 
have now begun to compete with one another for dominance in this potential 
battleground. A ‘virtual landscape’ parallel to a state’s geographic territory may thus be 
drawn in cyberspace, representing a metaphorical territoriality that differs from that of 
the physical world. This new virtual structure challenges traditional doctrines of 
military strategy; further to this, any new developments in military strategy will 
inevitably bring about a re-formulation of state policy regarding warfare and security. 
As such, research into the effect the development of cyberspace as a potential 
battleground plays on existing military doctrine is becoming increasingly crucial. 
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It is thus of global significance that China, a rising world superpower, is 
currently expending great effort on the development of cyber warfare. This research will 
investigate how China’s fundamental strategic doctrine, People’s War4 – which is 
traditionally based upon geographical battlegrounds – can be integrated into the concept 
of cyberspace as a battlefield. Through a case study of China’s rapidly developing cyber 
warfare, this research aims to generate potential responsive guidelines, as well as 
underlining the importance of cyber security to a state’s national security as a whole. 
Traditional military strategy based on geographic battlegrounds must be re-considered 
in light of insights arising from Strategic Studies and Security Studies, in order to tackle 
new strategic issues relating to warfare conducted in cyberspace. Another consideration 
for this research is how relevant discourses of international relations approach the 
prospect of cyberspace as a new arena in which states compete to expand their power 
through the application of new military strategy. States may deploy strategies of cyber 
warfare to accomplish decisive campaigns outside of their own territory, potentially 
fulfilling the ancient Chinese maxim: ‘subduing the enemy without fighting is the acme 
of skill.’ (Sun Tzu, The Art of War)  
Research Questions 
What is the relationship between cyberspace as a potential battleground and existing 
doctrines of modern Chinese strategy? 
Expanding on the primary research question, this research further encompasses 
three secondary research questions:  
1.   How is cyberspace developing into a potential battleground? 
2.   How has People’s War remained the guiding principle throughout the many 
transformations of modern Chinese strategy? 
3.   How does China develop and conduct cyber warfare through the strategy of 
People’s War? 
In order to answer these research questions, this research aims to construct an 
analytical framework, which comprises of Chapters Two, Three, and Four, so that four 
theoretical propositions are produced as follows: 
1. The strategic values of cyberspace make it an intangible arena in which states 
contend for predominance over one another. 
                                               
4 The concept of People’s War will be examined comprehensively in Section 3.2. 
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2.  China’s cyberspace is constructed based on an integrated platform consisting of 
computer networks, telecommunications, and electromagnetic environments in 
order to enlarge the strategic value of cyberspace.  
3.  Cyberspace as a potential battle space is particularly suited to the tradition of 
People’s War. This means that this strategic tradition remains an up-to-date 
doctrine in modern Chinese strategy. 
4.  China’s cyber warfare is a strategic warfare that adopts the principle of People’s 
War. In so doing, internet control and monitoring are also likely to be an element 
of China’s cyber warfare in order to control and command civilians into 
disciplined cyber warriors for military purposes. 
Following the analytical framework, the research presents a case study as an 
empirical investigation to further elaborate these propositions empirically. In the case 
study, three distinct types of evidence are collected as follows, which may also form a 
methodological validity of triangulation: 
1.  Interviews with representatives of ROC’s military, government and civilian 
sectors, which presents Taiwanese perceptions of the cyber warfare strategy of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). This data collection is analysed as shown as 
Section 5.2 to Section 5.5. 
2.  Analysis of recent cyber incidents which suggest actual implementation of PRC 
cyber warfare strategy. This data collection is presented in Section 5.6. 
3. Documentary evidence of China’s cyber warfare from the PRC. This data 
collection is presented in Section 5.7. 
One might argue that the fieldwork in Taiwan will have some bias against the 
PRC. As noted in the methodology section 5.1, one limitation of interview data 
collected in Taiwan is that it might only reveal Taiwanese perceptions of China’s threat 
and Taiwanese officials may have their own agenda so distort the threat.  However, 
conducting interviews inside China, particularly in this sensitive military-oriented area, 
is imposible because respondents within the Chinese military would likely be extremely 
reluctant to be interviewed, let alone to give politically unacceptable answers, for fear of 
putting themselves at risk.5 Therefore, though the fieldwork in Taiwan might have 
inevitable bias against the PRC, conducting fieldwork and interviews in Taiwan can 
                                               
5 As Bryman (2008:150-152) indicates, researchers need to have keen perception on whether respondents 
are reluctant to give socially unacceptable answers for fear of being judged, which can break down the 
validity of data collection. 
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nevertheless be an effective alternative measure. In addition, the opposing position of 
the Taiwanese military should still provide a good understanding because their 
judgments are conceptually sophisticated and insightful, since Taiwanese military and 
officials have obtained plentiful experience in exercises against China’s cyber warfare. 
Of course, the information derived from the interviews must be subject to critical 
examination by the researcher.  Validation of the interviews is undertaken in Section 5.1, 
which follows the interviews with empirical case studies in order to highlight areas of 
agreement with the interviews and counteract any bias. Ultimately the aim is to reach a 
valuable research outcome by answering the research questions via the examination of 
the analytical framework through the presentation of empirical case studies backed by 
interviews with those who know the area well. 
This research is premised on the assumption that China conducts cyber warfare 
based on Chinese military documents discussed in Section 5.7. The interviews are 
therefore a means to collect additional data in order to further investigate the 
significance and implications of Chinese documentary evidence on cyber warfare and 
alleged incidents in which China is believed to engaged in cyber attacks.   For this 
reason, rather than proving whether China conducts cyber warfare or not, the interviews 
were focused on obtaining valuable insights into  modern Chinese strategy and some 
possible methods of China’s cyber warfare from the Taiwanese perspective.  Political 
confrontation between the Taiwan and China heightens the interest of Taiwanese 
officials in Chinese strategy and policy in this area and makes them highly aware of 
Chinese activities in the field. Bias might be a problem in the interpretations of 
Taiwanese officials but the interviews have also provided valuable empirical 
information and validation of other sources in explaining how China implements its 
strategies in cyberspace. 
1.1 The disciplines of cyber warfare: Military Studies and Strategic Studies 
The key issue of this research is cyber warfare. Research indicates discovery of 
several cases of cyber warfare within recent years, carried out not only by states but 
also by non-state actors6 (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001:17). Denotatively, cyber 
warfare can refer to warfare conducted in cyberspace, regardless of the actors 
involved. Aside from investigation into the nature of cyberspace, this research will 
involve explorations into Military Studies, including aspects such as strategy and 
                                               
6 Section 5.2 will further examine how such incidents in cyberspace demonstrate that both state and non-
state actors could implement cyber warfare strategy within military conflicts. 
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warfare. For some critics, the value of Military Studies can be somewhat 
questionable, as relevant works are often written ‘for a professional audience rather 
than an academic one.’ (Freeman, 2010:392) However, Military Studies may well 
provide conceptual guidance for the study of warfare, including its nature and 
principles, comprehension of its regularity and development and the application of 
further strategy and tactics, and even predictions and corresponding guidelines for 
future warfare. Military Studies can be interpreted as the study of any activity 
directly or indirectly related to war. Alternatively, it may be the study of any 
activity related to military affairs, the study of the relationship between armed 
forces and war, or even the characteristics of soldiers. In short, Military Studies 
involves the exploration and epistemology of military knowledge. Though such 
knowledge can be generally extended yet further to certain cross-border fields like 
crime-fighting, smuggling, trafficking and piracy (Baylis and Smith, 2005:2-4), the 
traditional focus of Military Studies is conventional warfare. In Wang Pufeng’s 
(1998) view, Military Studies encompasses two interconnected dimensions. The 
first dimension is warfare, implying the investigation of the use of the military to 
present a state’s power. The other dimension is national defence, tackling the 
problems of constructing this military power. These two dimensions are closely 
interrelated due to mutual cause and effect. 
Since military affairs are by nature highly concerned with functionality and 
practicality, Military Studies must surpass purely theoretical conjecture; instead, 
related investigations must closely correspond with military practice, such as how 
to conduct and win a war, to ensure fulfilment of actual requirements. From a 
functional perspective, the primary purpose of Military Studies is to analyse past 
precedents to extract relevant factors of warfare which can be systematised into 
useful knowledge. In this way, the gap between current military capabilities and 
guidance for future warfare may be removed; it may even make it feasible to 
overcome time limitations to quickly collect accurate necessary information to 
prepare the national defence, perhaps via cyberspace. (Cheng, 2003) However, 
though military planning and the construction of military power may be based on 
such rational thinking, this does not necessarily infer certain military victory: the 
outcomes of warfare are influenced by many variables, not least by the uncertainty 
in situation awareness experienced by participants in military operations referred to 
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by Carl von Clausewitz as the ‘fog of war’. (Clausewitz, 1976:140)7 Doubts may 
include, for example, what the extent of the discrepancy is between theoretical 
probabilities and the true readiness of the national defence. Or, how many variables 
exist which have been overlooked or not correctly calculated? What conclusions 
have the enemy drawn in terms of military guidance? How well prepared is the 
enemy’s national defence?  These multiple factors are all associated with the 
process of warfare – from preparation to operation. The results of warfare will 
accordingly reflect these factors. Military Studies hopes to create the most 
appropriate military strategy based on historical experience, in order to narrow as 
much as possible the distance between prior theoretical thinking and the subsequent 
result. This directly corresponds to Sun Tzu’s aphorism in The Art of War:  ‘careful 
planning will lead to a victory; careless planning will lead to a defeat’. 
Another discipline relevant to cyber warfare is Strategic Studies. Strategy is 
indispensable for states to provide effective inter-communication between civil 
society, defence policy and military forces. Strategy has never been easily defined, 
as its exact meaning and derived notions can be confusing due to their ambiguous 
nature. Before further exploration of the concept, it would thus be useful to clarify 
the term. Baron de Jomini explained comprehensively that strategy is ‘the art of 
directing the great part of the forces of an army onto the most important point of a 
theatre of war, or of a zone of operations.’ (Howard, 1965:34) His contemporary 
Carl von Clausewitz defined strategy as ‘the use of engagement for the object of 
war.’ (Clausewitz, 1976:128)  In the words of the British critic Liddell Hart, 
‘strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the end of 
policy.’ (Hart, 1991:321) General André Beaufré stated that ‘strategy is the art of 
dialectic of force or the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to 
resolve their dispute.’ (Freeman, 1992:282) These different definitions by eminent 
pioneers of Strategic Studies, though reflecting somewhat abstract elements of 
strategy, establish the fact that the aim of strategy is to link military power to 
political purpose. Despite the periodic modification of the application of strategy 
and the occasional redundancy of traditional frameworks in examining modern 
strategic details, the fact that certain political purposes guide military force has 
never changed. Although the fundamental concept of strategy has never undergone 
                                               
7 Clausewitz’s eminent work, entitled Vom Kriege [On War], was translated into English by Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret and published in 1976. 
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a monumental shift, the academic investigation of strategy is currently expanding 
greatly compared with the eras of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.  
Nevertheless, the concept of strategy is still primarily focused upon the field 
of warfare, which also encompasses security, national defence, and military 
discipline. However, Clausewitz, in his work On War, stresses that strategy 
contains a diverse range of features such as ethics, supply, mathematics, geography 
and statistics. (Clausewitz, 1976:183) Michael Howard (1965) also points out that 
strategy should consist of dimensions of society, logistics, operations and 
technology. This not only reflects the extensive themes and approaches of Strategic 
Studies but also indicates that exploration across the various disciplines is 
necessary to comprehend, evaluate and produce strategy. As a result, it is 
undeniable that the diversity of demands, from philosophy to science, theory to 
practice, and civil to military, makes the nature of Strategic Studies exceedingly 
complex. Additionally, there is no clear boundary between different subject areas. 
As Kenneth Booth (1997:96) points out, ‘strategic theory helped to constitute the 
strategic world, and then Strategic Studies helped to explain itself reverentially and 
tautologically.’ From this point of view, in order to form this strategic world, any 
one of the variety of intellectual concepts in human life can be regarded as an 
element of Strategic Studies. The features of diversity and complexity prevalent in 
this field of study will inevitably lead to further research developments.  
Though much relevant research has been conducted in the field, critics still 
claim that existing Strategic Studies remain academically wanting. Philip Green, for 
instance, asserts that aspects of the field, such as deterrence theory, are ‘pseudo-
scientific,’ using apparent scientific methods to give it a ‘spurious air of legitimacy.’ 
(Green, 1966:225) These criticisms stem from doubts concerning not only the 
miscellaneous, seemingly random, features of strategy but also the methods of 
scientific investigation involved in the field. Clausewitz commented that everything 
in strategy is very simple, but this does not mean that everything is easy. 
(Clausewitz, 1976:656) As Baylis et al.( 2007:9) investigate, critics have stated that: 
‘Because strategists focus on the role of military power, they tend to be preoccupied 
by violence and war,’ and that Strategic Studies neglects the ‘more cooperative, 
peaceful aspects of world politics’ as it chiefly regards the world as a ‘conflict-
oriented’ space. That is to say, states traditionally present their  power through the 
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military, and Strategic Studies is accordingly state-centric and obsessed with 
conflict and force.   
However, in the digital age, the progress of information technology (IT) and 
the rapid development of cyberspace into a potential battleground have blurred the 
boundary between military and civil power, as both sectors function on the same 
information network platform. As a result, this platform, cyberspace, potentially 
binds together the civil, government, and military sectors of a state. Therefore, the 
formulation of cooperative and peaceful inner state, inter-state, or even 
transnational strategies among these three sectors will be indispensable when 
attempting to resolve conflicts occurring within the battleground of cyberspace. 
1.2 Understanding warfare 
In addition to interpretations arising from Military and Strategic Studies, it is 
necessary to comprehensively understand the concept of warfare in order to devise 
relevant strategies relating to cyberspace. Historically, changes in human behaviour 
have caused transformations in warfare, and civilisations in different time eras have 
evaluated warfare in myriad ways. In general, warfare indicates armed conflict 
between different political groups. However, many regard warfare as merely a risky 
approach to gain benefits, which may or may not be useful, legal or necessary. The 
consequence of these different approaches to warfare over time is the wide 
extension of definitions of warfare, which may even contain metaphorical meanings. 
For example, the American concept of ‘Cultural War’ can be seen as a metaphorical 
take on warfare. (Steinert, 2003)  
Clausewitz (1976:75) defines war as ‘an act of force to compel our enemy 
to do our will.’ In Clausewitz’s view, a ‘true war’ is still defined as armed combat 
provoked by enmity. Crucially, then, the establishment of the existence of an 
enemy is the key to distinguishing between true warfare and metaphorical or 
agonistic war. As a result, it is essential for doctrines of defence strategy to identify 
the enemy in the battleground of cyberspace. Basically, the enemy is ‘the other’, 
‘the stranger’ and existentially deemed to be something ‘different.’ (Schmitt, 1996)8 
‘The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship 
to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by 
                                               
8 The works of Carl Schmitt, a German political theorist, are widely controversial, but this research refers 
analytically – not normatively – to his definition of enemy, which does not imply support of his general 
political philosophy. 
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virtue of such a relationship. The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense.’ 
(Schmitt, 1996:28)  This perspective posits that hostility towards the public enemy 
is an essential fact within the concept of warfare. Schmitt additionally asserts that 
‘Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a 
political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according 
to friend and enemy.’ (Schmitt, 1996:37) Therefore, in addition to the existence of 
an enemy, recognising a conflict of antithesis may also help discern and classify 
true warfare. This theoretical concept of distinguishing between friend and enemy 
may support this study in establishing guidelines for differentiating between true 
warfare, antagonistic attacks, or merely non-malicious provocations on the cyber 
battlefield. This research will also explore whether the traditional method of relying 
solely on physical military action to counter hostility or make distinctions between 
friend and foe can be applied successfully to cyberspace. 
So how will it be possible to identify true warfare in cyberspace in order to 
justify defensive action? In terms of international law, Article Two of the Charter of 
the United Nations explicitly states, ‘All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.’ (Charter of the United Nations, 2009) Nevertheless, there 
remains a discrepancy between legal warfare and the reality of war. The former is a 
war declared according to justifiable standards of international law; the latter may 
be a war which is not only undeclared, but may also be a conflict of force which is, 
by definition, not true warfare. A well-known example is the Korean War from 
1950 to 1953. The countries involved in this war number as many as fifteen, and 
the casualty figures run into the hundreds of thousands (though the total numbers of 
casualties suffered by all parties involved may never be known). (Singer, 1972:68) 
However, since it was not declared, the Korean War was criticised as a mere 
conflict of armed forces, not legalised warfare. (Singer, 1972)  
Due to the needs of quantitative research, the definition of warfare also 
relies on the statistics of war, such as the number of people involved, the time 
period, the type of actors (state or non-state; military or non-military), and the 
number of casualties. For instance, the Encyclopaedia Britannica defines warfare as 
a large-scale conflict of armed forces – a definition established through the number 
of people engaged in the situation, which must number no fewer than five hundred 
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thousand. Singer (1972) defines an international war as a military conflict occurring 
between national entities, so one of the actors therefore must be a state. He further 
makes explicit that the number of deaths must be no fewer than one thousand. It is 
also very important to identify who initiates the war and who is the victim. For 
example, in the physical world, a state could claim to be a victim when its territory 
is invaded by others.  
The potential battleground of cyberspace does not fit neatly into the 
definitions of conventional warfare. Warfare changes and adapts in pace with the 
progress of technology, which is itself often astonishingly rapid. (Creveld, 
1991:312) Advances in weapon technology increasingly erode the significance of 
sovereign territorial boundaries, so that traditional state borders might not be the 
only factor influencing a state’s defensive strategy against attack or invasion. In 
other words, warfare reflects the development of technology; to a large degree, the 
possible achievements of strategy depend on technological capabilities. For 
instance, when humans entered the age of the atom, the transformation of warfare 
took place much faster than ever before. In modern times, the speed, scale, and 
potential damage of cyber attacks could be much more severe than even nuclear 
weapon attacks, as nuclear ballistic missiles are technically controlled by computer-
based combat systems. (This will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2) As a 
result of such developments, strategic concepts and policies of national defence 
must be adjusted accordingly; otherwise, it will be impossible to meet the rapidly 
changing challenges to state security. 
1.3 The transformation of warfare 
It is possible to identify three main historic transformations of warfare in world 
politics, based upon the three different phases of military evolution: Machiavellian, 
atomic, and digital. The first two phases are examined below according to the views 
of John Herz (1962), the latter by taking into account the work of many scholars. 
1.3.1 The Machiavellian age 
As John Herz (1962:39) suggests, in the Machiavellian system, states were heavily 
influenced by power politics and it was possible for a state to become dominant by 
establishing a relatively higher law and authority. At that time, states protected their 
own interests and territoriality by employing military force or economic approaches 
to threaten one another. Upon the emergence of the modern state system, concepts 
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of ‘international anarchy’ and ‘collective security’ appeared. Modern territorial 
states were protected by a so-called ‘hard shell’, which acts like a cell wall 
protecting a small unit within a larger body. This ‘hard shell’ established features of 
a state such as ‘impenetrability’ and ‘territoriality.’ (Herz, 1962:40) In Herz’s view, 
the features of modern territorial states can be condensed into the terms 
‘independence, sovereignty, non-intervention, equality, and international law’. 
(Herz, 1962:48)  
The ‘impermeability’ of modern territorial states relied upon maintenance of 
sovereignty and control of territory. Throughout history, powerful states broke the 
‘hard shell’ of smaller states, previously considered impermeable, and even wiped 
out their sovereignty. This revealed the limitations of impermeability and peaceful 
co-existence in the world. Therefore, within international relations, nation-states 
adopted a certain standard for actions and behaviour regarding principles of 
territoriality to ensure the continuing functionality of the state. For a state, the 
nature of territoriality included its impermeability, state power, and maintenance of 
sovereignty. (Herz, 1962:60)  
1.3.2 The atomic age 
Following World War II, warfare moved into the atomic age. Due to nuclear 
weapons’ feature of massive-scale destruction, geographical boundaries became 
more and more ambiguous. Some countries, like the United States of America, 
Russia, or China possess a vast geographic territory including continental land and 
ocean. The ocean could previously act as a natural barrier, reminiscent of a moat, to 
protect the state from attacks arising outside the area. However, nuclear weapons 
such as interstate missiles can now be deployed by military forces, resulting in the 
erosion of the boundary between the battlefront and the rear. The previous 
impermeability of the ‘hard shell’ of territoriality thus no longer exists, unless the 
state is able to deploy an effective anti-missile defence system to defeat threats 
from the edge of the ‘shell.’  
States, based on rationality and self-control, are nevertheless forced by the 
devastating nature of nuclear weapons to ensure effective deterrence against atomic 
war. Attacks on enemies with such destructive weapons could also be regarded as a 
threat to the aggressor itself, as all humans inhabit the same fragile planet. (Herz, 
1962:13-14) Though technological discoveries in the new atomic age were 
unpredictable, meaning state military planning and policy making could not always 
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match the pace of development, nuclear developments effectively resulted in the 
reduction in importance of military superiority, as destructive weapons such as 
atomic bombs, even in tiny amounts, boasted results massive enough to destroy 
entire territorial states. Inferior powers were thus able to mount an offence against 
traditionally more powerful adversaries, and states competed with one another to 
develop these destructive weapons, leading to the vicious circle of the international 
arms race. In the atomic age, geographical territory and state sovereignty were no 
longer guarantees of power, since the ‘impermeability’ of the territorial state would 
be easily obliterated by weapons like the atomic bomb. Therefore, as Herz indicates: 
‘Before we undertake to study in more detail how the principal new factors affect 
the structure of statehood and the system of international relations, we must glance 
back at where we have come from: […….] the era of territoriality.’ (Herz, 1962:36) 
The atomic age was an era in limbo between the past and future. 
Despite the dawn of the atomic age, even taking into account rational 
approaches to disarmament and arms control, states have not been able to transcend 
the restraints of pursuing national interests, leading to inevitable security dilemmas. 
Herz proposes the idea of the mutual dilemma to: ‘kill or perish, of attacking first or 
running the risk of being destroyed.’ (Herz, 1962:231-232) The solution to this 
dilemma could be represented metaphorically as two sides choosing to stay in the 
same boat, as any explosion would cause both sides to sink together. Despite this 
collective concern, human nature does not facilitate easy mutual trust, as people 
cannot predict the actual plans of the enemy. Feelings of perceived insecurity may 
well occur even if both sides remain in the same virtual boat. Herz poses the 
question: ‘How could [a nation] trust in the continuance of good intentions in the 
case of collective entities with leaders and policies forever changing?’ (Herz, 
1962:235) The most significant example is of course the Cold War, in which the 
phenomenon of bipolarity was clearly manifest. At this time, the motivation for 
states to maintain national security was generally driven by the dread of being 
attacked, not by the hope of pursuing peace. (Herz, 1962:242) In the face of 
destructive atomic weaponry, states’ national interests suddenly included the need 
to build up offensive power, as well as the simultaneous maintenance of the 
constraints of collective security. In Herz’s (1962) view, ‘holding operations,’ 
which refers to the halting of arms races amongst states, might be the most efficient 
solution for resolving the security dilemma. But once again, would states be willing 
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to implement holding operations without the prior reduction of perceived insecurity 
and fear? 
1.3.3 The digital age 
In the present digital age, also known as the information age9, techniques of IT are 
advancing at an astonishing pace. The concept of warfare is undergoing an 
evolution of strategy due to developments in computer devices, network systems, 
and telecommunication. Historically, information technology is not the first new 
development to cause a revolution in military strategy, as there have been similar 
experiences with audio and video broadcasting. From Machiavelli to the atomic age, 
many new technologies have entered the world and subsequently affected the 
existing doctrine of military strategy and warfare. (Paret, 1986:21-31) In terms of 
scale, however, information technology is the deepest and broadest revolution. It is 
also believed that the most important progression in weapon technology is currently 
in the realm of electronics. (Creveld, 1991:267) In addition, as Barry Buzan and 
Lene Hansen (2010:54) point out, the technology of cyberspace has ‘a military as 
well as a civil side that can be difficult to differentiate.’ Warfare in the digital age is 
consequently very different to warfare in the previous two ages. 
In the digital age, cyberspace has emerged as a potential domain in which to 
wage war. Dimensions of cyber warfare must therefore be applied to military 
strategies in order to protect states’ interests against cyber threats. Threats of cyber 
warfare, which may affect critical infrastructure, are referred to as non-traditional 
threats, as they do not result from conventional violence or traditional weapons. 
The target of a conventional attack is usually a regime or a state. However, the 
actors who produce non-traditional threats and launch attacks do not necessarily 
identify with a regime or a state, and their targets are located all over the world. 
This means that cyber warfare is an issue beyond the previous international scope. 
It is therefore necessary to develop new strategies through cooperation not only 
with states but also with private sectors which own information infrastructures in 
order to construct mechanisms for prevention of cyber threats and attacks. 
                                               
9 The term has been identified as an era when ‘ideas about the computer, the internet, or digital resources 
seem to influence policy decisions more than social concerns about access, privacy or preservation.’ 
(Weller, 2011:18) The term is often applied in relation to the use of mobile electronic devices, digital 
music, high definition television, digital cameras, the internet, cable TV, and other items that have come 
into common use in the past 30 years. (Castells, 2000) 
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One might well ask: would such cooperation match a state’s interests and 
defence policy? What are the constraints on cooperation with private sectors or 
even with other states? Lewis (2003:xii) points out that there are indeed constraints, 
but that: ‘Cooperation in cyber security is crucial because there are no national 
solutions to transnational problems.’ Therefore, unlike traditional state-centric 
conduct in international politics, it is now essential that private sectors take 
precedence in transnational cooperation to protect states’ common interests. 
1.4 Features of warfare in cyberspace and existing doctrines 
Following the definition of warfare and its three transformations, it is possible to 
interpret cyber warfare simply as any kind of warfare waged in cyberspace by both 
state and non-state actors. In 2001, the US Congress released a government report 
regarding research into cyber warfare. This report notes that ‘Cyber warfare can be 
used to describe various aspects of defending and attacking information and 
computer networks in cyberspace.’ Also: ‘It can include offensive information 
operations mounted against an adversary, or even dominating information on the 
battlefield.’ (Hildreth, 2001:16; emphasis mine)10 That is to say, compared with 
warfare conducted on traditional battlefields or even the deployment of atomic 
bombs, the distinction between offence and defence in cyber warfare is even more 
ambiguous. However, this research debates that the ideas of a ‘hard shell’ and 
impermeability in the territorial state system may still remain somewhat applicable 
in cyberspace. This will be examined further in Section 2.2 through an investigation 
into the features of cyberspace.  
Forms of cyber warfare may be categorised into various types, such as 
Information Warfare (IW), Electronic Warfare (EW), and even cyber terrorism, all 
of which are performed against enemies in cyberspace. Information Warfare, also 
known as Information Operations (IO), was proposed by a team of strategists led by 
Andrew Marshall, director of assessments in the US Department of Defense. It can 
be defined as warfare designed to affect the enemy’s networks or information-based 
systems via cyberspace. This information may include text, image, audio, and video. 
(Libicki, 2007) Electronic Warfare, according to existing US doctrine relating to 
information communication, is any military action using electromagnetic 
approaches to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an enemy. Cyber 
                                               
10 This research report may be regarded as one of the earliest official documents that points to the concept 
of cyber warfare. (Hildreth, 2001) 
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terrorism is now popularly discussed in the arena of politics. Research states that it 
is defined by the National Conference of State Legislatures as: ‘The use of 
information technology by terrorist groups and individuals to further their agenda to 
organise and execute attacks against networks, computer systems and 
telecommunications infrastructures or making threats electronically.’ (Gorge, 
2007:9)  
What existing doctrines of military strategy relate to information 
communications in cyberspace? Evidence shows that Chinese military doctrines are 
likely to draw closely from those of the US military, as will be seen in Section 5.4.2. 
Due to this fact, though China is the primary case in this research, it is possible to 
glean relevant information from US military documents, which are more readily 
available. According to the latest documents released by the US Department of 
Defense (DoD), there are two existing doctrines related to information 
communications, which fall under operations of the Joint Forces. The first is the 
doctrine of Information Operations (IO), and the other is the doctrine of Electronic 
Warfare (EW). The scope of the former is to ‘provide doctrine for information 
operations planning, preparation, execution, and assessment in support of joint 
operations,’ and in this doctrine, cyberspace is regarded as ‘the notional 
environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer 
networks.’ (Doctrine of IO, 2006:111) The applications of the latter ‘in support of 
homeland defence are critical to deter, detect, prevent, and defeat external threats 
such as […..] hostile space systems, and cyber threats.’ (Doctrine of EW, 2007:20) 
These two doctrines provide some general guidelines for the purposes of training 
and exercise, but they do not provide guidelines of cyber warfare strategies, tactics 
of protection, detection, and reaction, or coordination between governmental and 
private sectors. 
Cyber warfare has become a problematic yet crucial challenge for states 
worldwide, and more research is necessary. For example, further to the principal 
duty of protection, what strategies for detection and reaction should a state’s 
national defence implement in terms of cyber warfare? Also, as mentioned 
previously, strategy involves inter-communication between civil society, defence 
policy and military forces. It is thus important to consider how states coordinate the 
governmental and private information infrastructure to reinforce defence strategy 
with regards cyber warfare. Eriksson and Giacomello (2006) point out that any new 
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defence strategy brought about by developments in cyber warfare may challenge 
the realist camp in International Relations, which traditionally practices state-
centric and military-oriented Strategic Studies.  
It is important to identify why China’s cyber warfare is a particular cause 
for concern. The Chinese government recently released a White Paper entitled 
China's Peaceful Development, in which it declares to the world that China has 
made the strategic choice of peaceful development. (PRC State Council, 2011) 
However, China’s rise as a world power is not merely economic in nature; there are 
regular developments and advancements in China’s military. As such, despite the 
PRC’s insistence that its rise is peaceful, it has become both essential and valuable 
to study the development of China’s cyber warfare, particularly the incorporation of 
cyber warfare into existing Chinese strategy and doctrine, as well as to understand 
China’s way of thinking regarding cyberspace as a potential battleground. 
1.5 The nature of this research and thesis structure 
This research can be categorised as Strategic Studies even though, as investigated 
previously, the true boundary between the fields of Military Studies/War Studies 
and Strategic Studies is uncertain. Therefore, the consideration of ethical, legal, and 
moral issues occurring in cyberspace is informed by Strategic Studies. Furthermore, 
military-related research may differ from more general studies due to the rare 
opportunities for the testing of conclusions in real-world situations. For general 
studies of any subject, such as Science and Engineering, it is possible to test out 
conclusions and subsequently adapt theoretical recommendations as necessary. 
However, for research associated with military affairs, the circumstances are not the 
same. The factors of war are uncertain and there are no opportunities for theoretical 
alterations in the real world. Any verification of the efficacy of conclusions can 
only appear in a situation of war, which may then make any revision irrelevant, or 
even impossible. The reality is that there are high risks to such research when 
applied to the real world. If it were to fail, it may lose the chance for correction 
once and for all. This research must therefore be as prudent and objective as 
possible, but even so, certain limitations may still exist. For instance, one might 
argue that China’s cyber warfare is still at the conceptual level as there is not a 
substantial body of evidence and groundwork to precisely prove the operation of 
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cyber warfare by a state, even though this warfare has been clearly visible within 
global politics for many years.  
The primary aim of this research is to investigate how the development of 
cyberspace as a potential battleground challenges existing doctrines of military 
strategy through a case study of China’s cyber warfare. The secondary research 
questions will be answered comprehensively through an in-depth, longitudinal 
examination of previous research as well as the study’s own empirical case study. 
The common contentious limitation of a case study is to what extent the results can 
be generalised. The methodological details of the case study in this research will be 
explained further in Chapter Five. 
For the ease of identifying any new findings, this research is divided into 
two main parts: an analytical framework and an empirical section, comprising six 
chapters in total. Firstly, the analytical framework of this research starts from a 
theoretical examination of cyberspace in Chapter Two, which lays out conceptually 
how cyberspace is developing into a potential battle space. Here, the nature of 
cyberspace and its features are presented and examined, and the four principles of 
cyber-territoriality are set out. It is hoped that these principles can form a 
theoretical tool to offer cyber actors a justification for dealing with disputes in 
cyberspace. Chapter Three focuses on modern Chinese strategy. The chapter 
proceeds from an investigation into the basis of strategy and an outline of 
traditional Chinese strategic culture, and leads into a discussion of the three 
transformations of Chinese strategy in the modern era. The constant guiding 
doctrine of People’s War is explained in detail in this chapter, as well as its 
suitability for adaptation to cyber warfare. Chapter Four links the two previous 
chapters into an analytical framework, which will allow explorations of how 
China’s cyber warfare is challenging existing modern strategy and how the doctrine 
of People’s War can be adopted in the digital age. The case study is analysed 
empirically in Chapter Five, to indicate the current developments and deployment 
of China’s cyber warfare. Finally, Chapter Six presents the conclusions of this 
research. 
Through the examinations and analyses of the following chapters in this 
research, it is argued that: 
1.   The features of cyberspace present a strategic value for both state and 
non-state cyber actors. Actors are therefore likely to contend for the 
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dominance of cyberspace, which is accordingly transformed into a 
potential battleground. 
2.   The government of the PRC, a rising power in international politics, 
strategically shapes the integrated platform of cyberspace, consisting of 
various electronic environments, in order to enlarge its strategic value. 
3.   China’s cyber warfare adopts the doctrine of People’s War, a constant 
guideline of Chinese modern strategy that is perfectly suited for the 
potential battleground of cyberspace. 
4.   As a result, internet control and monitoring in China is not only 
employed for political purposes to prevent the Chinese people from 
accessing sensitive political information and to suppress opposition, but 
could also be a method of preparing and conducting cyber warfare by 
creating ‘cyber warriors’ and accumulating important information for 
the Chinese government. Meanwhile, the strategic value of cyberspace 
offers a condition far superior to any other medium for the rapid 
dissemination of information, conducive to the mobilisation of the 
Chinese people into ‘online nationalism’.11 However, online nationalism 
can be employed not only by the Chinese government for external 
political purposes, but also by the Chinese people themselves for 
internal purposes.12 
 
                                               
11 This term refers to nationalism communicated via various electronic media, such as emails, websites, 
instant messages, SMS, and mobile devices, and is employed in China’s cyberspace to mobilise people 
and disseminate information on certain political issues. This will be discussed in Section 4.3.5 and 
Section 5.5.1. 
12 This argument will be developed in Section 5.5.1. 
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Chapter Two: Cyberspace as a Potential Battleground 
 
The term cyberspace13 was first coined by William Gibson in 1982 and came into 
wide use after the publication of his 1984 science-fiction work Neuromancer. 
(Benedikt, 1991:335) The term has been used frequently ever since. It seems, 
however, that what Gibson invented was not merely a single new word, but in fact a 
reference to a whole new world.14 Unlike physical geographical battlegrounds, such 
as those of land, sea and air, cyberspace has become a virtual space in which states 
may present military power in a different manner. A recent US government report 
clearly emphasises the importance of security in cyberspace as a current critical 
issue of national security for all states worldwide.15 Moreover, according to Ian 
West (2010), head of the Technical Centre at the NATO Computer Incident 
Response Capability (NCIRC), even though it has been acknowledged that the 
security of cyberspace is imperative for state security, existing research into 
cyberspace primarily focuses on the technical side, but fails to investigate more 
strategic aspects. It is evident, then, that academic resources still lack supportive 
theoretical concepts relating to cyberspace. In order to devise a comprehensive state 
strategy to secure cyberspace, it is first essential to comprehend both the features of 
cyberspace and how these features shape cyberspace as a potential battleground. 
This in turn is impossible to do without first assessing the nature of cyberspace. As 
Gregory Rattray (2001:79) points out, the nature of cyberspace as a battlefield must 
be understood in order to prevent or handle malicious attacks in this new realm of 
information systems. 
Cyberspace is established upon a universal platform of information 
infrastructure which creates an unprecedented strategic condition by blurring the 
boundaries between the government sector, civil society, and private industry. 
Conducting operations on such an ambiguous battleground requires efficient 
                                               
13 Cyberspace refers to the virtual space in which communication occurs via computer networks. The 
term ‘cyberspace’ is a portmanteau of the words cybernetics and space. It can also be written as two 
separate words: cyber space. 
14 Interestingly, William Gibson’s inspiration for the term ‘cyberspace’ came from watching youngsters 
playing video games. He observed that ‘video game kids and computer users seem to develop a belief 
that there is some kind of actual space behind the screen, some place you cannot see but you know is 
there.’ (Barnes, 1996:195) 
15 According to the US Congressional Research Report, published in 2009, cyber security is regarded as 
‘one of the most urgent national security problems facing the new administration.’ (Rollins and 
Henning, 2009:1) 
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information capabilities to cope with the challenges of the uncertainty of combat. As 
Lance Strate (1999:3) highlights, cyberspace is a ‘collective concept,’ which can be 
defined by the diverse applications of a space associated with computers and 
telecommunications.  
Cyberspace can be defined in a variety of ways through different dimensions 
and angles of analysis. However, though the dimensions of cyberspace may be 
altered, the intrinsic nature of cyberspace has not been changed since its creation. 
Compared with geographical fields, cyberspace is a relatively new realm, which 
represents not only a physical theatre but also a virtual domain with associated 
abstract concepts. Even though a large number of studies about the internet or 
cyberspace have been compiled, it can still be asserted that little is known about 
how cyberspace is structured and how it operates. Therefore, this chapter takes as its 
premise that there is a need to define and illustrate the features of cyberspace 
inherent across the government, civil society, and military sectors, which should 
begin with an examination of the nature of cyberspace to establish how its features 
may shape it into a potential battleground. 
2.1 The nature of cyberspace 
Although the term ‘cyberspace’ originally came from science fiction, for many of us 
cyberspace now forms part of our everyday routine. Since 1990, rather than 
considering cyberspace to be a manifestation of a video game, academia has begun 
to take cyberspace more seriously. This development is certainly closely related to 
the rapid commercialisation of the internet in the 1990s. Michael Benedikt 
(1991:122) defined cyberspace as a structure formed by an amalgamation of 
computer technologies such as both 2D and 3D graphic user interfaces, internet 
technology, virtual reality, multimedia, databases, and hyperlinks. He also ascribes a 
broad domain of physical space to the nature of the computer-sustained virtual 
world.16 
Along with the technical development of computers and the internet, 
cyberspace seems to be becoming more concrete and the concept of cyberspace is 
continuously expanding. Cyberspace is not only a physical body of machines or 
                                               
16 Michel Benedikt also indicates that cyberspace is ‘a new universe; a parallel universe created and 
sustained by the world’s computers and communication lines. A world in which the global traffic of 
knowledge, secrets, measurements, indicators, entertainments, and alt-human agency takes on form: 
sights, sounds, presences never seen on the surface of the earth blossoming in a vast electronic night.’ 
(Benedikt, 1991:1) 
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computer networks which store and exchange data via computer media, but is also a 
conceptualised space. Tim Jordan (1999:26) attests that ‘Cyberspace has been 
conceptualised as a net, matrix, metaverse and, universally, as a place constructed 
out of information.’ Mark Slouka (1996:2-6) claims that the critical impact of 
information techniques infiltrating society has led to the creation of a whole new 
society, namely cyberspace. He also stresses that cyberspace brings about the 
development of the so-called ‘global brain’ which generates a ‘global sense,’ 
referring to a manner of geographically unrestricted thinking.  
In practical terms, according to the US governmental report Cyberspace 
Policy Review 2009, cyberspace is the ‘interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures, and includes internet, telecommunication networks, 
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.’ 
Some experts believe that ‘Cyberspace is a domain characterised by the use of 
electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange data via 
networked systems and associated physical infrastructures’ (Hansen, Williams, 
Mills, and Kanko, 2008). Furthermore, Rattray (2001:17) argues that ‘Cyberspace is 
actually a physical domain resulting from creation of information systems and 
networks that enable electronic interactions to take place.’ 
In terms of communication technology, as Eduard Babulak (2009:142) 
suggests, in the digital generation, cyberspace is ‘collaborative’, allowing us to 
communicate over long distances through sharing ‘emotions’ and ‘non-verbal 
communications’, and will feature what he terms advanced ‘tele-commuting.’ In 
Strate’s theoretical discourse (1999:382-412) three conceptual orders of cyberspace 
are proposed. Within the second order of the three, he identifies three specific 
aspects: physical, conceptual and perceptual. According to these definitions, 
physically, cyberspace is ‘the material base of computers, monitors, disk drives, 
modems, wires, and their users.’ Strate (1999:412) indicates that, conceptually, 
some scholars claim cyberspace is ‘the sense of space generated within the mind as 
we interact with computer technology’, or more perceptually as ‘the sense of space 
generated by the computer-user interface, through one or a combination of our 
senses.’ 
In summary, it can be argued that cyberspace is created upon a physical 
platform and forms a conceptual space via the spatial flows of information 
transmitted. Put another way, cyberspace is a space comprising telecommunication 
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networks which use either electronics or electromagnetic transmission and the 
internet to form a conceptualised space.17 In order to comprehensively understand 
cyberspace, this research will address both its physical and conceptual aspects. 
2.1.1 Physical aspects: cyberspace as a technical field 
In recent years, the dramatic growth of internet usage has triggered an increasing 
interest in cyberspace, not only in personal business but also on a governmental 
level. Both the internet and cyberspace can be seen as social, cultural 
constructions, but it could be argued that there is a key difference between them in 
that the internet has a clear technical definition whilst the term cyberspace has 
become increasingly vague and drained of meaning. Cyberspace is a virtual world 
with different dimensions to the physical world. For example, previous physical 
state borders are largely meaningless and non-existent for internet users in 
cyberspace, which creates a certain strategic value, addressed in detail in Section 
4.1. In addition, it has been stated that: ‘Cyberspace is the total interconnectedness 
of human beings through computers and telecommunication without regard to 
physical geography,’ and also: ‘Cyberspace started to become a de facto synonym 
for the Internet, and later the World Wide Web, during the 1990s.’ (Hildreth, 
2001:1) Accordingly, cyberspace can be considered physically to be a 
combination of the internet and the World Wide Web (WWW); the former being a 
network which transmits information; the latter being storage which presents 
information. Historically, the internet is the extension of a government project in 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)18 in the United States. The 
earliest ideas for a computer network, in 1962, were intended to allow general 
communications among computer users. The ARPA network (known as 
ARPANET) was first used by the US military and government in 1969. After the 
Cold War, the US government released the technique of ARPANET to academia 
and civil society as a whole. In the 1980s, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) became the standard protocol of communication for the 
                                               
17 This argument will be elaborated in the case study of China’s cyber warfare through relevant empirical 
evidence presented in Section 5.4. 
18 ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency), under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) of the United States Department of Defense, was the world’s first operational packet 
switching network, and the predecessor of the contemporary global internet. The packet switching of 
ARPANET was based on designs by Lawrence Roberts. 
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network. By 1994, only 8 countries had joined this network, but in 200919 the 
internet could be accessed in 195 countries. The internet has become the 
overwhelming backbone to global society, and is now a complex spatial system 
without obvious boundaries. The following statement reflects the definition of the 
term internet since 1995 according to the US Federal Networking Council (FNC): 
Internet refers to the global information system that: 
1)    is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based 
on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons; 
2)    is able to support communications using the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent 
extensions/follows-ons, and/or other IP compatible protocols; and 
3)    provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high 
level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure 
described herein.  
It can be additionally noted that the function of TCP is to correctly 
disassemble and reassemble data through small packages on the internet from the 
side of delivery to the side of reception, and the function of IP is to arrange and 
lead flows of information to their exact destination through the networks’ physical 
layers.20 
In 1989, the British scientist Tim Berners-Lee developed the technique of 
the hyperlink. In a manner reminiscent of the complexity of a spider’s web, this 
technique combines a diversity of formats such as text, image, audio and video 
into a document which can be requested and submitted by different functional 
                                               
19 World internet usage in 2009 is illustrated below: 
Geographical regions Internet users (million) % of population 
World total 1,734.0 25.6 % 
Asia 738.3 19.4 % 
Europe 418.0 52.0 % 
North America 252.9 74.2 % 
Latin America 179.0 30.5 % 
Africa 67.4 6.8 % 
Middle East 57.4 28.3 % 
Oceania/Australia 21.0 60.4 % 
This table is generated based on online information available from 
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>  
20 The ‘networks’ physical layers’ refers to the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model, which defines 
a networking framework for implementing protocols in seven layers. Control is passed from one layer 
to the next, starting at the application layer in one station, and proceeding to the bottom layer, over the 
channel to the next station and back up the hierarchy. The seven layers, from top to bottom, are the 
Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data Link, and Physical Layers. TCP/IP is the 
radical protocol for the Transport and Network Layers. (Edwards, 2009:346-349) 
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servers on the internet via the location of its web address. This crucial technique 
quickly became the foundation of the global information infrastructure. Since 
1994, many facilities and techniques have been invented by private sectors, and 
accordingly governmental control faded away from this realm. (Castells, 
2000:394-402) Currently, the relevant official standards and technical 
specifications governing the operation of the World Wide Web and the internet 
are organised by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which is a non-
governmental organisation. Given that W3C may be able to function without any 
state influence, a further question is raised regarding the manner in which a state 
may coordinate its governmental and private information infrastructures to exploit 
necessary strategy and reinforce security ability in the potential battleground of 
cyberspace. 
As Lennard Kruger (2005:7) points out in his research report for the US 
Congress, ‘To navigate the internet requires using addresses (and the 
corresponding names) that identify the location of individual computers.’ 
Cyberspace, however, is a very interesting creation. Unlike the physical world, no 
one can certify how big cyberspace is, as its scale is dependent on different 
measurements, such as, for example, IP addresses, nodes, or the amount of 
information online. In cyberspace, each place is coded by one unique IP address. 
No matter whether there are computers connected to it or not, these so-called 
niches still exist per se. The terminal computers which are connected to an IP 
address are referred to in technical terminology as ‘hosts’, which can be clients or 
servers. In addition to this, there are two other kinds of niche. Those already 
assigned IP addresses but not connected to a terminal computer, such as those in 
an empty classroom on campus, are known as niches without cyberspace. Those 
which have not been assigned IP addresses are referred to as niches without 
geographical place. An IP address consists of four sets of numbers ranging from 0 
to 255, each number set separated by a full-stop. Every computer on the internet 
has a unique IP address. However, there is also a textual address for locating a 
computer on the internet; the Domain Name, which corresponds to the numerical 
IP address. Even though IP addresses, such as 128.240.229.7 for example, provide 
a convenient and compact representation to specify a source and destination, it can 
be presumed that users still prefer to assign each computer a pronounceable and 
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memorable name, such as proxy.ncl.ac.uk21 for example, which is the equivalent 
domain name. The internet Domain Name System (DNS) is a set of databases 
containing IP addresses and their corresponding domain names. Since each 
domain name is mapped to a particular numerical address, the DNS performs the 
transformation back and forth between domain names and IP address numbers. 
This is located in the uppermost layer, the Application Layer, in the networks’ 
physical layers.  
It is important to note that without IP addresses, the internet would simply 
not match its definition. However, it could function perfectly well without the use 
of the DNS. The existence of the Domain Name System is not because computers 
need it for any technical reason, but rather that the users – people – prefer such a 
format. Therefore, compared to the IP address system, the Domain Name System 
carries a characteristic of sociality, making it more significant for analysis. 
Technical development makes up only a small part of the whole history of the 
Domain Name System; instead, the primary focus, especially since 1990, has been 
on how to manage the system and who should have the authority to police its 
operation. Thus cyberspace cannot merely be analysed on a technical level, but 
must also be considered socially and politically.  
Cyberspace is a space physically constructed by the Domain Name System, 
which combines the assigned IP addresses, servers, routers, and cables into a 
system which links up computers to form a critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is 
necessary to know how IP addresses and the DNS operate and how this affects 
cyberspace as a battlefield. As will be seen, this research argues that the domain 
identified by IP addresses can form a virtual territory, and a line connected by 
nodes of IP addresses can draw a boundary acting as a virtual border. This virtual 
border can be a real functional border dividing different ‘territories’ in cyberspace, 
so that the users inside a ‘territory’ cannot cross the functional border to go 
outside of this cyber-territory, and vice versa.22 That is to say, computers and their 
                                               
21 In this domain name, ‘uk’ means the country of the United Kingdom; ‘ac’ means this address is related 
to academia (some countries use ‘edu’ instead); and ‘ncl’ is an abbreviation for Newcastle University. 
Using the alphabet to represent numbers is not a new idea. Before the Domain Name System, people 
had already used the alphabet to individualise telephone numbers, such as ‘1-800-THECARD.’ Its 
history can be traced back to the 1920s when the US telephone system relied on local-exchange 
telephone numbers, though the alphabet was then used in a slightly different context. 
22 An IP address can be allocated to a geographical location via relevant information such as longitude 
and latitude. Therefore, a network domain, which might be a virtual cyber-territory, can in fact be 
related to geographical territory. 
-28- 
 
users could be protected from threats arising outside their cyber-territory; indeed, 
people inside one cyberspace territory may even be prohibited from connecting to 
outside networks.23 
As described above, the Domain Name System relies upon the system of 
IP addresses. Before the use of TCP/IP, which began in 1983, every computer had 
its own name or nickname, and every host on the net had its own name-address 
table. As Cricket Liu and Paul Albitz (2006:11-32) explain, foreseeing that not 
every host would be able to include all internet hosts in its name-address table in 
the future, in RFC 79924 D. L. Mills (1981) proposed a hierarchical name-space 
partitioning, based on the geographic locality of hosts, which would solve this 
issue and also geographically re-territorialise cyberspace. He invented a 
topological map covering the space of all internet addresses with a set of so-called 
‘name domains.’ Later, in RFC 81925, Zaw-Sing Su and Jon Postel (1982) 
proposed that internet names should form a tree-structured administrative 
dependent, rather than a strictly topological hierarchy depending on geographic 
locations. In addition, they proposed to establish a Name Service, which would be 
a network service providing name-to-address translation, and a naming authority 
which could assign simple names and ensure proper distinction between these 
names. Furthermore, in RFC 882 and 883, Paul Mockapetris (1983) suggested 
further technical developments in the construction of cyberspace to resolve three 
crucial problems in the network system. Firstly, as the application of the network 
grew, the number of resources, the number of locations for resources, and the 
diversity of such an environment caused formidable problems. Secondly, the 
ARPANET illustrated these size-related problems. ARPA internet was a large 
system and was likely to grow much larger. The need to map between host names 
and ARPA internet’s addresses was beginning to pressure the existing 
mechanisms. The final and most serious problem was related to computer mail. 
                                               
23 For instance, as Jens Damm and Simona Thomas (2009, 120-121) point out, the Chinese government 
can technically prohibit the internet users inside the network domain (cyber-territory) of Mainland 
China from surfing some outside websites through the use of a censorship mechanism. 
24 RFC is the abbreviation of Request for Comment. RFC is a series of documents published by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) describing methods, behaviours, research, or innovations 
applicable to the working of the internet and internet-connected systems. These documents discuss 
many aspects of computing and computer communication focusing upon networking protocols, 
procedures, programmes, and concepts. Even though RFC is offered as suggestions rather than 
requirements, the IETF adopts some of the proposals published in RFCs as internet standards. (Bradner, 
1996) 
25 RFC 819 is noted as a key development in the structure of computer addressing for the internet. 
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When mail system technicians realised the impossibility of centralising mailbox 
names, they created an increasingly large and irregular set of methods for 
identifying the location of a mailbox. Some of these methods involved the use of 
routes and forwarding hosts as part of the mail destination address, forcing the 
mail user to comprehend multiple address formats, the capabilities of various 
forwarders, and ad hoc tricks for passing address specifications through 
intermediaries. In order to solve these problems, RFC 882 pinpointed the 
conceptual framework of the domain system. RFC 883 discussed further the 
implementation of domain name servers and specified the format of 
transactions.26 Both of them outlined the indispensable principles associated with 
domain names and their use for further network designs. 
Another significant document is Domain Requirements RFC 920. In RFC 
920, J. Postel and J. Reynolds (1984) suggest an initial top-level domain name. 
Rather than a suggestion, Postel and Reynolds (1984) indicate that ‘this memo is a 
policy statement on the requirements of establishing a new domain in the ARPA-
Internet and DARPA research community.’ The top-level domain name was 
divided into three: ‘Temporary,’ ‘Categories,’ and ‘Countries’ as below: 
Temporary: 
ARPA = current ARPA-Internet hosts. 
Categories: 
GOV = Government; any government-related domains meeting the second level 
requirements. 
EDU = Education; any education-related domains meeting the second level 
requirements. 
                                               
26 The solution has three major components: (Mockapetris, 1983) 
1. The Domain Name Space, which is a specification for a tree structured name space. Conceptually, 
each node and leaf of the domain name space tree represents a set of information. Query operations 
are attempts to extract specific types of information from a particular set. A query names the 
domain name of interest and describes the type of resource information that is desired. 
2. Name Servers are server programs which hold information about the domain tree’s structure and 
sets of information. A name server may cache structure or information about any part of the 
domain name tree, but in general a particular name server has complete information about a subset 
of the domain space, and can point to other name servers that can be used to lead to information 
from any part of the domain tree. The parts of the domain tree for which name servers have 
completed information are called ‘zones;’ a name server is an ‘authority’ for these parts of the 
name space. 
3. Resolvers are programs that extract information from name servers in response to user requests. 
Resolvers must be able to access at least one name server and use that name server’s information to 
answer a query directly, or pursue the query using referrals to other name servers. 
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COM = Commercial; any commercial-related domains meeting the second level 
requirements. 
MIL = Military; any military-related domains meeting the second level 
requirements. 
ORG = Organisation; any organisation-related domains meeting the second level 
requirements. 
Countries: 
A two letter code identifying a country according to the ISO 3166 Standard of 
‘Codes for the Representation of Name of Countries.’   
These divisions are very important. According to RFC 920’s specifications, 
domain names are available from network service providers, and are organised in 
accordance with the different categories. The change, using the name of categories 
defined by different aggregations of similar organisations and ‘free of undesirable 
semantics,’ (Postel and Reynolds, 1984) is a critical point, which made 
cyberspace a social territoriality open to the development of the DNS.27 In 
addition, for people, a domain name, such as www.ncl.ac.uk, reads from left to 
right, and also from most specific to least specific. The first field ‘www’ is the 
name of the host computer. The next field, here ‘ncl’ is the third level domain 
name. The third field ‘ac’ is the Second Level Domain (SLD) name. The very last 
field ‘uk’ is the Top Level Domain (TLD) name, which in this case is also a 
country code domain name. However, for computers operating under the Domain 
Name System, it is interpreted from right to left and from least specific to most 
specific. Thus the country code will be identified first and so on.  
There are five main components in the Domain Name System. They are: 
local user’s computers, local Internet Service Provider (ISP) Name Servers, Root 
Name Servers, Top Level Domain Name Servers, and Second Level Domain 
Name Servers. The whole process can be schematised as follows: (Bayne, 
2008:631) 
 
                                               
27 As Postel and Reynolds (1984) define: ‘Domains are administrative entities. The purpose and expected 
use of domains is to divide the name management required of a central administration and assign it to 
sub-administrations.  There are no geographical, topological, or technological constraints on a domain. 
The hosts in a domain need not have common hardware or software, nor even common protocols. Most 
of the requirements and limitations on domains are designed to ensure responsible administration.’ 
-31- 
 
Local computer → Local ISP Names Server → Root Name Server → 
Local ISP Names Server → TLD Name Server → Local ISP Name Server → 
SLD Name Server → Local ISP Name Server → Local computer → Destined 
Host (www.ncl.ac.uk) 
In addition, with the help of Cache28, after the query of the destined Host 
(www.ncl.ac.uk), the local ISP Name Server will, within a certain period of time, 
help any local ISP Name Server to quickly resolve any similar queries from other 
computers within the same local ISP. However, Cache is a double-edged sword, 
since this benefit also provides space for manipulation by computer viruses. 
On the other hand, as mentioned previously, the Domain Name System 
cannot be seen as a purely technical field. The processing time of the DNS is not 
faster than that of using an IP address. Under the structure of the DNS, in order to 
connect to a host which is located in a different Top Level Domain, it is necessary 
for the system to make queries four times and inter-communicate eight times 
before the local computer can finally connect to the remotely located destined 
Host, unless this information already exists in the Cache. Certainly, not every 
connection needs to undergo such a complicated process. Connecting to a destined 
Host in the same TLD is much simpler. However, in other cases, for example, if 
connecting to a remote destined Host through the Third Level Domain as well as a 
different TLD, there could be even more complicated inter-communications. 
Though the entire process normally take just a few seconds, if there were no 
Domain Name System and each computer were connected to other machines only 
through the use of IP addresses these ‘few seconds,’ could be saved, not to 
mention the social costs for maintaining the stability of Name Servers. 
Performance and efficiency do not seem to have been the first priority here.   
There are further networks in cyberspace other than the internet: according 
to the definition of cyberspace, there are three more networks, which are the 
telecommunication, electronic and electromagnetic networks. Due to the latest 
developments in technology, these communication infrastructures are also 
constructed upon the TCP/IP system, regardless of whether they are space-based, 
                                               
28 Cache is a hardware component that improves computer performance by transparently storing data so 
that future requests for that data can be retrieved faster. The data that is stored within a cache might be 
values that have been computed earlier or duplicates of original values that are stored elsewhere. 
However, this means that a client who is requesting data from a system is not aware that the cache 
exists, and also does not know exactly where the provided data comes from. 
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airborne, or wireless networks. Thus different weapons systems, such as ballistic 
missiles on land, warships in the sea, and aircraft in the air, can be integrated into 
this infrastructure in order to control and command them with first-hand 
information. According to the US Global Information Grid Architectural Vision29, 
for instance, the newest version of the Global Information Grid (GIG) will 
integrate the telecommunication, electronic and electromagnetic networks in 
accordance with the primary interface, standards and guidelines of networks such 
as TCP/IP, Physical Communication Links, Access Protocols and Routing 
Protocols. Through cooperating with satellites, this GIG architecture can provide 
advanced communication, control, and command through different formats, such 
as voice, metadata, imaging, and data exchange, in order to deploy further 
operational actions. On the one hand, this is undoubtedly a military advantage as 
it can reinforce military capability in the future battlefield by integrating different 
weapon systems into one information system. On the other hand, it could also 
become a vulnerable area and an attractive attack target for adversaries. In 
addition, this military system shares the same information and telecommunication 
infrastructure with civil society in cyberspace. 
For the security of cyberspace, as Postel and Reynolds (1984) point out, 
‘An individual must be identified who has authority for the administration of the 
names within the domain, and who seriously takes on the responsibility for the 
behaviour of the hosts in the domain, plus their interactions with hosts outside the 
domain.’ IP addresses in cyberspace are allocated by the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA), which is the body responsible for coordinating some 
of the key elements that keep the internet running smoothly. (Edwards, 2009:353) 
While cyberspace has become a potential battleground in terms of international 
politics, there are some private organisations, such as W3C IANA, and ICANN30, 
                                               
29 ‘Global Information Grid Architectural Vision’ describes the aims – and, thereby, provides the 
direction – for the development of the Global Information Grid (GIG) capabilities that will support the 
strategy of the US Department of Defense for their missions, operations, and functions in future cyber 
warfare. (Global Information Grid Architectural Vision, 2007) 
30 ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, was established as a Californian 
not-for-profit public benefit corporation in 1998. Its creation was invoked by the US Department of 
Commerce during a public proceeding in 1997–1998 that invited international participation. ICANN 
took over the centralised coordination of the internet’s domain name and address assignments. (Mueller, 
Mathiason, and Klein, 2007:237-254) In addition, this institution also cooperates with private sectors 
for technical support. 
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serving as transnational political actors31 to police the global operation of 
cyberspace and secure its functions.  However, as long as the internet functions as 
an information network inextricably linked by technical complexities, the 
conditions for actors to pose a threat will remain. In addition, the feature of 
anonymity in cyberspace still remains even though the TCP/IP is traceable to a 
geographical location. This will be discussed in greater detail with regard to 
China’s case in Chapter Five.   
2.1.2 Conceptual aspects: cyberspace as a social field  
Instead of relying on a simple dichotomy of the physical and conceptual aspects 
of cyberspace, many scholars have begun to focus on the relationship and 
interaction between cyberspace and real society. For instance, as Castells (1996) 
points out, the network is not only an organisational principle of cyberspace, but 
also the principle of organisation overall, even though this principle is still unable 
to integrate the world in which we live as a whole. He further argues that what we 
are trying to understand is not the culture of virtual reality but the culture of real 
virtuality in the post-modern world. David Hakken (2003:11) uses the new term 
‘cyborgs@cyberspace’ to link the abstract concept of cyberspace with real society 
by its material basis or carriers, namely cyborgs.32 Hakken also points out that the 
wide belief that there is a computer revolution in our world is just a myth, arguing 
that the role of advanced information technology in societal formation is better 
understood symbolically or ideologically than in technological terms. In terms of 
human history, information in cyberspace which can be transformed into 
knowledge for humans is more important than the computer technology of 
cyberspace. (Hakken, 2003:141-142) For example, Deleuze (1990) noticed that 
after the Second World War, a new kind of power emerged and rapidly began 
dominating our societies; this new power is based on information technology and 
computers. He terms this new form of society ‘control society’ that ‘no longer 
                                               
31 States and governments in the world have equality of statehood by law. However, due to the lack of 
political similarity between countries, transnational actors must exist and must now increase their 
authority in order to deal with disputes between states. In addition to state and non-state actors, it could 
be suggested that private groups, companies, and national minorities in each country should engage 
with transnational actors. (Baylis and Smith, 2005:427-430)  
32 Cyborg is a portmanteau of cybernetic and organism. The term was coined in 1960 when Manfred 
Clynes and Nathan Kline used it in an article about the advantages of self-regulating human-machine 
systems in outer space. However, David Hakken uses the idea of ‘cyborgs@cyberspace’ (cyborgs at 
cyberspace) to refer to the fact that a computer-based information infrastructure with named automated 
information technologies can reproduce information in cyberspace into knowledge for people. (Hakken, 
2003:141)  
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operates by confining people but through continuous control and instant 
communication.’ (Deleuze, 1990:174) As referenced by Manuel Castells 
(2000:15-18), Michel Foucault points out that power and social forces are 
incorporated obscurely into practices or structures which everyone takes for 
granted. It can be argued that it is the same for cyberspace. As Lawrence Lessig 
(1996) claims in his Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, cyberspace is 
governed by three sorts of constraints. Just as in the ordinary physical world, 
cyberspace is constrained by law, social norms, and rules. However, there is 
another set of peculiar constraints in cyberspace: rules and laws which are 
embedded into the software itself. ‘Rules, for example, that require a password 
upon entry into a system; or that require a filename no longer than thirty 
characters; or that require a verified returned address on a particular e-mail 
message; or that allow the places one’s web browser has visited to be reported to 
another web browser.’ (Lessig, 1996:869-910) These constraints are not 
constraints that one can choose to follow or ignore, regardless of whether or not 
they are welcome. As Lessig (1996:32) further indicates, ‘While regulation in real 
space is primarily regulation that relies upon cooperation of the individuals who 
live under the regulation, regulation in cyberspace can be something different. The 
code in cyberspace – the software – can enforce its control directly.’ Indeed, a 
cooperative mechanism behind the software itself is necessary in order to secure 
cyberspace, an arena in which civil society, the government, and the military are 
all mixed together. This cooperative mechanism not only involves extensive 
negotiations between government and private sectors; the security of cyberspace 
also rests on ‘active cyber citizenship as a resilient model that can manage this 
new and challenging security environment.’ (Harknett and Stever, 2009) Internet 
users thus play a crucial role in cyberspace. 
The first level of Strate’s (1999:382-412) classification of the three 
levels/orders of cyberspace, mentioned previously, is concerned with the ontology 
of cyberspace composed of ‘paraspace’ or ‘nonspace’ and ‘spacetime.’ While 
paraspace, or nonspace, refers to a fictional, imaginary, or unrealised space – a 
seemingly paradoxical space that is a fake space or a simulation – cyberspace can 
be seen instead via different dimensions, which involve relationships between 
humans and computers, between humans via computers, and between computers 
themselves. However, instead of asking what cyberspace is, a more profound 
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thing is to understand what kind of environment cyberspace produces; in what 
precise environment something may exist or occur. Interestingly, both the ‘virtual’ 
and the ‘real’ in cyberspace can actually be defined as either real or virtual, but 
the true main issue should be how they connect and interact with one another, as 
well as under which precise conditions cyberspace is considered to be real, and 
under which conditions virtual. Cyberspace is not totally independent from the 
world in which we live. Perhaps, cyberspace is a different environment from our 
‘real’ society, but the events in cyberspace are still, in fact, events occurring in the 
real world. As Bayne (2008:629) stresses, ‘cyberspace is the operating 
environment,’ and ‘through exchange of information, goods, and services, this 
environment is simultaneously physical (tangible and real) and present in 
geospace.’ 
Castells (2000) further proposes the concept of ‘a space of flows’ to 
replace the former notion of ‘a space of place’; conceptually, cyberspace is 
formed by spatial flows of information. Castells (2000) also claims that society is 
constructed from certain flows, including flows of information and flows of 
technology which form a ‘network society.’ He (2000:442-445) defines the space 
of flows as having three different layers: ‘The first layer, the first material support 
of the space of flows, is actually constituted by a circuit of electronic exchanges 
(micro-electronics-based devices, telecommunications, computer processing, 
broadcasting system, and high speed transportation – also based on information 
technologies),’ and the second layer is a ‘space of flows constituted by its nodes 
and hubs.’33 These nodes and hubs coordinate all the local places integrated into 
the network. Consequently, the concept of cyberspace can also be represented in 
layers of spaces of flows. Information flows through cyberspace, making use of 
the hardware network to form a vital infrastructure of flows based in the physical 
world. Finally, the third layer of ‘the space of flows refers to the spatial 
organisation of the dominant, managerial elites.’ Castells (2000:446) believes that 
‘elites are cosmopolitan, people are local.’ The space of power and wealth is thus 
reflected all over the world, but people’s life and experience are rooted deeply in 
                                               
33 ‘The space of flows is not placeless, although its structural logic is. It is based on an electronic network, 
but this network links up specific places, with well-defined social, cultural, physical, and functional 
characteristics.’ (Castells, 2000:443) As Castells (2000) also indicates, some places are information 
exchangers, i.e. communication hubs which mutually coordinate. Some places are the nodes of network 
society which link up the locality with the whole network. 
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Figure-1 (OPTE, 2005) 
local places through culture and history. However, due to the ‘nodes and hubs’ 
linking local people, the populace in cyberspace has become a crucial power 
which can generate, distribute, and receive information in cyberspace’s network 
society. In addition, people can be mobilised in this space to produce an influence 
based on a political purpose, as will be discussed in further detail in later chapters. 
As a result of this network society, a virtual world can be formulated 
which represents the number of internet hosts34 distributed worldwide. This 
virtual world may present a wholly different terrain to the geographical one, since 
the number of internet hosts is not necessarily in equal proportion to the size of 
the territories of their respective states, nor the extent of the state’s power. It may 
thus be assumed that information will flow from regions with a high density of 
information to regions with a low density, representing a flow of information as a 
moving power based on constant requests for information, made due to the 
intrinsic curious nature of human beings. Timothy Luke (1997:9) claims that the 
human will express ‘its bit forms on cyberspace/infoscape/mediascape of 
telemetricality,’ as a result of natural human nature; humans imprint their personal 
nature onto the virtual flows of cyberspace through demand for this digital 
information. Alongside this flow of information from state to state via cyberspace, 
invisible impacts and intrusion may also be encountered since this flow can 
possibly form a type of power.35 Information flows are processed and distributed 
by internet hosts. According to the ranking of the 
number of internet hosts per state, it can be 
concluded that a small state is not necessarily equal 
to a small power in cyberspace if information can 
represent power. In addition, recent research 
identifies a partial map of the internet (Figure-1, 
OPTE 2005) based on data from 2005 by the OPTE 
Project. In this graph, each line is drawn between two nodes which represent two 
IP addresses. This graph can visually portray the potential virtual battlefield of 
                                               
34 The ranking of the number of internet hosts (an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) computer Server is a 
host) per state has been generated as statistics. In the 2009 rankings, for example, in terms of 
geographic territory, Taiwan is very small at 138th in the world; however, its internet hosts ranking is 
15th in the world. If information can be harnessed into power in cyber-territory, this reinforces the 
strategic value for states of asymmetry in cyberspace. 
35 This power means a state is potentially able to influence the ideology of another state’s people via 
disseminated information , such as propaganda. 
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cyberspace. Furthermore, Figure-1 is a scale-free graph,36 and recent research 
points out that ‘a focused attack on a scale-free network is the most productive.’ 
This scale-free graph may therefore show where the points of vulnerability in 
cyberspace might lie. (Repperger, Haas, McDonald, and Ewing, 2008) Meanwhile, 
in order to understand the changing of the ‘world political map’, O'Tuathail 
(1999) investigated the impact of instant communication and information flows. 
His research has contested various discourses associated with the transcendence of 
territory during the growth of cyberspace due to the features discussed in the next 
section. It is therefore worth investigating how relevant theories of international 
relations contend that cyberspace will be a new arena where states compete to 
expand their power, replacing geographical battlegrounds. 
2.2 The features of cyberspace as a potential battleground 
The actors in the potential battleground of cyberspace are not necessarily only states, 
but may also be non-state actors such as non-government organisations and even 
private companies. Unlike the modern state system, in which a war is usually waged 
by a state, it is possible that an attack in cyberspace may be conducted by just one 
individual. If traditionally a war could be identified based on whether a state’s 
territoriality is intruded, the same proposition can be reflected onto cyberspace. That 
is to say, war could be defined based on encroachment onto virtual territory in 
cyberspace. In order to examine how this ‘cyber-territory’ can be invaded, it is 
indispensable to establish some principles of cyber-territoriality for further 
investigation. 
The digital age is manifested not only in civilian circumstances, but also on 
the military field. Recent research indicates that ‘the sophisticated information 
technologies on which the best armed forces, and all modern societies, now rely 
pose an attractive target to potential adversaries.’ (Moran, 2010:139) It is 
consequently highly likely that cyberspace is developing into a potential 
battleground in the digital age. The internet, rapidly expanding in scope, constitutes 
a new theatre for belligerent politics, further transforming cyberspace from a 
societal and political platform into a potential battleground. This will affect national 
state security as traditional borders cannot protect a state’s territory from cyber 
                                               
36 A scale-free graph such as Figure-1 means that a power-law relationship would exist for the same plot. 
As new links are added, the most highly connected nodes are more likely to gain additional links, 
which somewhat reflects the concept of the ‘rich getting richer.’ 
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threats, and government bodies no longer dominate communication systems and 
relevant techniques in cyberspace. (Schwartz, 2001) So why exactly is cyberspace 
considered a potential battleground? And what differences are there with traditional 
battlegrounds in terms of warfare? To begin with, it is contestable whether military 
strategy based on geographical battlegrounds can fit the battleground of cyberspace. 
After the invention of the internet and the World Wide Web, states began to build up 
their information infrastructure for both domestic and international affairs. States 
have started to compete with one another for dominance in this potential 
battleground, and it can be expected that a parallel virtual landscape will be drawn 
in cyberspace which will represent state territoriality differently to that of the 
physical world. Traditional thinking about the existing doctrine of military strategy 
will consequently be challenged based on this new proposition. In addition, state 
policy regarding warfare and security will need to be re-formulated, to respond to 
new military strategies which may well be generated to match this new battleground. 
Therefore, states need to seek a comprehensive strategy to formulate the best 
approach to secure cyberspace, which may be identified through investigation of 
several of its key features. 
2.2.1 The permeability of cyberspace 
In the territorial state system, in addition to natural barriers, fortification and 
fortresses constituted important elements in the border surrounding a state’s 
territory. Correspondingly, servers and routers also play the same role as 
functional borders in cyberspace to prevent malicious attack from outside. 
Geographical barriers, borders and fortification, acting as a hard shell, would 
formerly have represented the impermeability of the state. However, this cannot be 
said for the equivalent functional borders in cyberspace due to the key feature of 
infiltration. Conceptually, cyberspace is formed by spatial flows of information 
reminiscent of liquid, resulting in the key feature of infiltration. Through an 
examination of the characteristics of cyberspace, Cahill (2003:101) concludes that 
all systems allowed input are vulnerable since theoretically any computer network 
can be infiltrated and attacked; geographical distance from the target is almost 
irrelevant. Consequently, any computer system allowing input can be a target of 
attack for cyber infiltration, and the feature of infiltration in cyberspace will 
therefore challenge defensive approaches at a strategic level.  
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A cyber attack is essentially the use of computer viruses to intrude upon 
the computer systems of an adversary target. Vice versa, the defensive approach is 
to prevent such viral infections from entering the computer systems which support 
state information infrastructure. Cyber attacks are conducted based on certain 
dimensions: one such dimension is information infrastructures such as TCP/IP and 
network structures; the other is techniques used in cyberspace such as firewalls 
and encryption/decryption. In addition, an attack may include various purposes of 
offence, defence, and even deterrence. It is thus essential to investigate features 
such as permeability and impermeability, which would influence functional 
borders in the battleground of cyberspace. Regardless of whether or not an 
approach is offensive or defensive, all approaches pertain to certain operational 
actions associated with tactical level methods and techniques, such as tracing a 
hacker, decrypting a code, reinforcing a firewall against attacks, even conducting 
counter-attacks, and so on and so forth. However, in addition to existing doctrines 
at a tactical level, relevant guidelines at a strategic level are indispensable to tackle 
the issue of cyberspace as a battleground. Traditional warfare carries risks because 
all humans inhabit the same planet, and any attack across a state’s borders may 
endanger them. In terms of cyber warfare, humans do not just exist alongside one 
another inside state borders, but are actually all making use of the same 
cyberspace which may potentially become a battleground. Cyberspace combines 
many different computer networks which are all inter-connected. These computer 
systems are susceptible to infection from computer viruses whenever the systems 
are not restricted to read-only. Once a computer virus has been created it will exist 
in cyberspace to automatically infect computer systems from one state to another 
state without purpose or discrimination, since these different states share the same 
cyberspace as the transmitting medium. It may thus mirror the way some 
biological viruses can transmit mutually between humans and animals as both 
biological bodies are susceptible to infection. 
2.2.2 Three sectors sharing cyberspace: civil society, government and military 
Historically, civil networks are derived from ARPANET, which was a research 
network for military purposes. Cyberspace, which technically comprises transport 
and physical layers and was also derived from ARPANET, potentially binds 
together the military, government and societal sectors, as they are all constructed 
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on the same virtual information platform. This has caused the boundary between 
the battlefront and the rear to disappear. In addition, though attacks in cyberspace 
are waged by actors in a state’s territory, these actors are not necessarily acting for 
that particular regime or state. In sum, cyberspace manifests itself not only in the 
military field but also in civilian circumstances, as both share the same 
information platform. This feature of cyberspace means that as a battlefield, it falls 
into the category of irregular warfare, as Freedman (2008) stresses in his research. 
He also points out that the battlefield is transformed from one which is separated 
from civil society to one which is combined with civil society. (Freedman, 
2008:597) Furthermore, as Thomas Cahill (2003:100) reports, Chinese senior 
Colonel Wang clearly stated that conducting an attack against a state’s civilian 
network, including, for example, financial transactions, telecommunications, 
media networks, and traffic dispatching systems, could entirely paralyse the 
enemy, causing social panic which can lead to political disaster. Thus, in terms of 
cyber attacks, the division between the battlefront and the rear is no longer clear; 
as such, existing military doctrines based on this division must be challenged.  
Though the design of information infrastructure may vary across states, the 
so-called Open System Interconnection (OSI) model is a world-wide standard 
which defines a networking framework for implementing protocols in seven layers, 
which are, from top to bottom, the Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, 
Network, Data Link, and Physical Layers. In addition, TCP/IP is the radical 
protocol for the Transport and Network Layers of the OSI in all sectors. Therefore, 
for instance, both the US Network-Centric Warfare37 and Global Information Grid, 
which are the most advanced information architecture for military operations in 
the world, operate on a so-called ‘Convergence Layer,’ which is established upon 
the same Transport Layer and Network Layer shared by civil infrastructure, in 
order to connect various networks and telecommunications. (Department of 
Defense, 2007) In this way, dominant capability in this battlefield can be increased 
whilst the ability of securing the civil information infrastructure can be reinforced. 
The relations between civil society, government, and military are shown in Figure-
2 below. 
                                               
37 Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), though originally coined by the US military, is now also a new 
concept in European military affairs.  
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    Figure-2: Researcher’s own 
In this figure, the bold lines between the different areas can be assumed to 
be servers, such as proxy servers and web servers with firewall or 
encryption/decryption, acting as an inspection mechanism in order to monitor 
communication and information exchange between the three sectors. However, all 
of them share the same infrastructure: the Transport and Physical Layers 
constructed by the DNS and TCP/IP. 
2.2.3 Asymmetry and vulnerabilities of cyberspace  
Cyberspace has become indispensible for modern human lifestyles across the 
world, but the features of cyberspace mean conditions of asymmetry and 
vulnerability are created. 
On traditional battlegrounds, the scale of warfare, identified by the size of 
the battlefield, the manpower involved, and the causal destruction, may be limited 
geographically, whereas the exponential growth of cyberspace presents a very 
different scenario. For instance, according to The Office for National Statistics in 
the UK, in 2008 65% of households in Great Britain had internet access, 
numbering 16 million in total – up 1 million from just the year before.38 Due to 
this steep rise in internet usage, people are already becoming accustomed to 
dealing with their affairs in virtual cyberspace instead of in a physical 
environment. This covers banking, marketing, shopping, communication and 
suchlike. The Office for National Statistics (2008) also points out that: ‘Use of the 
Internet by both consumers and businesses has expanded rapidly in recent years. 
For example, the latest National Statistics Omnibus Survey shows that in July 
2005 over 60 per cent of adults in Great Britain used the Internet, and results from 
the e-commerce survey show that in 2004 over 64 per cent of all UK businesses 
had Internet access. Together with this expansion in Internet use, there has been an 
                                               
38 If internet use in a relatively developed country like the UK can rise so substantially, as the trend for 
expansion of cyberspace continues, developing countries have even more potential for a massive rise in 
usage. 
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increase in spending over the Internet.’ (Wallis, 2006:2) The range of functions 
relying on cyberspace is expanding with each passing day. For instance, the 
fundamental sectors of state such as agriculture, electricity and water supply, 
defence, government administration, information and telecommunication, public 
transportation, banking and finance, mail systems and goods supply chains and so 
on all operate via cyberspace.  
However, as the Chinese proverb states: while water can carry a boat, it 
may also capsize it. That is to say, whilst a state gains great benefits from relying 
heavily on cyberspace in terms of these critical national infrastructures, thus being 
‘carried’, this very reliance means there is more risk of being ‘capsized’ if 
cyberspace is adversely affected. State reliance on cyberspace offers an attractive 
target for adversaries, since many attacks, crimes and terrorist acts can be 
generated through the medium of cyberspace. Due to the reach of information 
technology in the digital age, any individual may be able to conduct cyber attacks 
or simply spam junk emails to cripple computer servers. This makes the virtual 
field of cyberspace much more vulnerable than a traditional territory, which is 
protected by physical borders which enemies cannot overcome so easily. Cyber 
attacks can leap over state border inspections to create damage to information 
infrastructure. Put simply, cyberspace offers a feature of asymmetry beneficial for 
cyber attackers. As this asymmetry and vulnerability are caused by the technical 
features of cyberspace, it is essential to understand the physical construction of 
cyberspace in order to prevent potential threats.39 Furthermore, as Paul Virilio 
(2000) indicates in his discourse on dromology, the speed at which something 
happens may change its essential nature, and that that which moves with speed 
will come to dominate that which is slower. ‘Whoever controls the territory 
possesses it. Possession of territory is not primarily about laws and contracts, but 
first and foremost a matter of movement and circulation.’ (Virilio, 2000)40 This 
view reinforces the argument that the speed of movement in cyberspace leads to 
further vulnerability.  
 
                                               
39 Please see Section 2.1.1. 
40 This is from an interview with Paul Virilio entitled ‘The Kosovo War Took Place in Orbital Space’ in 
2000. He believes that the Kosovo War largely bypassed geographical territories. This war is generally 
acknowledged as the first war ever fought in cyberspace. (Cavelty, 2007:73) 
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2.2.4 A non-state space: anonymity of actors 
As recent research indicates, the speed and anonymity of cyber attacks make the 
actors indiscernible, whether they are terrorists, criminals, nation states or even 
just individuals carrying out random malicious attacks. (Kelly, Raines, Baldwin, 
Mullins, and Grimaila, 2008) In traditional warfare, an enemy can be recognised 
by its visible hostile military action, and the target of attack is usually a regime or 
a state. According to Schmitt’s (1996) definition, mentioned in the Introduction, in 
human history enemies could generally be identified as unknown people or 
strangers, and existentially deemed to be something ‘different’. Moreover, in a 
conventional war, the enemy becomes the public enemy, because everything that 
has a relationship to a collectivity of humans, particularly to a whole nation, 
becomes public by virtue of such a relationship. This perspective posits that 
hostility and the public enemy are crucial prerequisites in the concept of warfare. 
Even in the atomic age, the threatened use of nuclear weapons was an obvious 
presentation of certain hostility towards other states. However, in cyberspace, for 
any individual or group, the existence of the enemy is indiscernible. Thus, 
identifying hostility or the enemy is a crucial factor when attempting to secure 
cyberspace. In addition to the existence of an enemy, recognising a conflict of 
armed forces also makes it possible to discern what can be classed as a war. 
However, the actors who produce threats or even launch attacks in the 
battleground of cyberspace do not necessarily identify with a regime or a state. 
Cahill (2003:101) proposed two categories of actor in cyberspace, which are 
‘intentional cyber actors (I-actors)’ and ‘unintentional cyber warfare attack (UA).’ 
He interpreted that the former intentionally wage war in cyberspace, affecting 
national security, and may be identified as cyber troops or cyber forces; the latter 
refers to non-malicious provocations which may not be intended to attack states 
through cyberspace. (Cahill, 2003:101) The features of cyberspace increase the 
ambiguity of hostility in such a battlefield. This research will argue that the way in 
which the existence of an adversary is discerned challenges modern strategy in the 
potential battleground of cyberspace. 
It is thus very difficult to identify an attack waged in cyberspace, and it is 
just as difficult to define it according to the international legal environment. Singer 
(1972:19) stresses that international war is a military conflict occurring between 
national entities. In war, one of the actors must be a state and the number of deaths 
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no less than one thousand. In terms of an attack in cyberspace, a problem thus 
arises as there could be no immediate physical ‘casualties’ in a cyber attack. 
Existing definitions, based on the features of conventional war, may not easily 
match the battlefield of cyberspace in the digital age. The world is faced with a 
‘legal vacuum’41: national or international laws cannot impose justice or prevent 
transnational hostile actions in cyberspace; a further problematic issue is how it 
will be possible to define a true war based on existing law in order to justify legal 
defensive action in cyberspace. 
2.3 The metaphorical ‘territoriality’ of cyberspace  
Traditionally a state is protected inside a geographic territory surrounded by 
physical borders – natural barriers such as rivers, oceans, straits, mountains, and 
special terrain. These boundaries also distinguish the state’s territory and determine 
its territoriality. In general territory in the modern state system was protected by 
borders lined with fortresses and fortifications to form a ‘hard shell’ (Herz, 1962).42 
However, in the atomic age, destructive weapons perhaps changed such territorial 
thinking as nuclear power shattered all previous conceptions. This may well occur 
again as a result of cyber warfare in the digital age, since the geographical 
protection of a state is far removed from cyberspace. For instance, research points 
out that any fresh meat passing the physical border into a country will be inspected, 
but a malicious attack via cyberspace could be transmitted unchecked across 20 
borders by the click of just one button (Nykodym and Taylor, 2004). As the virtual 
‘territory’ of cyberspace is shaped differently to the physical world, traditional 
borders cannot ensure state security against cyber attacks; instead, each state needs 
to formulate new strategic approaches to guard its relevant surroundings. However, 
cyberspace is also a space like land, sea and air. States or non-state actors can 
interact and communicate with one another through these spaces, and share the 
resources arising from them. As David Fahrenkrug (2008:135) argues, strategists 
often make the big mistake of erroneously focusing just on information, and not on 
cyberspace itself – the platform which bears the information. Fahrenkrug provides 
                                               
41 Since the onset of cyber-terrorism, it has been questionable who is responsible for the content of policy 
in cyberspace. (Cavelty, Mauer, and Krishna-Hensel, 2008:101-108) 
42 In addition, Herz also provides an example from Mencius, an ancient Chinese philosopher, to reflect 
the condition of territorial security. Mencius provided guidance for the governor of a small state about a 
thousand years ago, advising: ‘Dig deeper your moats; build higher your walls; guard them along with 
your people.’ (Herz, 1962:107)  
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the example of sea as a modern line of communication for states. It is far more 
important to securely maintain this line of communication than to protect the goods 
transported through it. He goes on to extrapolate that instead of protecting the 
information itself, securing cyberspace as a domain, where information is stored, 
transferred, and modified via a computer system, should be the aim of theory and 
strategy. (Fahrenkrug, 2008:141) Unfortunately, according to Hansen (2008:43), 
although the US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the definition of cyberspace and 
recognised that it was a potential battleground as early as October 2006, military 
doctrines relating to cyber warfare still remain uncertain. It is therefore crucial to 
create guidelines for the identification of cyber warfare in order to clarify 
operational doctrine for the battlefield. 
What’s more, conceptual boundaries, such as proxy servers acting as 
functional borders, are essential in cyberspace for actors to recognise respective 
ownership, as actors may include states, non-state organisations, private companies 
and even individuals. In other words, it could be constructive to establish a 
conceptual ‘territory’ for each actor in cyberspace, so that the actors can demarcate 
their zone of responsibility and proclaim their ‘authority’, which may imply 
equivalence to ‘sovereignty’. Servers, routers and network protocols can be 
employed technically as functional borders to form this corresponding ‘territory’, as 
well as protecting against attacks in cyberspace. This research argues that 
cyberspace could be conceptually territorialised by the Domain Name System, 
TCP/IP, and functional borders, creating a new virtual realm. This new 
conceptualised territory also leads to a virtual territoriality43, which could be dubbed 
cyber-territoriality, where in addition to states, non-state organisations and private 
companies are also actors in cyberspace. In other words, it is not necessary that 
owners of cyber-territoriality be only states, but can also be private actors who have 
the authority of managing the ‘functional borders’ created by IP addresses and the 
DNS. 
Moreover, definitions of territory44 seem to assume that territory exists 
innately, and in a general sense involves not merely an actual and already existing 
                                               
43 Territoriality is a term associated with nonverbal communication, referring to how people use space to 
communicate ownership/occupancy of areas and possessions. (Beebe, Beebe, and Redmond, 2008:209)  
44 The word ‘territory’ is defined in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Online Dictionary as: 
1. a: a geographical area belonging to or under the jurisdiction of a governmental authority. 
-46- 
 
geographical area, but the relation of this area to either humans or animals. 
Wolfgang Kleinwächter (2000) put forward the concept of ‘territory of cyberspace,’ 
conceptually constructed upon the Domain Name System and IP addresses, but he 
did not go so far as to explain the potential territorialisation of cyberspace. As 
Robert Sack argues, ‘Territories are socially constructed forms of spatial relations 
and their effects depend on who is controlling whom and for what purpose,’ and 
‘Territoriality in humans is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence, 
or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as a strategy, territoriality 
can be turned on and off.’ (Sack, 1986:216) As a result, a territory is not merely a 
geographical space, but also a conceptual space such as cyberspace. These 
discourses, proposed from the field of philosophy, construct the argument that 
territory is not confined to a geographical area; it can also be something abstract: a 
concept, rather than a geographical zone. In other words, though the word ‘territory’ 
is derived from geography, the concept of territory can also be conceptually 
regarded as a sphere of autonomy in accordance with its ownership.  As discussed in 
depth in Section 2.1, cyberspace, constructed of interconnected computer networks, 
provides an infrastructure for information exchange and communications based on 
the Domain Name System (DNS) and the mapping of IP addresses. This 
indispensable information platform is structured by combining a large amount of 
physical hardware, such as computers, servers, routers, converts, and cables, with 
conceptual interactions, such as information exchange and communications. The 
authority to control these individual physical systems and to access their information 
potentially constitutes a virtual territory of cyberspace, leading to the 
‘territorialisation’ of cyberspace. As Ian Buchanan and Adrian Parr (2006:194) 
examine, the concept of the virtual territory has already been applied to cyberspace 
in the work of Deleuze and Guattari45.  
                                                                                                                                         
b: an administrative subdivision of a country. c: a geographical area (as a colonial possession) 
dependent on an external government but having some degree of autonomy.  
2. a: an indeterminate geographical area; b: a field of knowledge or interest. 
3. a: an assigned area; especially: one in which a sales representative or distributor operates; b: an 
area often including a nesting or den site and variable foraging range that is occupied and 
defended by an animal or group of animals. 
45 In the book, Thousand Plateaus, ‘the territory is the product of a territorialization of milieus and 
rhythms…A territory borrows from all the milieus; it bites into them, seizes them bodily…It is built 
from aspects or portions of milieu…There is a territory precisely when milieu components cease to be 
directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become 
expressive…What defines the territory is the emergence of matters of expression.’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988:314-315) 
-47- 
 
The main achievement of the Domain Name System is to create a conceptual 
space which regulates dispersed IP addresses into a well-organised and strictly 
individual hierarchy: a name space under a certain domain. However, if the DNS 
were temporarily ignored, only the relation between assigned IP addresses and their 
connected hosts would be considered. It could be judged that the geographic 
mapping between the space constructed by IP addresses and the geographic space 
constructed by these host computers becomes meaningless, since there is no rational 
or regular relation between them. In other words, without the DNS, IP addresses 
would just be a series of numbers, and their allocation would be arbitrary, especially 
in terms of geographic distribution. Therefore, if the DNS were somehow removed 
and then brought back, the map of cyberspace would be totally different. Under this 
new DNS framework, cyberspace would have a meaningful and hierarchical 
structure; thus, in contrast to the chaotic image of cyberspace established by IP 
addresses only, the DNS would create a well-defined construction. Cyberspace 
would be reconstructed as a hierarchical realm by the DNS and IP address system. 
In this hypothetical example, the Domain Name System (DNS) would not merely 
rebuild the system ruptured by use of IP addresses alone, but also deconstruct itself 
from its technical field and then reconstruct itself. In addition, this issue cannot be 
described only from a technical point of view; it must also be considered from social 
and cultural dimensions, since the difference between ‘dajkjw23ds.org’ and 
‘cybersecurity.org’ or ‘chinese-web.org’ cannot be answered in terms of technical 
orientation, as their functions are all the same from the DNS’s point of view. 
Certainly, technology causes some structural limitation, but the motivation of 
matching domain names with popular terms used in real life or special meanings 
goes far beyond technology itself. The DNS reconstructs the relationship between 
distributed IP addresses and well-structured domain name spaces to establish a 
virtual territory of cyberspace, which also obtains symbolic values and names which 
can only be noticed in the social environment in which they are used. In addition, 
each computer has a name assigned by an Internet Service Provider (ISP) when 
connecting to the internet to identify its position in the whole hierarchical name 
space. In the real world, it is possible that two people may have exactly the same 
names, which is not a problem as people are identifiable through other means. 
However, this is impossible in the virtual territoriality of cyberspace even if two 
machines are identical. The name space is exclusively at any time under the 
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principle of universal response, according to which the same query always gets the 
same answer no matter where it was asked or what server name was required. 
Unlike in real life where one’s name and space or location are separate, under the 
Domain Name System, a name represents space and location. There is no possibility 
for the identical, and that creates an extremely rigid territoriality. In the next chapter 
this research will generate a theoretical tool, equivalent to the principles of the 
territorial state system, in order to identify whether or not the virtual territoriality of 
cyberspace is being intruded upon. 
2.4 General concepts of cyber warfare 
The current importance of cyber warfare is clear and obvious to observers, as it has 
been addressed recently by many government and media reports.46 However, the 
explicit conceptual identification of cyber warfare remains uncertain. From 
historical experiences of human warfare, it can be found that the more advanced the 
military technology, the more the spatial range of wars will expand. Battlefields 
have transferred from jungle to plain and from plain to ocean, and then out yet 
further to air and then space. Regardless of whether a space is tangible or intangible, 
if it is accessible to human reach, warfare may, perhaps inevitably, occur therein. 
Operationally, conceptual definitions indicate the essence of traditional warfare: 
‘war has historically been (a) a struggle involving the use of armed force; (b) 
between opposing sovereignties, nation-states in the last few centuries, sovereign 
cities, tribes, and groups before that.’47 However, due to its inherent features, 
cyberspace is not necessarily subject to the same warfare as traditional theatres. In 
the information age, as indicated by Alvin Toffler (1993), humans have shifted 
focus on the influence of information from the social to the military arena.48 Further 
to that, as Dong Zifeng (2006:127) stresses, since 1957, battlefields have broken 
                                               
46 Roughly 648,000 results are called up by a Google search of the keyword ‘cyber warfare’ on 1st 
December 2010. These results include government reports, news and articles of events associated with 
cyber warfare. 
47 Traditionally, conventional warfare is defined as having ‘four essential constituent elements: (a) there 
must be a contention between at least two nation-states; (b) the nation-states must use their armed forces 
in the contention; (c) each nation-state’s goal must be to overpower the opposing state(s) [the enemy] 
and impose peace on the victor’s terms; and (d) the contending states will have symmetrical, although 
diametrically opposed, goals.’ (Brenner, 2009:54) 
48 Alvin Toffler believes that the types of warfare can be categorised by the cultural background of the era, 
such as the agricultural age [First Wave], the industrial age [Second Wave], and the information age 
[Third Wave]. (Toffler, 1993) In the ‘Third Wave’ – the information age – Toffler believes that the 
forms of war rely on telecommunication systems and computer networks, where information can be 
mastered efficiently. (Toffler, 1993:65-72)  
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through the limit of the Earth’s gravity and entered universal space. Battle space has 
now transferred from tangible territories (air, land, and sea) to an intangible territory 
(cyberspace).49 The contest over this virtual space has begun. 
In addition to traditional warfare, Martin Libicki (1995) proposes that there 
are seven forms of warfare in the 21st century, namely ‘Command and Control 
Warfare (C2W), Intelligence-Based Warfare, Electronic Warfare (EW), 
Psychological Operations (PO), Hackerwar, Information Economic Warfare, and 
Cyberwar.’ Alongside the development of information technology, nearly all 
information related activities are carried out and conducted via electronic 
infrastructures – cyberspace. As a result of this, the previous situation of overlap in 
the definitions of the different types of warfare has become dramatically more 
pronounced. It may be argued, though, that strategic thinking on cyber warfare may 
cover Libicki’s seven new types of warfare, since these forms of warfare effectively 
share the same battle space. Divergences arise instead through different media, 
implements, and devices, and through outcomes, such as information, intelligence, 
electronic equipment, psychological effects and so on. In terms of establishing a 
defensive strategy, establishing as wide a defensive shell as possible is perhaps the 
best catch-all strategy to deal with the range of threats. Cyberspace is defined in the 
latest military doctrine of cyber operations, released in 2010, as ‘a global domain 
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of 
information technology infrastructures, including the internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.’50 This is 
the clearest definition of the concept of cyberspace published so far. As stated, it is 
possible to argue that Libicki’s seven different forms of warfare are all carried out 
and deployed on the same battleground, namely cyberspace. Based on this argument, 
cyber warfare can be classified as the primary strategy to secure the potential 
battlefield of cyberspace, forming a common conceptual strategy for the different 
types of warfare. Cyber warfare can be regarded simply as a strategy related to wars 
or threats in cyberspace. 
                                               
49 Since the first satellite was launched in 1957, humans’ battle arenas have been transformed from the 
dimension of ground to the dimension of space. Furthermore, in the information age, the conquest of 
territory has shifted from tangible to intangible territory. (Dong, 2006) 
50 As seen in the US Doctrine Document 3-12 named ‘Cyberspace Operations’, published 15th July 2010.  
This is a significant indication of cyber warfare, since relevant military training and exercises will be 
carried out according to this doctrine. The US Doctrine of Joint Operations also notes, ‘Cyberspace is a 
domain that requires man-made technology to enter and exploit. The difference is that it is easier to see 
and sense the other domains [such as land, sea and air]’ (U.S. Air Force, 2010:51) 
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In the physical world, the threats for human beings and state or non-state 
actors can traditionally be classified into three categories: crime, terror, and war. 
(Brenner, 2009) Each category has its own different legitimate players and attack 
targets, and so they are grouped separately. However, as Susan Brenner (2009) 
points out, in the digital age, as these three categories of threat could all be carried 
out via cyberspace, the boundary between them is becoming indiscernible. 
Furthermore, due to this situation, it may be argued that threats from each of these 
three different categories, when they are conducted in cyberspace, can be re-
classified as applications of cyber warfare, so that action against such threats can be 
carried out legitimately. This is an additional reason why it is so important to 
definitively and academically interpret the concept of cyber warfare by examining 
principles of cyber territoriality. 
Following the explanation of the concepts of cyberspace and 
warfare/strategy presented in previous sections, it is possible to interpret cyber 
warfare as warfare performed in cyberspace by either state or non-state actors which 
poses any threat to the security of cyberspace. As investigated, cyberspace is an 
electronic infrastructure combining the internet, computer networks, and 
telecommunication systems. Conceptually, cyberspace is also formed by the 
information that it contains, which includes any form of communication contributed 
by people. 
Thus, regardless of the precise type of cyber warfare, of which there are 
many, conceptually they all touch on one identical principle, which is that all are 
based upon the electronic infrastructure of cyberspace. Cyber warfare, then, is the 
core and vital strategy shared by these different forms of warfare to secure (or even 
compete for) the same battlefield. Cyber warfare may be inferred to be a strategic 
contest of actors against one another, carried out in order to gain dominant power in 
cyberspace. As Shen Weiguang51 stresses, the approach of cyber warfare can 
destroy adversaries’ computer systems to distress or even obliterate information 
delivery in many sectors such as financial systems, telecommunications, power 
supplies, and transportation services. (Shen, 1996) Actors can also implement 
                                               
51 Shen Weiguang is known as a pioneer in the field of China’s information/cyber warfare. His book, 
entitled新戰爭論 [Xin zhanzheng lun, Theory of New War] was published in 1990 (before the Gulf 
War). In his book, he proposed conducting asymmetric warfare through cyber warfare, and predicted 
that future wars will focus on information carried by computer networks. (Shen, 1990) At that time, 
Shen was regarded as a futurologist, as the military power of information technology was only unveiled 
for the first time in the Gulf War. 
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harassment attacks, falsify information, steal data, and monitor their enemies. 
Furthermore, in terms of the military, cyber warfare can be considered a strategy for 
dealing with operations in cyberspace. According to US military doctrine, 
operations in cyberspace are defined as ‘the employment of cyber capabilities where 
the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.’ (US Air 
Force, 2010:51)  
Cyber warfare does not necessarily match the characteristics of conventional 
warfare outlined in the Introduction. Similarly, the criticism is often made that a 
cyber war might not meet the requirements which define a true war, since there are 
no physical casualties or damages in cyberspace. In the digital era, as Libicki 
(2009:179) points out, ‘what constitutes an act of war may be defined one of three 
ways: universally, multilaterally, and unilaterally.’ He explains that ‘a universal 
definition is one that every state accepts.’52 An alternative hypothetical way in 
which a cyber attack could be identified as an act of war is if a group of states agrees 
on a specific definition of cyber war, identifiable by certain named characteristics. 
(Libicki, 2009) In order to identify a general concept of cyber warfare which may be 
accepted by states as a universal definition, it is valuable to review and borrow some 
principles of the traditional territorial state system (even though actors in cyberspace 
are not necessarily just states). When compared with the territorial state system, 
cyberspace is more metaphoric, acting as a conceptual world, as there are many 
remarkable social behaviours, norms, and communications in this space. That is to 
say, cyberspace may be regarded as a metaphor of an intangible territory.  
2.5 The impact of the growth of cyberspace on international security 
It has been pointed out that Strategic Studies is part of International Security Studies 
(ISS), since ISS is focused on ‘the use of force in international relations,’ which also 
distinguishes ISS from the general field of IR. (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:16) In 
human nature, the desire for security is a basic need. In a state, security must be 
stable and comprehensive, and no threats should be perceptible. True security means 
that an identity (region, state, group, or individual) maintains its existing value, 
including benefits for the people (Buzan, 1991). However, this ‘value’ is an abstract 
concept because threats to it might not actually exist. This value can be identified, in 
                                               
52  The closest international equivalent to ‘every state’ is the United Nations. Thus if the United Nations 
regards something as an act of war, this would fall into the universal definition. (Libicki, 2009)  
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reality, as interests. The concept of national security is therefore to assert the state’s 
interests and to avoid war and threats from outside of the state.  
As Lene Hansen (2009) argues, a crucial issue of cyber security is the 
identification of networks or cyber actors and their link to a nation/state or regime. 
Attacks occurring in cyberspace must therefore be investigated through a 
transnationally cooperative mechanism that goes beyond traditional state authority. 
Existing related cooperation must also be re-examined in the light of the features of 
cyberspace in order to best tackle new challenges. What’s more, as recent research 
points out, private individuals and groups are never far from the frontlines in the 
potential battlefield of cyberspace – the actors in cyberspace are largely non-state 
rather than state. (Cavelty, Mauer, and Krishna-Hensel, 2008:108) In terms of 
cyber-territoriality, though it can also be argued that it may be difficult to identify 
exactly who actors are, based on the Domain Name System (DNS), it is fairly 
simple to identify through which Internet Service Provider (ISP) a private actor 
accessed the internet. Furthermore, cyberspace can be a virtual world, which 
contains many cyber-territories in which functional borders can be employed. Thus, 
existing strategy also has to be reconsidered through these features of cyberspace in 
order to generate a new comprehensive strategy to guide cyber warfare in the near 
future. However, due to the intrinsic features of cyberspace, such as anonymity, 
asymmetry, and shared information infrastructure, everyone and anyone can be a 
warrior; as such, the populace in cyber-territory has become a crucial factor in terms 
of cyber security, and accordingly a civilian-based defensive strategy may well be 
the best security strategy for cyberspace. 
Historically, information technology (IT) is not the first new development to 
cause a revolution of military strategy, as there have been similar experiences with 
audio and video broadcasting. From Machiavelli to the nuclear age, many new 
technologies have entered the world which have affected existing doctrines of 
military warfare and strategy. (Paret, 1986:21-31) However, information technology 
is the deepest, widest and most recent revolution. Dimensions of cyber warfare must 
be applied to states’ military strategies in order to protect a state’s interests from 
enemies’ cyber threats. Threats of cyber warfare affecting critical infrastructure are 
referred to as non-traditional threats, as they do not result from conventional 
violence or traditional weapons, even if the target of an attack is a regime or a state. 
However, the actors who produce non-traditional threats and launch attacks do not 
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necessarily identify with a regime or a state, and their targets are all over the world. 
This means that cyber warfare is an issue beyond the international landscape, and it 
is therefore necessary to develop new strategies not only through cooperation 
between states, but also with the input of private sectors which own information 
infrastructures and facilities. 
However, it is questionable whether such cooperation would fit neatly with 
states’ interests and defence policies. There would no doubt be constraints on 
cooperation with private sectors or even with other states. Lewis (2003: xii) points 
out that these constraints do indeed exist, but he specifies that ‘Cooperation in cyber 
security is crucial because there are no national solutions to transnational problems.’ 
Therefore, unlike the traditional state-centric conduct in international politics, it is 
consequently now essential that private sectors take precedence in transnational 
cooperation in order to create strategies to protect common interests in the future. 
Military strategy also directly affects security issues. The military approach 
is traditionally regarded as the foundation of protection and cornerstone of national 
security. However, there is concern about the threats caused by non-traditional 
factors such as ethnicity, religion, economics, environmental resources, and 
informatics. After the conclusion of the Cold War, Buzan (1991) further expanded 
security study from simple military study to a five-dimensional concept. These 
dimensions, in addition to military security, are environmental security, economic 
security, social security, and political security. These new levels of threat are multi-
level and pluralised. They are very different from the traditional approach, which 
constitutes threats generated mainly by armed forces, but their impacts on 
sovereignty, state security and social development are just as profound. In addition, 
such impacts usually need to be dealt with not only by transcending inter-state 
relations but also by incorporating transnational relations. Since 1970, there has 
been an increase in the amount of non-state groups which process world affairs such 
as global currency exchange, health, oil supply, mail and transportation. These 
activities could not be performed across states as easily if they were based on 
traditional politics. A theory known as transnational politics, which goes beyond 
traditional inter-state theory, was proposed to explain the interactions between 
different transnational societies (NGOs). As some non-state actors may also 
challenge security (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006), security has become a critical 
component in both the international and the transnational sector. 
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How can relevant theories of international security inform analyses of the 
growth of the potential battleground of cyberspace in the digital age? Due to the 
difficulties of cooperation, ‘Trust is often difficult between states, according to 
realists, because of the problem of cheating,’ (Baylis and Smith, 2005:304) 
capabilities in cyberspace can shift the balance of power among states quickly. In 
addition, based on the assumptions from neo-realism, it is inevitable that a state will 
develop some offensive military strategies in order to protect itself and defend its 
sovereignty, and that its power will be expanded in so doing. Therefore: 
‘Uncertainty, leading to a lack of trust, is inherent in the international system.’ 
(Baylis and Smith, 2005:302) Consequently, the development of a strategy of 
coordination with other states, as well as non-governmental actors in cyberspace, is 
crucial for national security. 
As a result, state and non-state actors need to cooperate in order to develop a 
useful defensive strategy against threats occurring in the intangible territory of 
cyberspace. In addition, it is necessary to certify the efficacy of relevant military 
doctrines through conducting exercises and implementing necessary modifications 
in order to create practical comprehensive sets of guidelines for involved actors, as 
well as encouraging interaction between close allies to expand international 
defences. A significant recent example shows that this approach has already been 
adopted by some countries. According to an official report (US Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010), a joint military exercise of cyber warfare, known as 
‘Cyber Storm,’ was conducted by 12 international state actors and 60 private 
companies (non-state actors). This exercise, first carried out in 2006 and later 
repeated in 2008 and 2010, aimed to train governmental and private sector 
understanding and implementation of relevant concepts and processes. Though the 
results of the exercises still remain classified, the specific objectives were published 
as follows:53 (US Department of Homeland Security, 2010) 
  Examining the capabilities of participating organisations to prepare 
for, protect from, and respond to the potential effects of cyber attacks;  
                                               
53 As the report indicates, Cyber Storm is intended to act as a catalyst for assessing communications, 
coordination and partnerships across critical infrastructure sectors. To accomplish this, Cyber Storm II, 
in 2008, served as a distributed exercise that allows players around the world to exercise from their own 
office locations. The exercise control centre was located at a Department of Homeland Security facility 
in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. The scenario progressed as players received “injects” from 
the control centre via e-mail, phone, fax, in person, and websites set up specifically for the exercise. 
These injects simulated adverse effects through which the participants exercised their cyber crisis 
response systems, policies and procedures. (US Department of Homeland Security, 2010) 
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  Exercising strategic decision making and interagency coordination of 
incident response(s) in accordance with national level policy and 
procedures;  
  Validating information sharing relationships and communications 
paths for the collection and dissemination of cyber incident situational 
awareness, response and recovery information; and  
  Examining means and processes through which to share sensitive 
information across boundaries and sectors, without compromising 
proprietary or national security interests. 
Compared to the mature concept of international security, the concept of 
cyber security is still not fully understood due to the lack of relevant ground theories. 
In addition, it is technologically complex and the network environment in which it 
operates changes at lightning speed. Therefore, a feasible solution for cyber security 
will be proposed in Chapter Five through a case study of China’s cyber warfare. 
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Chapter Three: 
Modern Chinese Strategy 
 
It is impossible to know what is unique to a state’s strategy without first assessing what 
aspects of strategy are common to other states in the international system (Ross, 2009:1). 
Though a state’s strategy is formed by its own strategic culture, a state presents itself to 
the international system through these common aspects of strategy, and as a result, these 
common aspects are necessary for examination and illustration of strategy as a whole. 
Therefore, this chapter takes as its premise the argument that any effort to explain 
modern Chinese strategy should begin with an analysis of the sources of strategy that 
are common to all states in international politics. Compared with some classic theories 
in the field of International Security, the study of military theory, including such fields 
as War Studies and Strategic Studies, is a relatively new realm which still lacks 
essential fundamental theories to offer support for further research into strategy. 
Therefore, in order to eventually explore modern Chinese strategy by comprehensively 
interpreting the unique nature of Chinese culture, it is first indispensable to examine the 
sources of strategy in the international system on a theoretical basis. This chapter will 
hence not only provide the foundation for a deeper understanding of modern Chinese 
strategy, but also simultaneously link modern Chinese strategy to the international 
system.  
In addition, the West has been the dominant civilisation in the modern age, and 
all other civilisations have been forced to absorb its impact, regardless of whether this 
influence is welcome or not. We can see this trend within the field of Strategic Studies. 
For this reason, in this chapter the first section, which invesitgates on traditional 
Western strategic thinking contextualised with relevant ancient Chinese thinking, will 
create a theoretical basis of strategy in order to be contrast next with traditional Chinese 
strategic culture. These two sections will be linked up together in a discussion of the 
strategy of People’s War in modern Chinese strategy. The final section on China’s 
Revolution in Military Affairs will follow on for China’s cyber warfare. 
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3.1 The theoretical basis of strategy [‘戰略’ (Zhan lüe)] 
The Chinese term ‘戰略’, transliterated as ‘zhan lüe,’54  refers to ‘strategy’ as it is 
known in the modern era. In ancient China, the two Chinese characters as a term 
first appeared in 306 A.D. as a book title, but the context of the book was not related 
to ‘strategy’ per se.55 Instead, the concept of ‘strategy’, which can be seen as the ‘art 
of war’, was represented in ancient China by the term ‘兵法’ (bing fa) from about 
512 B.C.56 This Chinese term literally means ‘method of the military.’ Through 
Western influence on the modern era, the term ‘戰略’ (zhan lüe) came about and 
can be seen as a translation of the English word ‘strategy’. It not only directly 
represents the concept of ‘strategy’ imported from Western strategic thought57 but 
also replaces the term ‘兵法’ (bing fa), which originally referred to the ‘art of war’. 
Nevertheless, the precise definition of strategy is highly contentious regardless of 
whether it stems from Western or Eastern culture. In addition, with regards to the 
evolution of modern Chinese strategy in the 20th century, core strategic thoughts 
such as the concept of ‘People’s War’, which will be discussed in depth 
subsequently, remain in an indiscernible and vague position between the tactical and 
strategic level. Thus, in order to comprehensively elaborate the concept of ‘戰略’ 
(zhan lüe) in modern Chinese strategy, it is indispensable to first understand the 
nature of ‘strategy’. The essential definitions of ‘strategy’ and its origins will help 
identify where the term ‘zhan lüe’ originated from in the philosophy of ancient 
China as well as appropriately pinpoint ‘People’s War’ at a strategic level. 
 
 
 
                                               
54  From now, words in brackets ( ) are transliterations of the preceding Chinese characters. 
55 The book entitled 戰略’ (Zhan lüe) was written by Si-Ma in 306A.D., and was the first ancient Chinese 
book to use these two Chinese characters together in the title. (Niu, 2003) ‘戰’ (zhan) means ‘warfare’ 
and ‘略’ (lüe) means ‘strategy.’ The term ‘戰略’ (zhan lüe) is thus a Chinese translation of strategy that 
links together Western strategy with Chinese strategic thought.  
56 The earliest recognised Chinese military work is Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Its Chinese title is ‘孫子兵
法’ (Sun Zi Bing Fa). Sun Tzu began to use ‘bing fa’ to present the concept of strategy in about 512 
B.C. (Sawyer, 1993:149)  In other words, ‘bing fa’ represented the concept of ‘戰略’ (zhan lüe) from 
512 BC onwards until the term 戰略 (zhan lüe) became established. 
57 According to General Beaufré, strategic thought must continuingly take the facts of change into 
account and can predict probable changes many years ahead. Strategic thought must work on 
hypotheses and generate solutions by truly original thought. (Collins 1973:235) 
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3.1.1 The origin of strategy 
Before the early modern period, the Roman Frontinus wrote a book entitled 
‘Strategemata’58 in the 1st century A.D. The Byzantine emperor Maurice, who 
was also a well-known strategist, followed with ‘Strategicon’ in the late 6th 
century A.D. Strategemata is the first book to make a connection between strategy 
and warfare by using ‘strategy’ in the book title to represent the art of war. 
‘Strategicon’ meant the discipline of the General.59 Much later, in 1777, Maizeroy, 
in his work titled ‘Théorie de la Guerre’, used ‘stratégie’ to define ‘the conduct of 
operations.’ This book was published and distributed to the extent that the term 
strategy was gradually used in military terminology not only in France but all over 
Europe. Though the word ‘strategy’ has been used for only about two hundred 
and thirty years, the concept of strategy already existed during the ancient period, 
but was referred to by different terminology, such as ‘taktike lechne’ in Greek and 
‘ars bellica’ in Latin. The former has the original meaning of tactics; the latter 
means ‘art of war.’ In the Eastern world, first to use ‘戰略’ (Zhan Lüe), the 
modern Chinese translation of strategy, as the title of his work was the Chinese 
historiographer Si-Ma in 306 A.D. (Niu, 2003:18) However, the most famous 
masterpiece and earliest military work in relation to strategy is The Art of War 
written by Chinese strategist Sun Tzu in approximately 500 B.C.60 In both the 
Western and Eastern world strategy was regarded as a method with which to 
pursue victory on the battleground through military force. Liddell Hart called this 
strategy ‘pure or military strategy.’ (Paret et al., 1986:35) This traditional 
interpretation presents the primary principle of strategy. 
                                               
58 The term ‘Strategemata’ is originally from the Greek ‘strategama’, which has been translated as 
‘stratagems’ in English. (Polyaenus et al., 1994) 
59 ‘Strategicon’ was the title of a manual of war written by Maurice, and was also the term for the title of 
commander of a military region in the Byzantine Empire. By the late 6th century, the Byzantine Empire 
incorporated about 30 military regions, and Maurice wrote the book in order to educate the 
commanders of these regions. 
60 Sun Tzu, respectfully known as Sun Wu, is the author of The Art of War (Sun Zi Bing Fa) which is an 
essential text of traditional Chinese military philosophy and strategic thoughts. The book contains 13 
chapters and was written in about 500 B.C. (Griffith, 1971) The first foreign language edition was 
published in French in 1772. Collins clearly states that Sun Tzu was the first great figure in ancient 
times to build up a complete structure of strategic thought, stating that the 13 chapters of his 
masterpiece could doubtlessly rival almost all the military writings in the world, including that of Karl 
von Clausewitz. (Collins, 1973) However, very few scholars have examined Sun’s existence. (Yan, 
2011:70) One might still argue that Sun might be a mythical figure. Nevertheless, the book of The Art 
of War is the most significant work for Chinese strategic thinking since the work has been an essential 
reading in studying Chinese strategy. Thus, this research is going to examine the ideological influence 
of the work itself for Chinese strategy in modern era, rather than arguing for or against Sun’s existence 
and who the author may have been. 
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Machiavelli, writing in the 16th century, was one of the most important 
Western strategists of the early modern era. His tremendous achievement was to 
propose a concept of hierarchy of ranks as a normative standard, which remains 
the foundation of the modern command structure. His work, The Art of War, also 
became the primary instructional material at the military academy established by 
Maurice of Nassau at that time. In his military thought Machiavelli regarded 
discipline as the key element to reinforce military capability. He stressed that 
discipline could be accomplished by drill and training through a certain command 
structure. As Max Weber also asserted in his essay titled ‘The Origins of 
Discipline in War,’ ‘It [war] is discipline and not gunpowder,’ ‘which initiate[s] 
transformation,’ and ‘gunpowder and all the war techniques associated with it 
became significant only with the existence of discipline.’ (Paret et al., 1986:35) In 
addition to weapons technology, Paret believes that social and moral dimensions 
are very important for a war. This important concept of the existence of discipline 
became the foundation of professional military ethics in the future. Machiavelli 
also emphasized that battle and combat were very important approaches in 
strategy. This point of view seems to be an antecedent to that of Clausewitz. It 
could be also argued that such a strategy may lack a peaceful element as it focuses 
solely on the defeat of opponents in campaigns. Furthermore, Machiavelli claimed 
that a state’s security is its first priority of consideration. A state’s military power 
must be able to resist against threats arising from outside its borders; otherwise, it 
will not be able to retain security inside the state. Such a concept is similar to Sun 
Tzu’s statement that ‘War is a matter of vital importance to a state.’ (Sun, 1971:91) 
Like Machiavelli, Justus Lipsius, who also deeply influenced Maurice of 
Nassau, emphasized that citizens had a military obligation to serve their country 
and stressed that native soldiers were more trustworthy than foreign mercenaries. 
However, some authorities still believed that only mercenaries were sophisticated 
enough to control advanced weapons and perform more complicated tactics. 
(Paret et al., 1986) This instance of conflict between rulers and strategists 
demonstrates that policy-making may well dominate the development of strategy. 
Another strategist, Raimondo Montecuccoli, a famous Lieutenant General 
in Austria in the 17th century, was in disagreement with the bureaucratic hierarchy 
when he endeavoured to revolutionise the military. He tried to integrate all the 
knowledge acquired through experience to generate a ‘universal paradigm’ for 
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strategy. Though it was not the only strategic approach he supported, his 
experiences of the battlefield led him to state that attrition should be adopted after 
a series of defeats. He also stressed that war cannot be waged without battle and 
‘conquests and decisions can only be achieved by combat and battle.’ (Paret et al., 
1986:56) In terms of strategy, his brilliant contribution was to advocate 
‘manoeuvre warfare’ which was used successfully in his campaign against the 
French army in 1678. In the 18th century, manoeuvre warfare became very popular 
as many generals tried to achieve victory without engagement. In his strategic 
thoughts, Montecuccoli regarded strategy, operations and tactics as an ‘indivisible 
identity’ and he claimed to use an active defence to weaken the enemy. (Paret et 
al., 1986:62)   
In conclusion, concepts of strategy in the early modern era mainly 
incorporated categories such as military personnel, military organisation, and 
military operations. Strategists also believed that command and control were 
fundamental components to succeed in war; in terms of command, every soldier 
must follow orders from superiors through the hierarchical structure. After a 
command is received, the actions of soldiers must be in coherence, which is 
known as ‘control.’ Sun Tzu said that in an organised war, ‘When the men have 
been unified the courageous will not be able to advance alone, the fearful will not 
be able to retreat alone. This is the method for employing large numbers.’ 
(Sawyer, 2007:170) However, the larger the scale of a war, the more difficult 
command and control become. Command and control are closely linked with 
appropriate communication in war to enable enormous numbers of soldiers to 
follow command and control on a huge battlefield. 
3.1.2 Defining strategy 
Historically, strategy referred to military theory or the art of war. In modern 
society, however, strategy is a well-known term and has been widely used not 
only in military studies but also in business management. Some eminent pioneers 
of strategic studies defined strategy through military thinking. For example, Baron 
de Jomini explained comprehensively that strategy is ‘the art of directing the great 
part of the forces of an army onto the most important point of a theatre of war, or 
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of a zone of operations.’61 His contemporary Carl von Clausewitz defined strategy 
as ‘the use of engagement for the object of war.’62  In the words of the British 
critic Liddell-Hart ‘Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means 
to fulfil the end of policy.’63  General André Beaufré stated that ‘Strategy is the art 
of dialectic of force or the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to 
resolve their dispute.’64 These different definitions, though reflecting somewhat 
abstract elements of strategy, establish the fact that strategy aims to link military 
power to political purpose. However, strategy is still a highly contentious subject 
due to the diversity of political orientation from one age to another. The study of 
strategy may well provide conceptual guidance for warfare, which includes the 
nature and principles of warfare, comprehension of its regularity and development, 
application of further defence policy for state security, and even the prediction of 
how warfare will transform in the future. Therefore, strategy can be regarded as a 
theory for any activity which includes offence and defence directly or indirectly 
related to operations, tactics and various type of warfare. Alternatively, it may be 
a theory for any activity related to military affairs, including the study of the 
relationship between armed forces and warfare. In short, strategy involves the 
exploration and epistemology of military knowledge. Such knowledge can be 
generally extended yet further to certain cross-border fields such as crime-fighting, 
smuggling, trafficking and piracy. (Baylis and Smith, 2005:2-4) Admittedly, 
strategy was applied to different dimensions by strategists depending on the 
purpose of warfare and the political situation of the time. Establishing a general or 
common principle of strategy running through various phases from one generation 
to another, however, is worth investigation as it may facilitate tackling varied 
challenges in the future. 
Historically, aspects of warfare have often been changed as a result of 
human behaviour. Different civilisations in different eras have been inclined to 
evaluate warfare in myriad ways. In general, warfare indicates armed conflict 
between different political groups. However, many people regard warfare as 
                                               
61 Howard, M., B. H. S. and E.Liddell Hart (1965) The Theory and Practice of War. Essays presented to 
Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. Editor: Michael Howard. [By various authors.]. pp. x. 376. Cassell: 
London. 
62 Clausewitz, C. v., Howard, M. N., Paret, P. and Brodie, B. (1976) On War. Princeton; Guildford: 
Princeton University Press. (Edited and translated by Howard and Paret) 
63 Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J., Gray, C. S. and Cohen, E. (2007) Strategy in the contemporary world: an 
introduction to strategic studies. 2nd ed.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 5 
64 Ibid 
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merely a risky approach to gain benefits. Different approaches to warfare over 
time have consequently caused the definition of warfare to be widely extended. 
From a functional perspective, the primary purpose of strategic study is to extract 
relevant factors from previous experiences of warfare so that these factors can be 
systematised as useful knowledge. In so doing, the distance between current 
military capability and guidance for future warfare could be narrowed and it 
would be feasible to overcome time limitations to correctly prepare the national 
defence. (Cheng, 2003) However, though military planning and the construction 
of military power may be based on such rational thought, this does not necessarily 
infer certain military victory because the result of warfare is influenced by many 
variables. For example, what is the extent of the discrepancy between theoretical 
probability and the true readiness of the national defence? How many variables 
exist which have been overlooked or not correctly calculated? What conclusions 
has the enemy drawn in terms of military guidance? How well prepared is the 
enemy’s national defence?  All these factors are associated with the process of 
warfare; from preparation to operation. The result of warfare will accordingly 
reflect these factors. Thus the function of the study of strategy is to investigate the 
most appropriate strategic approach based on not only historical experience but 
also current calculations of the enemy, in order to narrow the distance between 
advanced theoretical thinking and the subsequent result. 
Furthermore, it is indispensable for states to address strategy in order to 
provide effective communication between civilian society, defence policy, and 
military forces. Strategy has never been easily explained, as its exact meaning and 
derived notions are confusing due to their ambiguous nature. Before further 
exploration of the concept, it would thus be useful to clarify the term. Despite the 
periodic modification of the application of strategy and the occasional redundancy 
of traditional frameworks in examining modern strategic details, the fact that 
certain political purposes guide military force has never changed. Although the 
fundamental concept of strategy has never undergone a monumental shift, the 
academic investigation of strategy is currently expanding greatly compared with the 
eras of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. 
Strategic Studies is primarily focused on research into warfare, which is 
also addressed by the study of security issues within the field of International 
Relations. In his work On War, Clausewitz stressed that strategy contains a 
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diversity of features such as ethics, supply, mathematics, geography and statistics. 
(Clausewitz, 1976:183) Michael Howard (1965) also mentions that strategy 
should consist of dimensions of society, logistics, operations and technology. This 
not only reflects the extensive themes and approaches of Strategic Studies but also 
indicate that exploration across the various disciplines is necessary to comprehend, 
evaluate and produce strategy. As a result, it is undeniable that the diversity of 
demands, from philosophy to science, theory to practice, and civil to military, 
makes the nature of Strategic Studies exceedingly complex. Additionally, in terms 
of Strategic Studies, there is no boundary between different subject areas. Any 
one of the variety of intellectual concepts in human life can be regarded as an 
element of Strategic Studies. The features of diversity and complexity prevalent in 
this field of study will doubtless lead to further research developments. 
 Nevertheless, although much research has been conducted in the field, 
critics still claim that existing Strategic Studies is too new an academic discipline to 
have developed a fundamental theoretical base. Philip Green, for instance, asserts 
that Strategic Studies are ‘pseudo-scientific, using apparent scientific methods to 
give the subject a ‘spurious air of legitimacy.’ (Green, 1966:225) These criticisms 
stem from doubts concerning not only the miscellaneous, seemingly random, 
features of strategy but also the methods of scientific investigation involved in the 
field. Clausewitz commented that everything in strategy is very simple, but this 
does not mean that everything is easy. (Clausewitz, 1976:656)  As Baylis et al. 
(2007:9) investigate, critics have stated that: ‘Because strategists focus on the role 
of military power, they tend to be preoccupied by violence and war’ and that 
Strategic Studies neglects the ‘more cooperative, peaceful aspects of world politics’ 
as it chiefly regards the world as a ‘conflict-oriented’ space. 
Briefly, strategy can represent different approaches and different 
applications due to its inherent variety. These approaches are mutually related and 
may even be sub-categories of one another. For instance, one approach is based 
on various levels of strategy such as total strategy, overall strategy and operational 
strategy according to French General Beaufré’s strategic pyramid. (Niu, 2003:33) 
Another approach is based on the uses of military force such as defence, 
deterrence, compellence, posturing and offence. (Jordan et al., 2008:49-54) 
However, these two approaches contain a spectrum of multidimensional factors, 
just as Clausewitz and Howard initially suggested. In Clausewitz’s strategic 
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theory, outlined in his work On War, he indicates five dimensions of strategy, 
which are ethics, supply, mathematics, geography and statistics. (Clausewitz, 
1976:183) Michael Howard also identified four dimensions in his 1979 article 
‘The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy.’ Later scholars provided a more 
developed theoretical concept of those dimensions. (Jordan et al., 2008:29)  
3.1.3 The concept of strategic culture 
In terms of a state’s strategy, it is arguable that the development of a state’s 
strategy is deeply influenced by the national culture. Basically, a state aims to find 
ways to maintain national security by employing various levels of strategy. 
However, the strategy of a state also contains characteristics of that state’s culture 
and social trends, as culture influences the philosophy of both war and peace. As 
John Baylis and Steven Smith (2005:543) point out, ‘a culture is composed of the 
customs, norms, and genres that inform social life.’ In addition, culture is 
especially important in a state like China which has an ancient civilisation and 
strategic tradition spanning thousands of years. Consequently, cultural thinking 
has merged with strategic thinking to form a strategic culture. Even though the 
application of a state’s strategy is not completely determined by it, strategic 
culture can, however, influence the choices of strategic operation. In addition, the 
process of shaping a strategic culture is associated with the concepts of security, 
interests, and threats. In terms of Chinese strategic culture, as Gong Yuzhen 
(2005:160) points out, there are several influencing factors, such as the 
distinctiveness of the civilisation, the geographical environment, and historical 
experiences. Furthermore, Andrew Scobell (2002:1) puts forward two motivations 
for trying to understand modern Chinese strategy through the dimension of 
strategic culture. The first reason is that national culture is widely regarded in 
China as a key point in strategy. The second reason is that the strategic actors and 
policymakers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) itself have claimed that 
their behaviours are conditioned by deeply ingrained traditional Chinese 
philosophy regarding international relations. 
The term ‘strategic culture’ was coined by Jack L. Snyder who studied the 
Soviet limited nuclear war doctrine of 1977. This concept was first used to predict 
the likelihood of the Soviet leadership accepting the policy of limited nuclear war. 
(Johnston, 1995:5) Snyder (1977:8) defines strategic culture as ‘the sum total of 
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ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that 
members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation and share with each other.’ Since then, studies of strategic culture have 
been developed. Ken Booth (1990:121) argues that strategic culture is ‘a way of 
adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use 
of force.’ As Yitzhak Klein (1991:5) indicates, strategic culture is ‘the set of 
beliefs held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political object of war and 
the most effective means of achieving it.’ He goes on to write: ‘Strategic cultures 
can be a hierarchy of concepts on several levels: political, strategic, and 
operational.’ Furthermore, Alastair Johnston (1995:46) believes that strategic 
culture is ‘an integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, 
languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-
lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of 
military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with 
such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and 
efficacious.’ Rosita Dellios’ research into Chinese strategic culture led her to state 
(1997:203) that strategic culture ‘pertains to a people's distinctive style of dealing 
with and thinking about the problems of national security.’ As former US military 
attaché to China Andrew Scobell defines, strategic culture is ‘the fundamental and 
enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in 
human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and military 
elites in a country.’ (Scobell, 2002:2) 
Strategic culture can thus be regarded as the way of thinking of the 
members of the community responsible for producing a state’s strategy. 
Consequently, one aspect of research into strategy may be the analysis of the 
strategic behaviour of members of this community. On a state level, these actors 
are strategists or the political elite, a group of people considered to be the best in 
the political arena because of their power and educational background. These 
people are the usual decision-makers for a state’s strategy and they form the 
‘community’ that develops a state’s strategic behaviour. Therefore, in addition to 
cultural influence, strategic culture is also heavily affected by this political 
community and environment. Wars are, in fact, political issues, and a war will 
remain in the realm of politics until the aims behind starting the war are achieved. 
It could be suggested that the culture of this political community and a state’s 
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strategic culture mutually affect each other, especially if the government is a 
dictatorship, which is akin to the one-party system of China. 
3.1.4 Summary of strategic concepts 
A state’s strategy can be roughly classified into two levels: national and military. 
The former is the highest strategic level for a state as it forms guidance not only 
for the national defence but also for the development of the whole country. The 
latter is the deciding principle behind various tactics and methods of warfare to 
guide military operations in both offence and defence. Furthermore, regardless of 
the type of warfare, there is no doubt that weapons technology reinforces strategic 
approaches and expands the scope of state strategies. However, the expansion or 
reinforcement of strategies due to developments in technology will still derive 
from fundamental strategic thought as a result of a state’s strategic culture. This is 
especially the case in China, where philosophies are deep-rooted due to the 
particularly long cultural tradition. Strategic culture essentially emphasises that a 
state’s strategic thinking is influenced by its culture; thus, a state’s strategic 
behaviour from one generation to another may well reflect its constant strategic 
culture. (Johnston, 1995:4-5) Thus, it will be argued in this research that even 
though warfare itself has transformed through the different ages, and battlefields 
have changed from land, sea and air in geographical space through to virtual 
cyberspace because of revolutions in weapons technology, modern Chinese 
strategic thought regarding warfare has fundamentally never changed as a 
consequence of the continuing and constant influence of strategic culture. 
Chinese strategic culture is guided by traditional Chinese ideology, which 
has primarily been shaped by the Confucian-Mencian paradigm and the ancient 
Chinese philosophy of war.65 Through investigating a range of literature on 
‘People’s War’, which has not only inherited the military thought of ancient 
Chinese strategists but also links to the modern era and continues to guide modern 
Chinese strategy, this chapter will produce a relevant theoretical discourse. This 
discourse, generated principally from the angle of defence, will clarify the 
ambiguous image of modern Chinese strategy. The structure of Section 3.2 is 
organised chronologically in order to clearly present how People’s War has been a 
                                               
65 This argument will be further elaborated upon in Section 3.3. 
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constant doctrine throughout strategic shifts in modern China from one age to 
another. 
3.2 Chinese strategic culture: a radical factor in shaping Chinese strategy 
In terms of Strategic Studies, it is argued that western strategic thinking and 
discourses may well play the leading role in the world since the western technology 
of warfare is dominant in the modern era. However, the basic tenets of every 
evolutional stage of China’s People’s War all hark back to the work of ancient 
Chinese strategists. Along with China’s rising in these decades, revealing the impact 
of traditional Chinese strategic culture on modern Chinese strategy is therefore 
highly valuable in order to investigate how the traditional thinking shapes the unique 
modern Chinese strategy. Embracing the possibility that non-Western cultures may 
exhibit different ways of thinking and acting in international politics, it is pertinent 
to recognise the impact of Chinese strategic culture on its modern strategy, 
especially when considering security in the 21st century. Chinese strategic culture 
continues to play an important role in modern Chinese strategy, and is likely to 
guide China’s cyber warfare in the digital age. It is arguable that the idea of cyber 
warfare perfectly fits into Chinese strategic thinking which has been formed through 
traditional Chinese strategic culture.  
As Scobell (2002:1) believes, it is important to interpret Chinese strategic 
culture for two reasons: firstly, culture is regarded as a critical part of strategy; 
secondly, the PRC’s scholars, analysts, and policymakers admit that their thinking 
and behaviour is often influenced by traditional Chinese culture relating to 
international relations. Thus, Chinese strategic culture is not merely formed by 
China’s contemporary strategic conditions, its national interest, and specific 
experience of wars, but also shaped by its historical culture and traditional relations 
with neighbouring nations. As Johnston argues, Chinese strategic culture is mainly 
cultivated through traditional Chinese thoughts associated with strategy, namely the 
Confucian-Mencian paradigm and the philosophy of war represented by Sun Tzu’s 
work ‘The Art of War.’ (Johnston, 1995:252-254)  Meanwhile, Dellios (1989:204) 
also states that Chinese strategy combines characteristics of the People Liberation 
Army’s (PLA) heritage with characteristics of contemporary warfare. However, her 
work does not comprehensively examine the specific strategic principles which 
shape this PLA heritage. In sum, it can be concluded that modern Chinese strategy, 
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namely People’s War, is profoundly influenced by Chinese strategic culture, which 
mainly comprises of the Confucian-Mencian paradigm and the ancient philosophy 
of war. 
3.2.1 The doctrine of the Confucian-Mencian paradigm 
In Chinese traditional culture, the Confucian-Mencian paradigm66 is a leading 
ideological model. Chinese traditional culture represented by this paradigm has 
been very influential in shaping the mental and social value of all Chinese people. 
Though the Confucian-Mencian paradigm was oppressed by the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the paradigm remains deep-rooted in the thinking 
of Chinese people. It therefore may well be believed that policymaking in China is 
influenced by this Chinese tradition, as borne out in certain examples.67 
In addition, as Gao (2003:122-129) explores, since the Warring States 
Period68 in China, Chinese ideology has integrated the Confucian-Mencian 
paradigm and the philosophy of war for more than two thousand years, so the 
development of military theory is quite potentially influenced by these factors. 
The Confucian-Mencian paradigm claims that virtuous governance is the 
foundation of a sovereign, and that warfare is only one of the ways to accomplish 
                                               
66 The Confucian-Mencian perspective, which Alastair Iain Johnston terms the Confucian-Mencian 
paradigm, regards the world as harmonious rather than conflictual. (Johnston, 1995) Harmony and 
order can be maintained through virtuous and exemplary behaviour on the part of the ruler. In addition, 
as Yan Xuetong (2011:259) probes, many Chinese scholars believe that ‘traditional Chinese thought 
[mainly Confucian-Mencian paradigm]’ to IR should be and will be recognised as the ‘Chinese school’ 
of IR. In other words, it is shown to be a widespread set of beliefs in the Chinese community in a way 
that is similar to that argued by Johston as this research investigates in the section. 
67 As Xu Keqian (2009) points out, the Confucian-Mencian paradigm has been the basis of Chinese 
cultural value for Chinese people from one generation to another. In addition, evidence shows that this 
paradigm is influential in China’s policymaking , such as in the following examples: 
1.  Wang Zaibang (2011) points out that the white paper China’s Peaceful Development reflects the 
traditional Confucian-Mencian paradigm in guidelines for foreign policy. 
2.  ‘Chinese traditional thought becomes very influential in the thinking of policymakers.’ (Yan, 
2011) For instance, the Chinese government has begun to regard ‘social welfare’ as essential for 
people through reference to the teaching of the Confucian-Mencian paradigm.  
3.  Though the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) oppressed the Confucian-Mencian 
paradigm, China’s 12th Five-Year national planning in 2010 promotes the teaching of the 
Confucian-Mencian paradigm in the national educational system in order to refine the moral 
behaviour of Chinese people. (People.com, 2011) 
4.  China’s foreign policy employs certain Chinese traditions, such as the ancient thought of ‘being 
neighbourly’, as a diplomatic approach to coterminous states. (Yang, 2011) 
5.  On 6th April 2010, President Hu Jintao, China’s paramount policymaker, clearly stressed the 
importance of Chinese traditions in China’s policies in a public speech, encouraging the CCP 
leadership to follow such traditions. (XinHua News-1, 2010) 
68 The Warring States Period (戰國時代, Zhanguo Shidai), also known as the Era of Warring States, 
covers the period from 476 B.C. to the unification of China by the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. (Brooks, 
1998:4) 
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virtuous governance. Accoring to The Analects of Confucius69, Confucius 
considers war with a very prudent mindset, writing: ‘It is only once a truly 
efficacious person has instructed the people for seven years that the subject of 
battle can be broached.’ (Confucius, 1998:170) and ‘To go into battle with people 
who have not been properly trained is to forsake them.’ (Confucius, 1998:170) In 
other words, virtuous government and teaching of the people must precede 
leading them into war. This involves long-term training and should not be rushed, 
lest the people be harmed or even destroyed. Confucius recognises the importance 
of the military in defending against outside threats, protecting the people and 
maintaining state security. When asked by Zi Gong how to govern effectively, 
‘Confucius replied: make sure there is sufficient food to eat, sufficient arms for 
defence, and that the common people have confidence in their leaders.’70 This 
demonstrates the emphasis on both the military and the people which is reflected 
in Chinese strategic culture. In addition, in terms of international relations, Gong 
(2002:153-155) points out that historically the Chinese regarded their country as 
the centre of world, naming it ‘中國’ (Zhongguo), which literally means ‘middle 
kingdom.’ In ancient times, the small states surrounding China had to pay tribute 
if they were conquered. Chinese empires complimented this by giving gifts back 
to these small states in a system known as ‘moralisation’ from the view of the 
Confucian-Mencian paradigm. This was followed in order to maintain harmonious 
relations with other nations, as opposed to using force. Li (1998:240) argues that 
the soul of Chinese strategy created by Chinese civilisation is a strategic culture of 
seeking peace, pursuing unification, and emphasising defence. These three basic 
points are the issues of focus for the study of Chinese strategic culture. In fact, the 
conservative concept of waging a war with prudent consideration represents the 
manner of controlling the forces in traditional Chinese military theory. Another 
influence giving prominence to the concept of peace in Chinese strategic culture is 
the idea of conducting a righteous war. In The Analects of Confucius, ‘Confucius 
                                               
69 This is from an English edition of ‘The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation.’ translated 
by Ames and Rosemont Jr in 1998. (Confucius, 1998) In addition, Confucius’s sayings were 
emobodied by his disciples in this book, which comprises twenty chapters. The sayings attributed to 
Confucius quoted in this research accordingly reflect the arguments and debates of his early followers. 
70 With regards the relations between a ruler and his people, in The Analects of Confucius Confucius also 
said, ‘If a superior man loves propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent. If he loves 
righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit to his example. If he loves good faith, the people 
will not dare not to be sincere.’ (Confucius, 1998:154) 
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said, when the way (道, Dao) prevails in the world, ritual propriety (禮, li), music 
(樂, yue), and punitive campaigns are initiated by the empire (天下有道，則禮樂
征伐自天子出, tianxia you dao, ze liyue zheng fa zi tian zi chu).’(Confucius, 
1998:196) This shows that Confucius insisted that conquering other nations must 
rely on ‘refinement and excellence.’71 In other words, in the sense Confucius 
regarded ‘civil culture and virtue’ as more prudent than waging war. Mencius also 
wrote that using military force with the pretence of benevolence cannot make 
other states submit with sincerity.72 In fact, all of these ideas convey the idea of 
righteous war73 in Chinese traditional culture. As Johnston (1995:68) points out, a 
‘righteous war’ is the only situation in which armed forces can be legitimately 
employed. This is known in Chinese as ‘A campaign must have a name (師出有
名, shi chu you ming).’74 This means a war must be conducted for a righteous 
reason, using armour and weaponry to punish unrighteous violence. (Johnston, 
1995:69) In this way, military action will earn the full support of the populace. 
This has been one of the critical fundamental principles of Chinese strategic 
culture. 
However, in modern conditions, Swaine (2000:21) argues that the choice 
of adopting moralisation or military force will depend on levels of military 
capability and the necessity of using force. That is to say, superior military ability 
is a realistic backbone to ‘moralisation,’ allowing a state to adopt ‘moralisation’ 
                                               
71 According to Confucius ‘If distant populations are still not won over, they persuade them to join them 
through the cultivation of their refinement (文, wen) and excellence (德, de).’ (Confucius, 1998:195-
196) 
72 ‘He who, using force, makes a pretence to benevolence is the leader of the princes. A leader of the 
princes requires a large kingdom. He who, using virtue, practises benevolence is the sovereign of the 
kingdom. To become the sovereign of the kingdom, a prince need not wait for a large kingdom. ….. 
When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, because their 
strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts’ core they are 
pleased, and sincerely submit….’ (Mencius, 1970:190-207) 
73 Righteous war, first used by Mencius, is a revolutionary war waged with the purpose of benevolence to 
overthrow a non-benevolent sovereign. As Mencius said, ‘In the “Spring and Autumn” there are no 
righteous wars. Instances indeed there are of one war better than another. “Correction” is when the 
supreme authority punishes its subjects by force of arms. Hostile states do not correct one another.’ 
(Mencius, 1970:477-478) 
74 This term originates from Liji[The Classic of Rites. In 475-221 B.C., Wu made an incursion into Chen, 
destroying the (places of) sacrifice, and putting to death those who were suffering from a pestilence 
(which prevailed). When the army retired, and had left the territory, Pi, the Grand-administrator of 
Chen, was sent to the army (of Wu). Fu Chai (king of Wu) said to his internuncius, ‘This fellow has 
much to say. Let us ask him a question.’ (Then, turning to the visitor), he said, ‘A campaign must 
have a name. What name do men give to this expedition?’ The Grand-administrator said, ‘Anciently, 
armies in their incursions and attacks did not hew down (trees about the) places of sacrifice; did not 
slay sufferers from pestilence; did not make captives of those whose hair was turning. (Niu, 1997:63) 
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rather than using military force. Bill (1996:6-7) indicates that the traditional 
Chinese economic principle of ‘self-reliance’ is also reflected in the PRC’s 
military, especially with regard to developing its own military technology. 
Modern Chinese strategy demonstrates an eagerness to gain the ability of self-
reliance in order to secure superior military capabilities. In addition, due to the 
influence of Confucian-Mencian paradigm, it is argued that China chooses to 
wage war based on justice. Making a war acceptable to the people must depend on 
legal justifications. However, war does not necessarily have to be defensive; it can 
also be castigatory, such as the Sino-Vietnamese War. Scobell (2002:3) points out 
that, not only does China have a ‘cult of defence’, consistently announcing a 
policy of peaceful, non-expansionist, defensive strategy for the national defence, 
but the justice of using military force is also stressed, under the ‘name’ of 
adopting an offensive or pre-emptive attack. This ‘stealthy’ aggression has 
become one of the features of Chinese strategic culture apparent in modern 
Chinese strategy. 
3.2.2 Ancient Chinese philosophy regarding the importance of war 
In addition to the Confucian-Mencian paradigm, there are a number of Chinese 
ancient discourses on strategy. Some great ancient Chinese philosophers, such as 
Lao Zi and Mozi, advocated peace based on the ancient philosophical concept that 
loving everyone is benevolent. Lao Zi thought highly of the ‘Benevolent 
Governance’ in the Yao and Shun Ages, and his teaching of ‘Benevolent 
Governance’ passed from one generation to another. Lao Zi also fostered the 
Chinese Doctrine of Kingcraft. In most cases, ancient warfare was intended to 
ensure the survival of a nation; its purpose was to protect the people in as 
benevolent a way as possible. Such wars could be considered just, as the aim was 
to save people in crisis. Often, the army labelled itself the army of victory. The 
idea of preventing invasion, promotion of justice and the launch of warfare for 
acceptable reasons stems from the concept of just warfare. The legacy of these 
ideas is that Chinese strategic culture is characterised by the thinking that one 
should not invade others, nor should one be invaded. The best example of this 
concept might be the Great Wall. Since ancient times, China placed emphasis on 
the importance of agriculture. However, nomadic Northern nations attempted 
invasion at various times throughout the Chinese dynasties. Therefore, Emperor 
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Qin Shihuang ordered the building of the Great Wall to prevent invasion by the 
nomads. Militarily, this strategic culture does not reflect a passive defence; rather, 
it combines defence with attack. This allows for the preparation of warfare whilst 
simultaneously reducing the enemy’s combat capability. Once the upper hand is 
gained, warfare would turn from defence to attack. 
In Ralph Sawyer’s (2007:2) view, the seven military classic monographs75 
in ancient China are the textual foundation for official examinations of both 
tactical and strategic conceptualisation, providing a common ground for the 
ancient Chinese philosophies of war. These monographs include Sun Tzu’s The 
Art of War, which is the most significant work to represent ancient Chinese 
strategic thought. It is referred to intensively by Mao Zedong in his theory of 
People’s War.76 As Taiwanese scholars Shen and Wan (2006:3) argue, two points 
can be extrapolated from these seven classic monographs: the first is the 
importance of making a state wealthy, and reinforcing military capability; the 
second is to focus on the flexibility and diversity of the art of war. In addition, it 
can be concluded that the philosophy and principles of People’s War originate 
from Sun Tzu’s strategic thought. Sun Tzu said, ‘Warfare is the greatest affair of 
state, the basis of life and death, the Way [Dao] to survival or extinction. It must 
be thoroughly pondered and analysed.’ (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:157) This implies 
that warfare is very important for nations and accordingly the importance of the 
populace cannot be neglected, a key aspect of People’s War. In addition, Mao’s 
16 character formula ‘Enemy progresses, we retreat; Enemy halts, we harass; 
enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue’ reflects Sun Tzu’s strategic 
thought. The mobile wafare maxim ‘Enemy progresses, we retreat’ is reminiscent 
of Sun Tzu’s ‘If they [enemy] are strong, avoid them’ in the chapter Initial 
Estimations, and ‘One who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent chi 
[life force]’ in the chapter Military Combat. (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:158, 170) 
‘Enemy halts, we harass’, referring to guerrilla warfare, relates to Sun Tzu’s ‘If 
they are rested, force them to exert themselves.’ (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:158) 
‘Enemy tires, we attack’ mirrors Sun Tzu’s ‘Create disorder [in their forces] and 
                                               
75 The seven military classics are: ‘Tai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings,’ ‘The Methods of the Ssu-ma,’ ‘Sun 
Tzu’s Art of War,’ ‘Wu Zi,’ ‘Wei Liao Zi,’ ‘Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung’ and ‘Questions 
and Replies Between Tang Tai-tung and Li Wei-kung.’ (Sawyer, 2007:vii-viii)   
76 According to Mao’s personal letter of the 22nd October 1936, ‘Those military collections being bought 
are not suitable, since most of them are related to tactics. What we need is related to commanding of 
battles and strategy. Based on this requirement, please buy Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”.’ (Mao, 1936) 
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take them.’ (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:158) Finally, ‘enemy retreats, we pursue’ is 
similar to Sun Tzu’s ‘Strike when it [the enemy] is indolent or exhausted.’ (trans. 
by Sawyer, 2007:170) Furthermore, the concept of ‘active defence’ in People’s 
War can be seen in Sun Tzu insistence on the necessity of pre-emption in a 
campaign: ‘Whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy will be 
at ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterward and must race to the conflict 
will be fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not 
compelled by other men.’ (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:166) In terms of mobilisation 
of the people, as Sun Tzu points out, ‘The Dao [way] causes the people to be fully 
in accord with the ruler,’ (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:157) He thus believes that it is 
very important to earn the full support of the people. What’s more, it can be 
argued that the concept of asymmetric warfare, including guerrilla warfare and 
information warfare, also manifests a connection between People’s War and Sun 
Tzu’s thought. For instance, in Mao’s ‘Problems of strategy in China’s 
Revolutionary War’ and ‘On Protracted War,’ as Johnston (1995:255) indicates, 
some precise references can be associated with Sun Tzu’s military thoughts. As 
Peng (2008:31) points out, Mao is inclined to consider a war through dialectics, 
such as big and small, far and near, before and after, weak and strong, war and 
peace, old and current, which can also be found in Sun Tzu’s writings. For 
example, Sun Tzu (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:179) wrote: ‘to keep the enemy’s 
forward and rear forces from connecting; the many and few from relying on each 
other; the upper and lower ranks from trusting each other….’ in the chapter Nine 
Terrains, which is a guideline on the strategic mastery of terrain as a tactic of 
protracted warfare. However, the most classic concept of asymmetric warfare 
extracted from Sun Tzu is the idea of defeating the enemy without actually 
fighting. He argues that ‘One hundred victories in one hundred battles [physical 
conflicts] is not the pinnacle of excellence.’ ‘Subjugating the enemy’s army 
without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.’ (trans. by Sawyer, 2007:161) 
Thus, under such a heritage, the PLA’s devotion to developing special warfare, 
such as cyber warfare, can be easily understandable as the desire to reach ‘the true 
pinnacle of excellence’ in the digital age. 
Though the maxim of subduing the enemy without fighting is perhaps the 
most important for asymmetric warfare, it is arguable that the most important idea 
of all in Sun Tzu’s work might be the ‘war to end all wars.’ Johnston (1995) 
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considers the 245 wars between the Ming Dynasty and great powers near its 
Northern boundary as proof that the diplomatic policies of the Ming government 
were characterised by realist values, advocating the notions of ‘making good use 
of every opportunity to achieve victory’, ‘sustaining the war by means of war’, 
and the ‘war to end all wars.’ 
 
In summary, modern Chinese strategy is shaped by its strategic culture which 
is primarily formed from both traditional culture and the ancient Chinese philosophy 
of war. However, this does not mean that this strategic culture will never change, as 
Chinese strategic culture does not only rely on its origins, but is also significantly 
influenced by the political ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During 
China’s modern time era, Chinese strategic culture has been greatly modified by 
Chairman Mao due to the impact of China’s Cultural Revolution from the 1960s up 
to the present, as this kind of ‘generational change’ is also regarded as an important 
source of strategic culture. (Lantis and Howlett, 2010:89) As Mao (1991) famously 
said, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,’ and ‘With guns the whole 
world can be transformed.’ These sayings have indoctrinated the Chinese people and 
their political leaders since as early as 1927, and accordingly continue to influence 
Chinese modern strategy. From this view, it may be argued that Chinese modern 
strategy does not truly call for peace as it has done in ancient times, despite the 
claims of many Chinese theorists. As a result, it may be that China’s cyber warfare 
includes the significant addition of threats and specific attacks to discourage 
adversaries from waging a war, channelling the concept of a ‘war to end all wars.’  
Further to this, the PRC is one of the few Communist states, with the largest 
number of Communist Party members in the world. The PRC’s Constitution 
regulates that the CCP leads the state’s armed forces and the government 
simultaneously in a ‘one-party state’77. Though the PRC has conducted a policy of 
economic opening since Deng Xiaoping’s era, reforming the societal sector and 
establishing many private enterprises, the deep-rooted one-party system has not 
been altered. As analysed previously, strategic culture is not just influenced by 
traditional culture, but also by the political elite, the primary actors formulating state 
                                               
77 Shambaugh points out that China’s political system is that of a one-party state, and the source of this 
one-party dominance is the close link between the military and the ruling party. He also suggests that 
this one-party state must study the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, so that the regime 
can build social bases of support and form other political parties. (Shambaugh, 2009:96-97) 
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strategy and carrying out strategic behaviour. In China, the political elite are the 
members of the CCP and are heavily influenced by the tenets of the CCP. As 
Shambaugh (2009:144-145) indicates, the CCP has a Party school system to 
cultivate the political elite. Undergoing this training programme has become an 
essential experience for an advanced career in China’s political system. The 
ideology of the political elite, who heavily influence Chinese strategic culture, is 
formed in this party school system.78 
Undoubtedly, in accordance with traditional Chinese culture such as the 
Confucian-Mencian paradigm, Chinese strategic culture traditionally seeks peace 
and pursues defence rather than offence.79 However, the strategic culture in the PRC 
is certainly influenced by the ideology of the CCP. As pointed out by Shen 
Weiguang, known respectfully as the ‘father of Chinese Information Warfare’, 
socialism with Chinese characteristics exhibits features of Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the Three Represents. (2005:168) These ideas 
consistently shape the ideology of the CCP, even though current PRC policies 
diverge from the origins of Communism and do not advocate dictatorship of the 
proletariat. In addition, nationalism and active defence are considered useful 
approaches against imperial invasion in the PRC, which still regards powerful 
Western states, such as the USA, as imperialists. Chinese strategic culture has thus 
differentiated from traditional Chinese culture. Furthermore, Johnston (1996:217) 
argues that China has presented a consistent ‘realpolitik’ or ‘parabellum’ strategic 
culture. He moreover indicates that ‘Chinese decision makers have internalised this 
strategic culture such that China’s strategic behaviour exhibits a preference for 
offensive uses of force.’ (Johnston 3, 1996:217) In this case, the PRC’s development 
of asymmetric warfare as a strategy of pre-emption under the auspices of active 
                                               
78 This school system is called the ‘Central Party School.’ Several key functions are fulfilled through a 
variety of training programmes, including: (Shambaugh, 2009:144) 
1. Marxist-Leninist ideology and the latest party policy documents. 
2. Mechanisms and methods of party organisational control. 
In addition, the Central Party School is a national-level party school, divided into several different 
sub-levels, such as provincial party schools, county party schools and even overseas party schools, 
and also including several cadre academies.(Shambaugh, 2008:829-838) The structure of this 
nationwide school system is fairly complex. 
79 Wang Hongxu, Director of the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the CCP Party School, 
argues that Chinese leaders from Mao to Hu have been influenced by the ideology of Chinese 
traditions upon their strategic thinking. Leaders potentially apply such aspects as the Way (道, dao) 
and ritual propriety (禮, li) [investigated earlier in section 3.2.1], to China’s policy-making. (Wang, 
2011)    
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defence, despite justifications of righteousness when waging war, would come as no 
real surprise.  
3.3 People’s War: a critical doctrine in modern Chinese Strategy  
As examined later in Section 3.3.1, the term ‘People’s War’ originally coined in 
Egels’ work in 1849. Egels’ idea inspired Mao Zedong (also written as Mao Tze-
Tung) to carry out the concept of China’s People’s War in 1927, which gradually 
became the most significant strategic thinking in modern Chinese strategy and has 
been well-known in the world for decades. In addition, Mao first read Clausewitz’s 
work ‘On War’ in 1937, and subsequently applied the concepts put forward by 
Clausewitz in his claim that warfare is the most typical form of political struggle. 
(Mao, 1991:171) In fact, some ideas of People’s War are similar to the concepts put 
forward by Clausewitz. Clausewitz (2001:170)80 argues that war relying on a normal 
army is general warfare and war waged by the power of the masses is an authentic 
‘people’s war’. The countries that best employ the approach of people’s war will 
draw more advantages than countries which neglect the idea. (Clausewitz, 
2001:464-465) As a result, it is therefore arguable that Mao’s military though, 
primarily a People’s War, is actually a hybrid of Western strategic thinking and 
Chinese traditions. 
Furthermore, strategy is a highly contentious concept, and there is no 
exception to this in the case of modern Chinese strategy. Tactics of warfare may be 
changed due to the development of military technology, but a state’s strategy, which 
is beyond the level of tactics, is always bound to a state’s interests. The state will 
guide any approach to warfare in line with these interests. In this way, strategy not 
only influences policy making but is also the guideline for development of military 
power, including military organisations, tactics, doctrine, national defence 
expenditure, logistics, and weapons technology. Some Western research considers 
People’s War to be an outdated, redundant concept with no research value.81 For 
                                               
80 This is a Chinese edition directly translated from ‘Vom Kriege’ which is the original German work of 
Clausewitz. The Chinese edition is titled ‘戰爭論 (Zhanzheng Lun, The theory of war).’ (Clausewitz, 
2001) 
81 Godwin claims that if the concept of Mao’s People’s War is not dispensed with, it will impede the 
modernisation of the People's Liberation Army. (Godwin, 1987:589) Joffe indicates that, in practice, 
the Chinese army has abandoned the concept of People’s War, though due to ideological and political 
reasons, they still claim to be following the military doctrine of People’s War derived from Mao’s 
original conception. As an operational guide to fighting and force-building, ‘Maoist doctrine has not 
been developed by China’s post-Mao leaders; it has been almost completely abandoned.’ (Joffe, 
1987:571)   
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example, Shambaugh (1999:663) asserts that Western researchers pay too much 
attention to the threats of China instead of the meaning behind the threats. In terms 
of a different strategic culture, most recently Pillsbury (2008:181-183) has indicated 
that Western research of Chinese military affairs neglects the traditional stealth of 
the Chinese military and any methods potentially adopted to deceive the enemy. 
Taiwanese scholar Luo Chin-Bo (2005:26) also implies that Western strategists 
would rather study Sun Tzu’s Art of War than investigate why the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) continues to insist on the concept of ‘People’s War’ as the guideline 
of modern Chinese strategy. However, if underlying misapprehensions about 
modern Chinese strategy can be clarified and eradicated, it will be understood why 
China in fact still insists on the legitimacy of People’s War. This is therefore a vital 
research direction. 
Since the initial proposal of the idea of People’s War, modern Chinese 
strategy has through time undergone three key stages: ‘People’s War’ (1927-1977), 
‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ (1978-1991) and ‘Local Wars under High-
Tech Conditions’ (1992-present). These transitions were due to the influences of the 
different time periods, Chinese leaderships, and related circumstances.82 Recent 
research concludes that the Chinese scholars who guide warfare mainly pertain to 
three schools of thought, namely the school of People’s War, the school of local war, 
and the school of military revolution.83 Furthermore, Michael Pillsbury (2000:268) 
argues that these three schools potentially reflect the current structure of Chinese 
defensive power and the development of military doctrines and theories. In 
accordance with his research, 80% of his 55 interviewees, who are Chinese scholars, 
strategists, or military officers, believe that the People’s Liberation Army should 
follow the school of People’s War, even though Western researchers generally 
conjecture that modern Chinese strategy now merely follows the current doctrine of 
‘Local War under Hi-Tech Conditions’, and that People’s War is now an outdated 
                                               
82 The timeframe of the key stages in the transformation of Chinese military strategy from 1927 to the 
present day remains contentious and different scholars put forward different dates. This research refers 
to the timeframes identified by Burles and Shulsky (2000:21-36) 
83 Michael Pillsbury, a leading US scholar of China Studies, led a research team to study and evaluate 
Chinese military power in 2000 in terms of various aspects influencing future national security, thus 
identifying the three schools of thought. (Pillsbury, 2000:269) Pillsbury is a consultant to the US 
government in Washington DC and has advised the Pentagon for more than three decades, including a 
year as Special Assistant for Asian Affairs at the Net Assessment Office, two years as Assistant 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and several years at the RAND Corporation and the 
National Defense University. His book incorporates more than 600 quotations from over 200 Chinese 
authors since 1994.   
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concept. As the school of People’s War still dominates the senior level of Chinese 
leadership, it can accordingly be concluded that the ideas of People’s War will 
continue to influence modern Chinese strategy. In addition, as Pillsbury (2000:292-
296) points out, though the three schools decline to accept each other’s views, there 
is one concept common amongst all three. This is that the strategy of asymmetric 
warfare will inevitably continue to be developed in China. The most significant 
form of asymmetric warfare is cyber warfare, a type of warfare which mainly deals 
with the control of information in cyberspace, a potential battlefield beyond the 
scope of land, sea and air. Chinese military leaders strongly believe that dominance 
of information is an effective asymmetric approach in which ‘the inferior can defeat 
the superior.’ According to Pillsbury’s interviews, it is believed that Information 
Warfare has been linked with People’s War.84  
At each stage of modern Chinese strategy, the concept of People’s War has 
been an invariable characteristic of state strategy, and its principles to this day still 
underlie the fundamental ideology of Chinese military thought despite the passing of 
time. It is thus essential for a true understanding of modern Chinese strategy that the 
principles of People’s War be examined, as well as the application of People’s War 
in each of the three key stages identified above. In addition, it will be suggested that 
the principles of People’s War have always been, and remain, the constant guideline 
of modern Chinese strategy, but that they have switched from an operational 
guideline on a tactical level, applied in the 19th century, to conceptual principles on 
a strategic level behind the development of Comprehensive National Power (CNP)85 
in the 21st century. In order to interpret this argument, the following sections 
investigate the origins and legacy of People’s War. Firstly, since 1927, how did the 
concept of People’s War originate and develop from Mao’s military thought? 
Secondly, the concept of People’s War continued after 1978 when Deng Xiaoping 
                                               
84 According to an example given in Pillsbury’s research, the interviewee clearly points out that ‘The 
concept of People’s War of the olden days is bound to continue to be enriched, improved and updated 
in the information age to take on a brand-new form. . . . only by bringing relevant systems into play and 
combining human intelligence with artificial intelligence under effective organisation and coordination 
can we drown our enemies in the ocean of an information offensive. A people’s war in the context of 
information warfare is carried out by hundreds of millions of people using open-type modern 
information systems.’ (Pillsbury, 2000:292) 
85 ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) (綜合國力, zonghe guoli) is a term employed by the PRC’s 
leadership to represent the evaluation of possible variables for China’s national power. Its concept 
basically means the sum of total powers and resources for a state to be survived. It is evaluated through 
five factors: natural resources, population, economy, military and technology. China values population 
as the most important factor. (Li, 2010:257-260) 
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took over the Chinese leadership. This period was an important turning point in the 
history of the PRC because the reforms started at this time still continue in China at 
present. During the process of modernisation led by Deng, how did the concepts of 
People’s War continue to be developed alongside Deng’s military theory? Although 
the Four Modernisations86 of the Chinese Communist policy were conducted very 
successfully, in relative terms the pace of military modernisation was significantly 
slow. Thirdly, how did the concept of People’s War under the leadership of Jiang 
Zemin in 1992 transform into the new concept of ‘Local War under High-Tech 
Conditions’? Finally, how will the concept of People’s War develop in order to 
tackle future challenges in China?  The different periods are shown in Figure-3 
below. 
1927-1977 1978-1991 1992-present 
People’s War   
 People’s War under 
Modern Conditions 
 
  Local Wars under 
Hi-Tech Conditions 
Tactical Level Strategic Level 
Figure-3: Transformation of Modern Chinese Strategy 
The figure above presents the fact that ‘People’s War’ has constantly been a 
doctrine of modern Chinese strategy from 1927 to present. In the first stage, from 
1927 to 1977, People’s War was a principle at the tactical level of military 
operations on the massive battleground of Mainland China. In the following two 
stages after 1977 (though the term itself does not appear in the title of the latest 
stage) People’s War was transformed into a national strategic level principle. In this 
regard, it is also used to address international affairs, and has become a primary 
principle reinforcing state strategy in different dimensions; not only in the military, 
but also in economics, the societal sector and national construction (key aspects of 
China’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP)87. The principle of People’s War 
itself has not changed, but has instead been applied to different levels and fields, for 
                                               
86 The Four Modernisations are the goals of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. They were first announced by 
Zhou Enlai in 1975 at the Fourth National People’s Congress in one of his last public acts. After his 
death and Mao’s soon thereafter, Deng Xiaoping assumed control of the party in late 1978. In 
December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping announced the 
official launch of the Four Modernisations, formally marking the beginning of the reform era. The Four 
Modernisations were in the fields of agriculture, industry, technology and defence. (Finkelstein, 
1999:103) 
87 Please refer to the definition in Glossary. 
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example by shifting from campaigns on domestic battlefields to the conduct of 
foreign affairs. 
3.3.1 Origins of People’s War (1927-1977) 
The term ‘People’s War’ originally appeared in Engels’ works in 1849.88 He 
stresses that a people which pursues independence should not solely use general 
methods of military operations. Instead, those that are weak in military terms 
should employ guerrilla warfare and enter revolutionary war to defeat those 
stronger than themselves. Two theoretical components feature in Engels’ 
definition of People’s War. The first is that the party using People’s War should 
strive to reach the enemy’s limits of strategic offence. The other is that relying on 
a populace striving for resistance speeds up the process of attaining the enemy’s 
limits of strategic offence. In 1927, Mao Zedong applied Engels’ theory to the 
revolutionary war in China. Mao’s own experiences of the Chinese Civil War 
shaped and cultivated his military ideology, leading to the development of 
‘People’s War,’ which he later officially affirmed in the 7th National Congress of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1945. ‘People’s War’ originally began as 
a special method of using the masses in a societal exercise. It could be argued that 
Mao’s People’s War applied military discipline to the masses in order to mobilise 
them for a political purpose. However, due to differing social conditions 
throughout history, People’s War has taken on different forms since its creation. 
When evaluated theoretically from a military perspective, the concept of People’s 
War can be raised from a tactical level to a strategic level. The Chinese Military 
Encyclopaedia,89 states that ‘People’s War is to seek the liberation of class or 
against foreign aggression, and organise and arm the masses for war. The 
People’s War is in accordance with the fundamental interests of the oppressed 
                                               
88 The term ‘People’s War’ originated in Engels’ work ‘The defeat of the Piedmontese’ written in 1849 
and first published in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 260-263, March 31, April 1 and 4, 1849 in 
Germany. This work is based on the battle of Novara between Italy and Austria in 1848. Engels 
believed that the reason behind the defeat of the Piedmontese is that, due to his personal weaknesses, 
the King of Piedmont naïvely chose to rely on his limited regular army to protect against Austrian 
attack rather than mobilising the oppressed masses to fight. Engels extrapolates that a revolutionary war 
must rely on the masses and employ the style of people’s war, so that oppressed peoples can be 
liberated. This idea inspired Mao’s conception of People’s War in China. The English edition of Engels’ 
works can be found on ‘Engels in Neue Rheinische Zeitung March/April 1849’ on the website of 
Marxists Internet Archive accessed via: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1849/03/31a.htm#263. 
89 The Chinese Military Encyclopaedia 1997 was co-edited by many Chinese military organisations and 
institutions. The quotation is translated by the author of this research. 
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classes and the oppressed nations.’ (Zhang Zhen, 1997:547) People’s War can 
also be the subject of scientific studies into the features and rules of war, which 
may eventually apply as a guideline to the decision of either waging or preventing 
a war. (Zhang Zhen, 1997:1) 
Some strategists regard People’s War as a military doctrine as well as a 
principle of the use of the armed forces. However Taiwanese scholar Shuh-Fan 
Ding (1996:35-43) argues that such a point of view actually refers only to the 
tactical level of People’s War. Thus, in order to truly comprehend People’s War, 
the military philosophy behind it must be examined. As Ding (1996:43) points out, 
some Chinese scholars may consider People’s War to be akin to a military theory 
in its own right, as it contains three elements which could elevate this idea to such 
a level. Firstly, People’s War meets the criteria of being a philosophy, providing 
theoretical guidance for military actions; secondly, People’s War employs an 
army, which serves it in practice; and thirdly, People’s War has a clear set of 
tactics, for use by its military forces. (Ding, 1996:43) In addition, the concept of 
People’s War can be found in Chinese military philosophy, the construction of the 
Chinese national defence and the principles of Chinese operational tactics. Ding 
(1996:19) also points out that the concept of People’s War could in the future 
evolve into a complete military science as it currently heavily dominates the study 
of Chinese military science. (Ding, 1996:19) Two of the PRC’s strongest leaders 
have backed the practice of People’s War: during the Chinese Civil War, Mao 
stressed that ‘our strategies and tactics are established upon the basis of People’s 
War’ (Mao, 1991:1248) Deng additionally acknowledged that Chinese strategy 
was formed by Chairman Mao and Mao’s key strategic principle was People’s 
War. (Peng, 2000:173) Furthermore, Chinese academia shows that the military 
thought first proposed by Mao consists of three elements: the notion of People’s 
War, the idea of constructing a ‘people’s army’ and the operational approaches of 
People’s War. In 2002 Chinese scholar Pan Zhaohuan reported that the senior 
generals then in office regarded the philosophy, strategy and tactics of People’s 
War as the core of Mao Zedong’s thought. (Pan, 2002:13) As Pan (1992:7-8) 
indicates, the Japanese Defence Report 1962 states that ‘respecting the thoughts of 
soldiers and people’ is included in the military thought of Chairman Mao. The 
report also indicates that Mao’s People’s War combines the concept of total 
militarisation with the development of military meritocracy. It has been clearly 
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indicated that in terms of contemporary Chinese strategy, the concept of People’s 
War already formed China’s national defence doctrine in Mao’s time. (Baylis et 
al., 1987:132-135) Mao’s tactics of deterrence against threats from ‘imperialists’, 
such as the US and the USSR, were based on the fact that at that time China was 
vulnerable and weak. Mao advocated the idea that ‘everyone is a soldier’ in order 
to conduct ‘Protracted War’ as an operational guideline for guerrilla warfare. 
(Baylis et al., 1987:133) Thus, the concept of People’s War was clearly a key 
element in Mao’s military thought. Mobilisation of the masses, total militarisation, 
and harnessing of the people’s will to defeat the enemy were the goals of People’s 
War. The core and critical ideas of People’s War were formulated from these 
three goals. 
Moreover, in terms of a people’s army, Mao drew conclusions from 
previous experiences of armed struggle and decided that the first issue of People’s 
War for the Chinese armed struggle was to organise peasants’ armed forces into a 
people’s army. Mao said that ‘To struggle for the creation of an army of the 
Chinese people is the task of the whole nation. Without an army of the people 
there will be nothing for the people.’ (Mao III, 1954:291) The principle behind the 
construction of the people’s army may be founded on the Marxist guideline of a 
revolution of the proletariat. The proletariat in China at that time were peasants, as 
China was a country established upon the agricultural industry, and according to 
Mao: ‘The armed struggle of the Chinese Communist Party is peasant war under 
the leadership of the proletariat.’90 (Mao, 1991:609) Furthermore, according to 
ancient Chinese works on warfare, the scale of peasant uprising and peasant war 
in Chinese history had been extremely large and virtually unmatched in the rest of 
the world. Only in Chinese semi-feudal society can such a large-scale uprising be 
found. (Mao, 1991:630-635)  
In order to successfully construct the people’s army, it was necessary to 
provide and follow a theoretical approach and strict guidelines, so that the armed 
forces, made up mostly of peasants, could be transformed into a people’s army 
with strong discipline and high military attainment, whilst still retaining the 
character of the proletariat and a close association with the masses. As the army 
would originally be drawn from the masses, the army can be impelled to be ready 
                                               
90 The English is translated from the Chinese version of ‘Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung III’ (Mao, 
1954:60) 
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for battle at all times in order to securely maintain their own fundamental interests. 
In addition to being ready for battle, the army must also shoulder the 
responsibility of organising the masses, arming the people, and constructing a new 
regime through revolution. (Mao, 1991:86) Mao indicated that to establish a 
strong national defence, the Chinese people must rely on themselves. (Mao II, 
1993:524) Mao told the people that, with regards the construction of a people’s 
army, ‘What we are doing and investigating is how to industrialise socialism and 
how to modernise national defence, and then how to cope with the new challenges 
in the atomic age’ (Mao, 1977:144) Mao hoped to build up an army from scratch, 
take it from a low level of quality to a high level, and in doing so reinforce the 
modernisation and normalisation of the armed forces. In terms of modernisation, 
Mao stressed that ‘The latest military equipments must be acquired and the latest 
tactics must be studied alongside them.’ Regarding normalisation, Mao required 
the ‘execution of unified command, unified institutionalisation, unified 
organisation, unified discipline and unified training, in order to carry out perfect 
joint operations throughout the different services.’ (Mao III, 1993:103; 337; 374; 
314) 
In summary, at the time of origin, it can be concluded that People’s War 
contained the following features, which gave People’s War the potential to 
transform from a tactical to a strategic level. In addition, these features may 
continue to apply to other forms of warfare in the digital age. 
1)  The army and the people are the foundation of victory:  
Both the people and the army are the main actors conducting warfare. In Mao’s 
‘On Protracted War,’ he states succinctly that ‘The army and the people are the 
foundation of victory.’ (Mao & Lawrence, 1954:237) In addition, in terms of 
both offence or defence, the potential to conduct warfare is deep-rooted in the 
masses. (Mao, 1991:511) Through his experiences of the Chinese revolution, 
Mao came to believe that the people are the primary actors in warfare and 
manpower is the main resource for a successful war. 
2)  Conducting/defending against a war must rely on the mobilisation of the 
people: 
Mao perceived that it is not enough to simply recognise the importance of the 
people in a war. It is also vital to know how to mobilise the people to engage in 
and support warfare. Mao claimed that in order to mobilise the people 
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effectively and collectively, the political purpose behind the war must be 
clearly outlined so that the armed forces have a clear understanding of their 
own actions; the political steps and policies for achieving the final purpose 
must be illustrated so that the people know how to reach these goals; the 
propaganda encouraging the people to join up must cater to the masses so that 
mobilisation can achieve maximum success; and the political motivation 
behind the armed struggle must be upheld so that the armed forces can be 
retained. (Mao, 1991:480-481) In addition, the implementation of solutions to 
the practical problems of the people, as well as consideration of the people’s 
interests, are imperative, so that the masses can see visible benefits and be 
willing to be mobilised for war. (Yuan, 2000:141) 
3)  The approach of three combinations of forces:   
In order to achieve mobilisation of the people, one of the most significant 
elements is the approach of three combinations of forces. The first combination 
is that of the main troops with local troops; the second is the regular army with 
the guerrilla army; and the third is armed masses with non-armed masses. The 
integrated power of the people can thus be exerted seamlessly. Local troops 
can liaise between the main troops and the armed masses, so that each force 
can provide support to the others. (Mao, 1991:1041) 
4)  Creation of new battlefields91:  
According to Mao, a battlefield is a geographical space for opponents to 
accomplish the purposes behind their warfare and to compete with each other 
in a certain time limit through operational organisation, format of combat, and 
operational approaches. (Mao, 1950:58-59) Based on this principle, in the 
Chinese Civil War Mao harnessed geographical advantages in the battlefield to 
the greatest extent, so that his inferior army could defeat a relatively superior 
opponent and play off the enemy’s vulnerability by evading their strength in 
order to gain the final victory.  
5)  The primary tactics of People’s War: 
(1)  Mao integrated his understanding from past military experiences to 
propose his tactical concept of guerrilla warfare, which forms the basis of 
                                               
91 This involves the deliberate tactic of leading the enemy to new battlefields. This can reflect tactics of 
manoeuvre warfare, protracted warfare, or attrition warfare, if the military power of the enemy is 
superior. 
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People’s War theory. The concept is manifested in a 16 character formula 
from his work of 1928: ‘Enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; 
enemy retreats, we pursue.’92 (Mao, 1954:212) This formula was produced 
in accordance with the principle of luring the enemy, but also contains 
levels of tactical offence and defence. In addition, the formula also 
interprets the tactical retreat and counterattack. The operational tactics of 
People’s War were developed based on this short formula. (Mao, 1950:54) 
(2)  Further to that, the concept of People’s War emphasises two military 
methods: ‘Mobile Warfare’93 and ‘Positional Warfare.’94 The former is a 
basic form of eliminating the opponent by taking advantage of familiarity 
with the geographical space of the military theatre. The latter involves 
building up a solid fortification as a hard defensive shell to delay the 
enemy’s attack. (Mulvenon and Yang, 2001:137) Mao indicates that 
mobile warfare was the major form of combat during the Anti-Japanese 
War and that guerrilla warfare should be regarded as the secondary form. 
(Mao II, 1954:224) As James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang 
(2001:136) state, mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare 
are the three basic tactics of People’s War put forward by Mao. They can 
additionally be further developed and applied to modern hi-tech warfare. 
(3)  There are two ‘effects’ of People’s War in terms of attrition warfare 
tactics: the first is the ‘swarm effect’ which involves taking advantage of 
plentiful manpower to exhaust the enemy on the battlefield; and the second 
is the ‘sting effect’: using mobile weaponry equipment to sneak up on the 
enemy. (Dellios, 1989:205) The purpose of the employment of these two 
effects is to achieve the measured destruction of the enemy through the use 
of the masses in the battlefield. 
(4)  In addition, there are ten principles of operations.95 These principles had 
been successfully implemented in Mao’s past experiences of military 
                                               
92 This is taken from the English translated text ‘Selected Works of Mao Tz-Dong.’ (Mao and Lawrence,      
    1954:212 ) 
93 Mobile Warfare, larger in scale than guerrilla warfare, is the English term for one of Mao Zedong's 
operational tactics. For the general topic of military mobility, however ‘manoeuvre warfare’ is the term 
generally being used in the Western military orthodoxy. 
94 As Mulevnon and Yang (2001:137) point out, the PLA interprets and applies the concept of positional 
warfare as‘digging tunnels and hardening shelters on the battlefield.’ 
95 According to the ‘Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung IV,’ these ten principles are: 1. Attack dispersed, 
isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later. 2. Take small and medium 
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conflict. Thus, they were viable military approaches to accomplishing the 
principles of People’s War, and could also provide a doctrine for People’s 
War under conditions of different warfare in the future, whilst maintaining 
the basis of solidarity between the people and the armed forces. 
6)  Active defence as a deterrence strategy: 
Mao stresses that tactics of defence must adopt active, not passive, approaches. 
(Mao I, 1993)  The army and the people should be consolidated for defensive 
purposes through various methods such as mobilisation of the people, 
organisation of the militia96 and the ‘three combinations’ mentioned previously. 
Furthermore, this solidarity not only applies to military conflict against the 
outside threats of imperialists, but also extends to the construction of society 
and development of the economy to reinforce Comprehensive National Power 
in the future. Once defensive approaches in a state become active in nature, this 
may result in the outcome of deterrence. 
3.3.2 The continuing strategic guideline of People’s War under Deng (1978-1991) 
Following Mao, Deng took over the leadership of China in 1978. From this time, 
there was no occurrence of any significant war, so Deng shifted the emphasis of 
military strategy to focus on a principle centred on national interest. Deng’s 
guideline was entitled ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’, so titled because 
Deng believed that Mao’s doctrine should be continued and adapted to fit into the 
new conditions brought about by the advent of the modern era. (Deng I, 
1994:10)97  
This shift further affected Chinese foreign policy, in particular state policy 
towards the USA. In 1989, at a meeting with former US President Nixon, Deng 
                                                                                                                                         
cities and extensive rural area first; take big cities later. 3. Make wiping out the enemy’s effective 
strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. 4. In 
every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force, encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to 
wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. 5. Fight no battle unprepared; fight no 
battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle. 6. Give full 
play to our style of fighting – courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous 
fighting. 7. Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare. 8. With regard to attacking cities, 
resolutely seize all enemy fortified points which are weakly defended. 9. Replenish our strength with 
all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. 10. Make good use of the intervals 
between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. (Mao, 1967:161-162) 
96 Militia means a military force that is raised from the civil population to supplement a regular army 
under certain conditions. 
97 The ‘Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping’ is divided into three volumes. Volume I records Deng’s works 
from 1938 to 1965; volume II is from 1975 to 1982; and volume III is from 1982 to 1992. Volume III 
was published in 1993, and afterwards volume I and II were published in 1994.  
-87- 
 
clearly expressed that both China and the USA recognised the principle that each 
state would choose to look after their own interests above all else. (Deng II, 
1993:79) In addition, Ross (2009:15) points out that during the time of their 
respective leaderships, both President George H. W. Bush and Deng Xiaoping 
sought to stabilise relations between China and the USA. As Mi (2004:308) states, 
Deng’s strategic theory was not merely the guidance for military operations, but 
also concentrated on the importance of national construction and development. 
Deng himself proclaimed that the most important interest for China was national 
stability. (Deng II, 1993:284) This stability would have to be established upon the 
foundation of China’s continuing modernisation, so Deng was keen to promote his 
agenda of domestic military reforms and ‘opening and reform policy’ to open the 
doors of China to the international economic market. (Ross, 2009:16) Mao’s 
leadership was established in wartime, when the primary task of the Chinese 
Communist Party was the overthrow of the Nationalist Party regime. However, 
after World War II and the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, Deng believed 
that there would not be any more large-scale wars for at least a few decades to 
come. (Deng I, 1994:77) In addition, O’Dowd (2007) claims that China’s lack of 
success in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 revealed the poor quality of the 
manpower, equipment and logistics of the Chinese military at the time. As Scobell 
(2003:411-415) argues, after the Second World War there was a phase of intense 
technological development throughout the world, including military technology, 
potentially causing a deep concern about the quality of the soldiers who would be 
required to master such modern equipment in the future. Deng’s military theory 
therefore not only made sure to follow the doctrine of People’s War, but also 
provided new related guidelines on waging ‘local wars’98 under modern 
conditions. In 1978, Deng shifted military theory from ‘People’s War’ to 
‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’. (Joffe, 1987:557) Joffe (1987:559) 
claims that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had to add some new ideas to the 
traditional concept of People’s War in order to effectively tackle the new 
challenges raised by the change of Chinese leadership. He indicates, for instance, 
                                               
98 According to Chinese national strategy, as identified by Burles and Shulsky (2000:31), there are five 
types of ‘local war’: ‘(1) small-scale border conflicts, (2) contention for territorial seas and islands, (3) 
surprise air attacks, (4) resistance against partial hostile intrusions, and (5) punitive counterattack.’ 
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that the idea of luring the enemy in99 may not be applicable to future warfare, and 
so it would be imperative to study new methods of warfare and adjust the role of 
the guerrilla troops and the militia. (Joffe, 1987:560) 
How, then, was the concept of People’s War continuingly developed 
alongside Deng’s military theory? Firstly, Deng inherited the basic concept of 
mobilising the people, but used this for the purpose of the construction of the 
national defence rather than for carrying out military operations, as in Mao’s era. 
As Liu (2000:113) points out, ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ still 
emphasises mobilising people in various sectors to reinforce the ability of China’s 
national defence. The data of Comprehensive National Power (CNP)100 can 
provide quantitative statistics on the potential for mobilisation of the people. 
Secondly, in terms of application and construction of armed forces, Deng 
maintained the concept of the ‘three combinations’, though in 1987 he refined the 
combinations to field troops, local troops, and militia.101 The guiding principle for 
the establishment of the militia was to control quantity, refine quality, place 
emphasis only on what is truly important, and construct a strong foundation. (Liu, 
2000:115) In addition, Deng stressed that the army must be able to cope with a 
sudden outbreak of war on a local scale and be prepared for a war on a large scale. 
(Peng, 2000:174) Crucially, People’s War must be adjusted to fit the features of 
modern warfare. Future warfare would be conducted in modern conditions. 
Therefore, in addition to development of military technology and weaponry, 
cultivation of military manpower, militia and soldiers would be necessary to 
strengthen the effectiveness of People’s War. (Deng-2, 1993:46) As much as 90% 
of the PLA is considered to be a ‘junkyard army’ by some Western scholars, but 
as Bitzinger (2001:41) insists, they must not be overlooked. He emphasises that 
extensive manpower is far from being useless in local wars under modern 
conditions, and that superior weapons technology is not the be-all and end-all. 
                                               
99 ‘Lure the enemy in’ is a tactic of ‘strategic retreat’ from Mao’s military thought. Facing invasion from 
outside imperialists, it would have been unlikely to successfully prevent the enemy from encroaching 
on territory, and so it would in fact be better to let the enemy enter further into the territory where the 
CCP would be more likely to win struggles. (Wang, 1999:94)  As Elleman (2002) argues, the idea of 
luring the enemy in was a way of using geographical space to buy time. 
100 Comprehensive National Power is a thorough indication of the Chinese state’s politics, economy, 
military, technology, diplomacy, education, and culture.   
101 The three combinations of Mao’s People’s War involved normal troops, guerrilla troops and militia. 
(Deng Xiaoping, 1993:46) In 1983 the PRC rebuilt the system of the reserve forces and organised tens 
of reserve military divisions in order to reinforce military power after a massive downsizing of the 
regular army. (Liu, 2000:115)   
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Collins (1973:18) also argues that a fundamental struggle is for the consolidation 
of the people’s will.102 This is the key issue in any military conflict and other 
issues like superiority of weapons are in fact not as crucial. 
In conclusion, Deng’s military strategy was inherited from Mao’s People’s 
War. Despite the changes in strategy, Deng believed that wars under modern 
conditions could still be fought through the practice of People’s War. Modern 
conditions merely changed the materials used, but did not affect the true essence 
of war. In addition, Deng insisted that due to these modern conditions, the concept 
of People’s War must be combined with a modernisation of the national defence 
and armed forces. It could therefore be argued that in Deng’s era, People’s War 
had attained an advanced level. People’s War at this level used Deng’s policy of 
the ‘Four Modernisations’ to allow more power to be released from all societal 
sectors, so that the power of the people could be combined with the regular army 
to prepare for or even prevent a war. Comparatively, People’s War in Mao’s era 
was at a more basic level. Deng further claimed that the tactical thought of his 
military strategy was that of ‘active defence.’ (Deng, 1992:97) Though this was 
the guiding idea at a strategic level, at an operational level necessary offensive 
approaches must also be adopted. Deng (1992:98) stressed his four basic intents: 
to embed defence into offence and merge the two; to be prepared for war at any 
time; to defeat the enemy with a well thought out plan103; and to follow the tactic 
of protracted war.104 
3.3.3 The guideline of ‘Local War under Hi-Tech Conditions’ (1992-present) 
Jiang Zemin took over the Chinese leadership in 1989. His military experience 
was not as abundant as Mao’s or Deng’s, and as a result, his military thought 
basically rested upon the military theories of his predecessors, as well as being 
influenced by domestic and international factors during that time105. Jiang 
                                               
102 According to Collins’ interpretation of strategic thought, revolutionary warfare (such as People’s War) 
falls into a different category of warfare to that merely waged in land, sea and aerospace. He believes 
that revolutionary war goes beyond geographical territory into the realms of politics, society, and 
psychology. (Collins, 1972:18)  
103 According to Deng’s theory, if war is inevitable, it is best to focus on good preparation in peace time 
to achieve victory on the battlefield in wartime. (Liu, 2000:26, 91) 
104 Deng’s guidelines emphasised that the PLA must strive for the goal of being constantly prepared for a 
long drawn-out war. (Liu, 2000:93) 
105 Domestic factors include the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, disadvantages caused by economic 
reform, and the return of Hong Kong and Macao to China. International factors include economical 
sanctions against China for human rights abuse following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 in New York, the 1991 Gulf War, the conflict in Kosovo, and 
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therefore changed China’s strategic guideline from being based on the 
battleground to focusing on the development of national power, causing the 
transformation in China’s strategy to ‘Local War under Hi-Tech Conditions.’  
It can be argued that the Chinese leadership would invariably regard the 
massive Chinese populace as a fundamental basis of strategy throughout time, 
from the period of traditional battlefields to any new developmental stages. Thus, 
the idea of People’s War was retained by Jiang with regards the development of 
national power. Jiang proclaimed two basic changes: military strategy would shift 
from local wars under ‘general conditions’ to local wars under ‘hi-tech 
conditions’106; secondly, the army must begin to follow a model of qualitative 
efficiency rather than one of mere quantitative scale (Xiao, 2004:141-142) These 
two basic changes formed the direction of military development during this period. 
Additionally, in order to strengthen the political loyalty of the populace, Jiang 
(2001:2) announced the ‘Three Represents.’107 According to the 2002 China 
National Defence report, the ‘Three Represents’ have since been written into the 
Constitution of the PRC (as the ‘important thought of Three Represents’) so that 
the PLA is required to learn and implement them by law. These ‘represents’ are 
not only designed to re-assert the exclusive leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party in China but also to stress the goals of revolutionising, modernising, and 
normalising the PLA. As Shambaugh (1996:274) states, due to these changes, 
since 1989 the PLA have gained more and more influence in the higher echelons 
of the Chinese political environment. In addition, according to Taiwanese 
researcher Wong (2007:272), Jiang realised that the assurance of efficient 
logistics was an essential factor in winning a local war under hi-tech conditions, 
since the scale of consumption of resources can be extremely unpredictable in 
operational forms of modernised warfare. As the Congressional Report of the 
United States (2003:21) points out, despite the PRC having the largest army in the 
world, the Chinese military would not have been able to successfully wage a war 
                                                                                                                                         
the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96. All served to convince Chinese leaders that they had to re-
assess how they should prepare for future conflicts. (Scobell, 2008:34) 
106 Jiang announced his military strategy of ‘winning local wars under hi-tech conditions’ at the PRC 
Central Military Commission in 1993. 
107 The ‘Three Represents (三個代表, Sange Daibiao)’, a socio-political ideology of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), was first introduced officially by Jiang Zemin at the 16th Party Congress in 
2002. The ‘Three Represents’ are: The CCP represents advanced social productive force; the CCP 
represents the progressive course of China’s advanced culture; the CCP represents the fundamental 
interests of the majority. (Jiang, 2002) 
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outside the Chinese territory due to the lack of supportive technology and logistics 
at the time. Shambaugh (2004:10) also argues that the Chinese army was at this 
point around 20 years behind the US army in terms of development of military 
technology. Therefore, it became necessary to reform China’s military affairs and 
distribute strategic resources more effectively. 
Finkelstein (2004:11-13) claims that since 1995, the PLA has presented its 
determination to standardise and legalise army modernisation. New defence law 
and relevant regulations have been generated in order to reform military affairs, 
including military personnel, logistics, acquisition, and technology R&D.108 
Institutional reform of the military has thus become the core issue of the army’s 
development. The PLA’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)109 is based on the 
inherent characteristics of China’s military. According to the 2004 China Defence 
Report, China’s armed forces were reduced by 200,000 soldiers alongside a 
simultaneous reinforcement of the navy, air force and 2nd artillery troops. In 
addition a boost was given to the information infrastructure and weaponry 
modernisation was accelerated. In addition, the PLA began to conduct a strategic 
scheme to identify talent. This is a crucial scheme in the institutional reform 
which emphasises that high quality in the military is vital to achieving the aims of 
People’s War under hi-tech conditions. As stated in the 2004 China Defence 
Report, Jiang devised a plan to implement the scheme in 2003, in order to 
cultivate the military elite in the long-term. This plan is divided into two stages: 
firstly, the quality of military manpower will be visibly refined by 2010; and 
secondly a vast leap in quality of the military elite will be made between 2011 and 
2020. 110 Jiang also clearly indicates that within 10-20 years the PLA will have 
‘informationised’ troops which can, through training, easily master information 
warfare. 
During his leadership, Jiang generated the military theory of ‘Winning 
Local Wars under Hi-Tech Conditions’ and devoted himself to reforming the PLA 
by carrying out a RMA with the Chinese characteristics outlined by People’s War. 
                                               
108 For instance, in 1999 PLA Civilian Regulations were enacted and in 2000, the PRC Military Officer 
Law was enacted. In addition, the PLA also established the Professional Military Education System and 
a professional corps of non-commissioned officers. (Finkelstein, 2004:13-15) 
109 Please refer to Section 3.4 for more details. 
110 As Scobell (2009:10) notes, the first major reform would inevitably involve a massive downsizing of 
the force. Since 1985, the PLA’s manpower has been reduced by approximately 1.7 million people. 
More recently, the “Active-Duty Officers Law” launched mandatory retirement ages for each officer 
grade as well as minimum service requirements prior to retirement eligibility. 
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However, unlike in Mao’s era, where the main tactic was to lure the enemy into a 
certain geographical territory and then wear them down by the use of sheer 
numbers, Jiang’s concept of People’s War ‘under high-tech conditions’ involves 
strategically mobilising the people and enabling defeat of the militarily superior 
despite possible military inferiority on the part of China. The features of ‘Local 
Wars under Hi-Tech Conditions’ are: the geographical space of war is smaller; the 
pace and progress of war is faster; and due to these conditions, the transparency of 
information and accuracy of attack have become much more important in warfare 
than they used to be, thus changing the face of war. Furthermore, as a Chinese 
scholar (Zhang, 1999:84) states, ‘hi-tech conditions’ basically refer to the 
conditions of information warfare. The strategy of ‘Winning Local Wars under 
Hi-Tech Conditions’ guides the preparation of military operations in accordance 
with the features of information warfare, and focuses on the preparation of 
warfare to comply with the transformation from the industrial age to the 
information age. (Zhang, 1999:184)  
In 2004, Hu Jintao took over the Chinese leadership. In 2006, he clearly 
specified that the PRC must accelerate informationisation and aim to ‘win local 
wars under information conditions’. (Xiu and Yang, 2007:82) Meanwhile, ‘active 
defence’ has still been retained as the main tactic to achieve this strategic aim and 
in fact, since 2006, has become even more of a clear tactic than it originally was. 
As Peng (2006:228) points out, in terms of active defence, to offend is in order to 
defend and to retreat is in order to progress. In addition, recent research shows 
that modern Chinese strategy persistently focuses on tactics and techniques, such 
as rapid movements, surprise, deception, camouflage, and concealment, by which 
‘military inferiority can overcome the military superiority.’ (Blasko, 2003:66) As 
Chinese scholar Deng (2006:219) points out, the original army of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) used old equipment to successfully defeat an enemy 
using modern equipment. Having access to superior high technology, following 
traditional military principles and conducting regular warfare, are no longer 
necessarily satisfactory to overcome all of a range of potential attacks in new 
warfare. Deng (2006:219) asserts that the operational thought of ‘an inferior 
military defeating superior adversaries’ reflects the basic idea of ‘asymmetric 
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warfare,’111 which has been studied by many Chinese strategists recently. Blasko 
(2003:66) points out that a report of the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission concludes that the PLA is fascinated by asymmetric strategies such 
as cyber warfare and information warfare due to the belief that these strategies can 
counter the military superiority of countries such as the USA. Taiwanese scholar 
Li-Ming Gu (2009:79) also indicates that the implicit concept of People’s War is 
the insistence on implementing asymmetric warfare. He additionally states that 
the mobilisation of people has been modified to focus on indirect mobilisation of 
the private sectors of society, a strategy which applies to new forms of battlefield, 
such as cyber space, the economy, trade, information, and psychology. 
3.4 China’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
Apart from Chinese strategic culture and the passing of traditional doctrine from one 
generation to another, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)112 is another key 
influence on modern Chinese strategy. The RMA creates policy for China to 
develop cyber warfare in the digital age in order to successfully proceed with the 
national strategic guideline: ‘winning local war under hi-tech conditions.’113 RMA 
basically implies that the tactics and operational methods of warfare must undergo a 
critical change.114 Historically, as Knox and Murray (2001:13-14) explain, there 
have been five general forms of RMA through time: 
Military Revolution 1: the seventeenth-century creation of the modern 
state and of modern military institutions; Military Revolution 2 and 3: 
the French and Industrial Revolutions; Military Revolution 4: the First 
World War; Military Revolution 5: nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile delivery systems. 
                                               
111 The 1997Quadrennial Defense Review (a study by the United States Department of Defense that 
analyses strategic objectives and potential military threats), reports that the doctrine of ‘US Vision of 
Joint Operations’ has been unveiled, encouraging the US to adopt the strategy of ‘asymmetric warfare.’ 
Cassidy (2003:8) interprets that asymmetric is ‘acting, organising and thinking differently from 
opponents to maximize relative strengths, exploit opponents’ weaknesses or gain greater freedom of 
action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational or a combination, and entail different 
methods, technologies, values, organisations or time perspectives.’ 
112 According to The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, the term ‘Revolution in Military 
Affairs’ (RMA) was coined by Michael Roberts, a British historian, in a speech in 1955. (Knox and 
Murray, 2001:1) The term implies a conceptualisation of future warfare, especially associated with 
information and communication technology.  
113 Please refer to Section 3.2.3 for a more in-depth discussion. 
114 As explained by Toffler (1993:32),  ‘A military revolution, in the fullest sense, occurs only when a 
new civilisation arises to challenge the old, when an entire society transforms itself, forcing its armed 
services to change at every level simultaneously – from technology and culture to organisation, 
strategy, tactics, training, doctrine, and logistics.’ 
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At every military revolution, each state will review its own military ability to 
set up a new goal of state strategy. In 2002, the PRC clearly proclaimed in its 
national defence report that China has started developing the strategy of information 
warfare115 as the primary stage of China’s Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA). 
(China’s National Defence, 2002) In addition, recent research shows that the 
conduct of cyber warfare is one of the significant strategies forming China’s 
response to US military transformation in the 21st century. (Mulvenon et al., 2006:5-
10) As a result, according to precepts of modern Chinese strategy, the Chinese 
government is devoted to develop its own RMA with unique Chinese characteristics, 
cultivated by the thinking of modern Chinese strategy. This revolution focuses on 
the development of cyber warfare as an asymmetric strategy. This involves avoiding 
the opponent’s strengths and instead attacking vulnerabilities in order to allow the 
militarily inferior to beat superior opponents. As such, it is believed that China’s 
RMA may be different to the RMAs developed by Western countries. (Blasko, 2005) 
As investigated by Lin Chong-Bin116, Chinese military leaders have been 
promoting a vision of China’s RMA since the mid-1990s, clearly stating that China 
must: 1) catch up to the level of informationisation of developed Western countries; 
2) digitalise the functioning of the PLA’s armed forces and troops; 3) establish the 
ability to oppose an opponent’s C4ISR system in order to ‘paralyse’ the enemy; 4) 
establish the ability of pre-emptive strike; 5) establish the ability to deploy computer 
viruses in cyber warfare. (Lin, 1999:6) China’s 2002 national defence report clearly 
shows that the PLA will attempt to use information technology to establish a ‘multi-
dimensional’ battle space (including land, sea, air, space and cyberspace).  As a 
result of this, 20,000km of optical fibre cable networks were laid in Western China 
in 2002. China is strengthening its military ability through the establishment of a 
civil information infrastructure, particularly reinforcing cyber warfare and 
information operations capacities. As Chinese Major General Dai Qingmin (2002) 
notes, according to a report of the PLA Military Science Academy to the National 
Chinese Military Committee, a significant indication of China’s RMA, China is 
desperate to develop cyber warfare. Dai (2002:112-117) points out that some critical 
issues of China’s cyber warfare in this report are: 1) reliance on opponents’ 
                                               
115 Initially, the PRC used the term ‘information warfare’ 信息戰 [Xinxi Zhan], rather than using the term 
‘cyber warfare.’ However recent focus seems to be on cyberspace rather than information systems. 
116 Professor Lin Chong-Bin is a well-known expert in China’s military studies and is a former Deputy 
National Defence Minister in the Republic of China.   
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information infrastructures; 2) vulnerabilities of cyberspace; 3) indispensable 
technical training for cyber warfare; 4) achievement of information superiority; 5) 
incorporating characteristics of Chinese modern strategy. Moreover, in terms of 
military modernisation, the PLA believes that implementing cyber warfare will be 
conducive to the successful development of China’s RMA as well as creating a 
symbolic application of advanced information technology in China’s military. 
Developing cyber warfare can therefore be regarded as a consensus of state strategy 
in China.  
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Chapter Four: 
China’s Cyber Warfare/Strategy – An analytical framework 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, People’s War can be defined as the strategy of 
mobilising the populace to achieve a strategic aim. Originally, People’s War was 
conducted on geographic battlefields located in Mainland China. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) employed the strategy of People’s War to drive the massive 
populace, mainly consisting of the Chinese proletariat, into wearing down the CCP’s 
militarily superior opponent in order to ultimately gain victory during the Chinese Civil 
War of the early 20th century. Subsequently, since the founding of the PRC in 1949, 
People’s War became and has remained a key guideline for China, not only in terms of 
military strategy but also for national development. The concept of People’s War 
incorporates the ideas of active defence, asymmetric warfare, protracted warfare, and 
guerrilla warfare117; thus, those with inferior military capability are able to deter and 
even defeat those superior to them. When the PRC’s opponent, the Republic of China 
(ROC), governed by the Chinese Nationalist Party, retreated across the Taiwan Strait 
during the civil war, the CCP was forced to accept that People’s War was restricted by 
conditions of geographical territory. Meanwhile, in the modern digital age, the inherent 
features118 of cyberspace have shaped it into a potential battleground. It can be seen that 
some principles deriving from People’s War may in fact be applicable to cyber warfare, 
and in turn, the features of cyberspace also lend themselves to the strategic concept of 
People’s War, so that it may be carried out without any geographical limitation in this 
virtual battlefield. In addition, as Timothy Thomas (2007) notes, China’s cyber warfare 
doctrine and theory are heavily infused with a unique concept of the ‘stratagem’ 
inherited from ancient Chinese strategy, which historically has had no direct parallel in 
Western military culture. Briefly, a ‘stratagem’ is ‘a manoeuvre to deceive or outwit an 
enemy in war.’  
As Chapter Three outlines, Chinese strategies are an integral part of the military 
cultural heritage of China dating back 2000 years, first conceived by ancient strategists 
and philosophers (primarily Sun Tzu, Confucius and Mencius). In the modern era, 
                                               
117 Please refer to Section 3.2. 
118 These features are: the permeability of cyberspace, the military, government and civil sectors sharing 
cyberspace, the asymmetry and vulnerability of cyberspace, and the anonymity of actors in this non-
state space, as discussed in depth in Chapter Two.  
-97- 
 
however, it is arguable that the primary Chinese ‘stratagem’ is that of People’s War. It 
may therefore be believed that, hypothetically, the PRC may adopt the strategy of 
People’s War to achieve strategic aims via the medium of cyberspace. It is important to 
note that, in general, a state’s capability in cyberspace relies on the private sector, as the 
military sector and civil society share the same civil information network infrastructure. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that People’s War, if not already so, is likely to 
become the primary strategic guideline for Chinese cyber warfare. Meanwhile, in order 
to investigate Chinese cyber warfare, it is imperative to identify cyber warfare by 
employing a theoretical tool, namely the principles of virtual cyber-territoriality as 
proposed later in Section 4.1.2.  
Following the examination of cyberspace and modern Chinese strategy, and before 
approaching the analysis of empirical findings on China’s cyber warfare in Chapter Five, 
it is important to also consider significant recent incidents of cyber attack, some of 
which have even been defined as acts of war. In the following sections, the analytical 
framework in this research will subsequently be outlined in sections 4.1 to 4.3, which 
respectively reflect sections 5.3 to 5.6 in the empirical analysis of Chapter Five.  
4.1 Strategic value of cyberspace 
Since civil society, government and the military sectors share the same national 
information infrastructure, shown in Figure-4 below, this feature offers a strategic 
value for developing cyber warfare through construction of the civil sector and the 
national information infrastructure. Moreover, the asymmetry and anonymity of 
cyberspace also make this value even more attractive for conducting attacks or 
counter-attacks against adversaries. Evidence shows that China has potentially 
adopted this strategic value into the guideline of national defence as a way to 
strengthen military capability in cyberspace.  
Figure-4: Inter-relations of states’ cyberspace 
This diagram, drawn by the author, demonstrates that the cyberspace of each 
state shares the same civil electronic information infrastructure between three 
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sectors: civil, government and military. Meanwhile, states’ civil information 
infrastructures are connected to one another through international cable networks, 
namely the World Wide Web, in global cyberspace as a whole. The development 
of cyber warfare could reinforce the protection of cyberspace. However, in 
geographic battlegrounds, the direction of threat against a nation-state is from the 
military sector towards civil society; but, in terms of the potential battleground of 
cyberspace, the threat against a nation-state may change the direction, arising 
from civil society towards the government or military sectors, since the civil 
sector, which is relatively vulnerable, shares the same electronic information 
infrastructure with the government and military sectors. As a result, the threat 
caused by cyber attacks could be regarded as a collective threat for all three 
sectors, which can be identified to define any counter attack as collective defence. 
In that case, it is vital to securely construct the civil information infrastructure and 
establish ‘fortifications’ in this potential battleground in order to achieve military 
purposes. 
4.1.1 Transcendence of territory caused by the growth of cyberspace 
As examined in the Introduction, traditionally territorial states such as the 
Netherlands or Belgium were self-protective of their territory through fortification 
or fortresses. Due to the invention of new destructive weapons, however, the 
impermeability of such territorial states was decreased as the concentrated 
offensive power of the atomic bomb was bigger than any other offensive military 
power. Some states with special terrain in their geographic location could protect 
their territory from attack by destructive weapons through natural barriers. Such 
states would survive even if they are small, since the factor of territory size is no 
longer of crucial importance. An example from Mencius, an ancient Chinese 
philosopher, reflects the condition of territorial security. Mencius provided 
guidance for the governor of a small state about a thousand years ago by advising: 
‘Dig deeper your moats; build higher your walls; guard them along with your 
people.’ But in modern times, destructive weapons have perhaps changed such 
territorial thinking because nuclear power shattered all previous conceptions. This 
argument is not only applicable to nuclear warfare in the atomic age, but also to 
cyber warfare in the digital age. Moreover, the destruction caused by cyber attack 
may be on an even larger scale, as the operation of nuclear plants and combat 
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systems are mostly controlled by computer network-based systems. According to 
the analysis provided in Section 2.1, the strategic values of cyberspace causing the 
transcendence of state territory can be interpreted as: 
1) Indiscernibility of offence and defence 
According to Clausewitz, ‘One might think of a strategic attack as an entity 
with well-defined limits. But practice – seeing things in the light of actual 
events – does not bear this out. In practice the stages of the offensive as often 
turn into defensive action as defensive plans grow into offensive.’ (Rattray, 
2001:77) The boundary between offensive strategy and defensive strategy in 
warfare may thus be indiscernible, and this is likely to prove the same in 
cyberspace. In other words, as cyberspace has become a potential battleground, 
an important military issue is the increase in dominant capabilities in this 
battleground whilst reinforcing the ability of securing the civil information 
infrastructure contained therein. 
2)  Permeability and vulnerability of cyberspace 
As examined in Section 2.2, the nature of cyberspace creates the features of 
cyberspace, offering conditions transforming cyberspace into a potential 
battleground. Technically, the shared information network infrastructure links 
together the civil society, government and military sectors, meaning the 
government and military sectors may be permeated via the civil sector. This 
condition of cyberspace makes it an attractive target for adversaries. 
3)  Asymmetry and anonymity of cyberspace 
As examined in Section 2.3, the asymmetric features of cyberspace, such as the 
speed of attacks and the causal scale of damages, provide opponents with a 
strategic value to carry out operations for certain purposes. In other words, in 
the potential battleground of cyberspace, an inferior military may defeat a 
superior military through conducting appropriate warfare/strategy.119 In 
addition, cyberspace conceptually represents an ‘information society’ for 
humans, forming a unique culture in this realm. However, due to the 
anonymity of cyberspace, it is possible for everyone and anyone to become a 
‘cyber-warrior’ in this battlefield. While the USA is now placing increasing 
attention on the development of cyber warfare, the PRC has attached great 
                                               
119 This argument will be further elaborated empirically in Chapter Five. 
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importance to it since as long as a decade ago. In particular, ever since 1999 
when the PRC first considered the concept of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’, cyber 
warfare has been viewed as a crucial element therein. 
4.1.2 A theoretical tool: a set of principles of cyber-territoriality 
Due to the transcendence of territory facilitated by cyberspace, it is necessary to 
propose a theoretical tool to identify any conflicts happening in this medium, 
because current international politics, based on a territorial system, lacks a 
theoretical basis with which to handle cyber conflicts.120 As outlined in Section 
2.3, this research proposes the term cyber-territoriality121 to delineate the concept 
of cyberspace as a battleground. Compared with a conventional war, a war waged 
in cyberspace in the digital age is relatively difficult to define due to the inherent 
features of cyberspace. Once cyberspace has a conceptualised territoriality, it is 
important to produce principles of this cyber-territoriality to generate a theoretical 
tool to identify cyber war, as well as to possibly provide a justification for actors 
to deal with cyber attacks. This research posits that it is logical to borrow the 
discourse of principles of territoriality based on the state system to generate 
equivalent principles of cyber-territoriality, even though cyber territoriality is not 
necessary in total accord with the state system. 
In terms of political territoriality based on the international state system, 
Hartmut Behr (2008:359-382) identifies three principles of territoriality, which are 
‘the concepts of sovereignty, (national) integration, and borders.’ It is suggested 
that these three principles of territoriality are applicable to non-territorial space, 
but with slightly different interpretations.  
1)   Sovereignty/Authority 
In terms of the concept of sovereignty, the owners of different ISP services, 
information networks, and telecommunications in cyberspace, such as states, 
non-state organisations, private companies, and even individuals, could claim 
ownership to provide authority for the legitimate control and access of their 
information network systems. This authority could be equivalent to sovereignty 
over their cyber-territorialities. 
                                               
120 As discussed in Section 5.2.1 regarding recent cyber incidents, disputes among actors remain in the 
scope of the current international system due to the lack of a theoretical basis to identify cyber 
conflicts. 
121 Please refer to Section 2.3 for more detail. 
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2)  Integration/Cyber culture 
In terms of the concept of integration122, the similarity drawn from cyber-
territoriality could be established upon cyber culture, including behaviours, 
customs, genres, and languages in cyberspace, according to the specifications 
and characteristics of the DNS and TCP/IP.  
3)  Borders/Functional borders 
Finally, the concept of borders is a very important factor in establishing a 
manner of protection from external threats as well as distinguishing actors and 
actions inside and outside of a territory, even though threats may also come 
from within. In cyber-territoriality, the equivalent of functional boundaries 
could be drawn by several functional servers, such as Names Servers, Proxy 
Servers, and Firewall Servers. The operations of these functional servers are 
also carried out through the techniques of the DNS and TCP/IP. These servers 
could filter malicious activities and block unwanted information in cyberspace. 
In addition, servers are geographically located in a territory, though this may be 
different to the territory of the nationality in which the owners of these servers 
are registered.123 
4)  Users as the internet populace 
In addition to the three principles of cyber-territoriality outlined above, it shall 
be argued that the internet users (individuals) who serve as the virtual 
inhabitants of this cyber-territoriality are extremely crucial actors, as they drive 
the flows of information in cyberspace and are the primary instigators of 
communication. In cyber-territoriality in the non-state system, individuals and 
social groups are more significant than in the state system, where they are 
simply considered as one of the sub-principles under the principle of 
integration. In addition, according to the conceptual investigation of 
cyberspace, virtual cyber-territoriality contains information flows. Lucas 
Walsh and Julien Barbara consider ‘the image of war as spectator sport, 
creating a contemporary ‘‘fog of war’’ beneath which states can mobilise 
citizens in pursuit of traditional geo-political goals’ (Walsh and Barbara, 
2006:205). This demonstrates that the internet populace can be mobilised for a 
                                               
122 In Behr’s research, this ‘integration’ refers to the integration of three domains: ‘the state’, ‘individuals 
and social groups’, and ‘values, norms, and political practices.’ (Behr, 2008:363-364)  
123 For example, Google is registered as a US company. However, some of its servers are geographically 
located outside of the US territory in other states’ territories.  
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political purpose. Moreover, the security of cyberspace rests on ‘active cyber 
citizenship’ as a strong and crucial component to tackle new and challenging 
security issues (Harknett and Stever, 2009). It can thus be suggested an 
additional principle of cyber-territoriality concerns the internet populace as 
virtual ‘citizens’. 
It can be criticised that the West has undoubtedly been the dominant 
actor in cyberspace, since essential facilities, such as the Domain Name System, 
Operating System (OS) and firewalls or database software, were invented and 
are provided mostly by Western countries. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by 
the possibility of the hypothetical virtual territory outlined above, it can be 
concluded that states no longer dominate the cyber-territoriality issue.  
In addition, it can be suggested that threats in relation to cyber-
territoriality can be dealt with through the territorial assumptions124 used to 
formulate strategies of national security based on traditional territory as 
identified by Hartmut Behr (2008:365). Firstly, in cyber-territory, the origin of 
a threat can be located through the Domain Name System and TCP/IP, and the 
‘final causus belli’ can be devised when cyber-territory is attacked. However, 
due to the anonymity of cyberspace, even though relevant techniques are in 
development, in most cases it is still not possible to identify the actor behind 
the threat with certainty. In addition, in comparison to territorial assumptions, 
digital attacks arising from cyberspace are limited inside the computer 
networks in non-violent cyber-territoriality; however, the damages can traverse 
cyber-territory to affect real territories and transform into physical damage. For 
instance, an attack inside the control systems of public transportation or state 
power supply may cause a physical crash outside the virtual realm. In addition, 
fake information in the public media could lead to physical conflict or panic125, 
and could also attempt to disrupt people’s opinions or beliefs through use of 
                                               
124 The five territorial assumptions are: ‘(1) the threat arises from a territorially definable actor; (2) the 
threat’s range is territorially limited; (3) the threat is directed at a territorially determinable area with 
the aim of conquering and occupying it;’ and accordingly, ‘(4) territory and the state’s claim on 
territory are the final causus belli; that is why (5) security politics can be distinguished, according to 
“inside-outside”-logic, into territorially specified external and internal affairs.’ (Behr, 2008:365) 
125 On 14 March 2010, panic in Georgia resulted from the fake news that ‘Russian tanks had invaded the 
capital and the country’s president was dead.’ Though the show opened with a disclaimer that it was 
not real, it featured a familiar news anchor who appeared to be unsettled by breaking news of fighting 
in Tblisi and it was stated that Russian bombers were headed for Georgian airspace, and troops and 
tanks were also on their way. (Kramer, 2010) 
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propaganda126. (Rattray, 2001:19) It can consequently be argued that the 
security of cyberspace is basically indistinguishable from the specified 
territorial ‘external and internal affairs’ though threats go beyond the 
boundaries of both real territory and virtual territoriality. Meanwhile, this 
cyberspace is also associated with not just states, but also with transnational 
actors. 
It may therefore be concluded that the four principles of cyber-territoriality 
generated above, namely, authority, cyber culture, functional borders, and people, 
may form the specific characteristics of cyberspace which, if violated, allow a 
universal identification of warfare acknowledged by all states. In the territorial 
state system, a war can be defined based on whether principles of territoriality are 
compromised. By the same logic, if at least one of the principles of cyber-
territoriality is affected, a defensive strategy could be invoked. Without a clear 
definition, one might argue that although a cyber attack is obviously an act of war, 
it cannot be defined as such unless there is a general concept achieving global 
consensus. 
Another way to interpret cyber warfare comes through the understanding 
of cyberspace as an intangible battle space consisting of three layers: ‘the physical 
layer, a syntactic layer sitting above the physical layer, and a semantic layer 
sitting on top.’ (Libicki, 2009:12) The physical layer is composed of the servers 
and cables. This layer could be associated with the principle of functional borders 
of cyber-territoriality. Secondly, the syntactic layer refers to the rules and norms 
of the computer systems and their owners, such as the Domain Name System 
(DNS) and TCP/IP. This layer also forms the principle of cyber culture. The third 
semantic layer is the information stored in the computer networks and database 
servers. This information is contributed by internet users and information 
providers and could be regarded as the intellectual property of owners in 
cyberspace, reflecting the principle of authority. Consequently, once one or more 
of these three layers is damaged by threats or attacks, it is reasonable to assume 
that actors could resort to defensive strategies of cyber warfare. In addition, 
damage in this intangible space, whether deliberate or accidental, may also cause 
very serious damage in the physical world. For instance, in October 2010, the US 
                                               
126 On January 2009, Israeli military forces reportedly hacked into a Hamas-run TV station to broadcast 
propaganda, in order to disrupt peoples’ faith. (Leyden, 2009) 
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military lost control of 50 nuclear warheads for 45 minutes due to a ‘computer 
glitch’, which could have been caused by a planted computer virus via the 
network system.127 In other words, since the control and command systems of 
traditional weapons rely heavily on computer network systems in the digital age, 
it might be possible for an intercontinental ballistic missile to be launched through 
a takeover of the command and control computer system128, potentially causing 
not only massive destruction but also inter-state conflict. As a result, the impact of 
cyber warfare can be transferred from cyberspace (intangible territory) to the 
physical world (tangible territory) as combat systems are established upon 
computer systems. That is to say, though a cyber war may not cause any casualties 
within cyberspace, physical damage and casualty in our tangible territory may be 
the fallout of cyber war. In this manner, we can see that cyber warfare is in fact 
related to the concept of traditional warfare. 
4.2 China integrates electromagnetic environments into informationisation 
According to the examination of modern Chinese strategy in Section 3.2.3, 
‘informationisation’ has become a critical guideline for the entire nation in the 
digital age. This informationisation also establishes a preparatory platform for China 
to develop cyber warfare. In so doing, once People’s War is adopted to conduct 
cyber warfare, the massive Chinese populace can be integrated into cyberspace via 
the national information network infrastructure. In addition, according to the claims 
of China’s thoughts towards cyberspace laid out in Chapter Two, China’s 
cyberspace channels various electromagnetic environments into an integrated 
platform to enlarge the potential strategic value of cyberspace. These two arguments 
are described in more detail in the following sections, and will also be elaborated 
upon empirically in Chapter Five. 
  
                                               
127 This incident saw one ninth of the entire US arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles knocked 
offline. As indicated by a missile launch officer, this was one of the most concerning mistakes to ever 
occur in the nuclear command and control system. (Daily Mail Reporter, 2010) 
128 There is another form and target of cyber warfare called C4ISR, which stands for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. This is basically a 
computer system controlling and commanding combat systems of different military carriers, such as 
aircrafts, warships, and ground missile vehicles, through communicating and sharing intelligence, in 
order to integrate the army, navy and air force into joint operations. The most significant warfare using 
C4ISR occurred in 1991 in the Persian Gulf War, also known as the Gulf War or Operation Desert 
Storm. This war caused states to realise that information technology can powerfully master control and 
command of weaponry in 21st century battlegrounds. 
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4.2.1 Establishment of China’s national information infrastructure 
In addition to China’s Revolution in Military Affairs examined in Section 3.4, it is 
generally believed that the civil information infrastructure will be built up before 
the military sector through ‘national informationisation’. Revolution in business 
will subsequently drive revolution in the military. As John Seely Brown and Paul 
Duguid (2000) point out, nation-states might be prone to fail economically by the 
rise of powerful private companies.129 In other words, some transnational private 
companies might become more powerful than a state.130 In terms of guidelines 
presented by modern Chinese strategy, China’s RMA also incorporates civil 
resources for the further mobilisation of the massive Chinese populace and its civil 
society. In addition, as Sheng (2005:136-137) stresses, one of the principles of 
China’s cyber warfare is to develop warfare based on the continued construction 
of the civil information infrastructure.  
However, due to the one-party system, the Chinese government controls 
the majority of a wide range of civil resources. China’s political trends may thus 
heavily affect the direction of the development of its civil information 
infrastructure. It is believed that the thinking131 of the Chinese government and the 
development of China’s information infrastructure are firmly associated with one 
another. (Kao, 2000) In terms of governmental policy, in 2006 the PRC published 
2006-2020 國家信息化發展戰略 (Guojia xinxihua fazhan zhanlüe, The strategy 
of the development of national informationisation 2006-2020). This official 
guideline proposes strategic principles for the development of China’s information 
infrastructure as follows: (PRC State Council, 2006) 
1) conduct economic informationisation; 
2) establish e-government; 
3) construct a quality cyber culture; 
4) promote societal informationisation; 
                                               
129 The authors also refer to the concept of the ‘global city’ coined by Saskia Sassen. It is believed that 
new world citizens are not those literally living on the earth but instead the individuals belonging to 
transnational enterprises. (Brown and Duguid, 2000:30)  
130 For instance, in a congressional debate, it was reported that the transnational IT company Apple Inc. 
has more cash than the US government according to Apple’s profit report of 2011. In other words, the 
world’s largest technology company might be more economically powerful than the world’s largest 
sovereign government. (Rosoff, 2011) Interestingly, this is similar to the popular Chinese idiom ‘富可
敵國’ (fu ke di guo, Wealthy enough to resist a state) which has also influenced Chinese thinking 
about statehood from time to time. 
131 This thinking is based on Chinese strategic culture, investigated in Section 3.3. 
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5) complete a comprehensive information infrastructure; 
6) enhance competitiveness of the information industry; 
7) establish a national system of cyber security; 
8) strengthen people’s abilities in information technology, and cultivate experts 
of informationisation 
Therefore, in order to propel national informationisation, China’s Ministry 
of Post and Telecommunication proposed the China Information Infrastructure 
(CII) system to construct China’s information infrastructure in practice. For 
example, the Golden Bridge Project, a significant project for China’s information 
infrastructure, implements techniques such as optical fibre, microwave, program 
control, satellite and wireless, to build up China’s cyberspace, thus integrating 
internet and telecommunication into a national information platform. (Wang, 
2007:89-92) However, China’s current information infrastructure still relies on 
Western technology. In other words, it is still inevitable that China needs to 
employ advanced core techniques from the West in order to continue the 
construction of its national information infrastructure.132  
Moreover, the PRC’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) manages an 
official internet police force which is officially charged with preventing cyber 
attacks from civil society. (Damm and Thomas, 2009:73) In terms of the 
development of China’s fundamental informationisation, the governmental 
department MPS operates the ‘Golden Shield Project’, also known as the ‘Great 
Firewall of China’, which began operations in 2003, in order to reinforce China’s 
information infrastructure and reinforce cyber security. The project includes 
design of both software and hardware. (Damm and Thomas, 2009:105) This 
project ensures that all internet activities in China can be monitored through 
methods such as IP blocking, DNS filtering and re-direction, web address filtering, 
and connection resetting,133 so that the PRC may ensure the domestic Chinese 
populace cannot access websites and retrieve information deemed inappropriate by 
the Chinese government. As a result, two notable points can be argued: firstly, 
engagement in daily, active network monitoring, control and espionage provides 
                                               
132 For instance, American, British, and Israeli technology companies are all involved in the construction 
of China’s information infrastructure. Cisco, a well-known American company supplying computer 
servers, has offered massive amounts of equipment to China. Cisco was criticised by some American 
congressmen and media at the time. (Chen, 2006) 
133 These methods are commonly used for censoring. China’s cyberspace is under enforced censorship, 
which may be considered to be part of China’s cyber warfare. 
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intensive defensive practice for China’s cyber warfare actors; secondly, 
monitoring all internet access into and out of China is significant when it comes to 
evaluating civilian hackers in the world. It is not far-fetched to suggest that China 
regards the Golden Shield Project as part of its cyber warfare. That is to say, the 
PRC government is likely to have the aim of technically controlling and 
monitoring the massive populace via the censorship of the Golden Shield Project 
in China’s cyberspace. Moreover, this project may resolve a certain dilemma for 
the Chinese government: on the one hand, the PRC could take advantage of the 
massive populace to function as ‘cyber-warriors’ pursuing cyber warfare, but on 
the other hand, the PRC has to overcome the challenge that the Chinese people 
may be too numerous to control and command into disciplined cyber warriors in 
the intangible cyber territory.134  
4.2.2 Integration with electromagnetic environments  
In addition to the construction of China’s national information infrastructure, and 
according to the definition of cyberspace as examined in Section 2.1, cyberspace 
may consist of the internet, computer network based systems, and 
telecommunication. China’s cyberspace is essentially the same; however, in order 
to increase its strategic value, it could be argued that China constructs this 
cyberspace by combining various electronic environments, other than just 
telecommunication, into an integrated platform to order to coordinate electronic 
warfare in this potential battleground. This integrated platform of China’s 
cyberspace characterises China’s cyber warfare as ‘Integrated Network Electronic 
Warfare,’ according to the US military report to US Congress in 2010, as noted: 
(US Department of Defense, 2010:34) 
‘PRC military writings highlight the seizure of electromagnetic 
dominance in the early phases of a campaign as among the foremost 
tasks to ensure battlefield success. PLA theorists have coined the term 
“integrated network electronic warfare” (網電一體戰 , wangdian 
yitizhan) to describe the use of electronic warfare, computer network 
operations, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefield information 
systems that support an adversary’s warfighting and power projection 
capabilities. PLA writings on future models of joint operations identify 
“integrated network electronic warfare” as one of the basic forms of 
                                               
134 This argument will be explained in the later Section 4.3.5 in this chapter. 
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“integrated joint operations,” suggesting the centrality of seizing and 
dominating the electromagnetic spectrum in PLA campaign theory.’ 
According to this report, China’s cyber warfare is likely to include 
electronic warfare as a whole. In other words, China’s cyberspace will combine 
various electronic environments in the ground, air and even outer space, in order 
to develop an integrated warfare. The empirical evidence for this will be presented 
in Section 5.3. 
4.3 Cyberspace as a potential battleground suited to People’s War 
Due to the strategic value of the potential battleground of cyberspace, it is arguably 
perfectly suited to People’s War. This means that the tradition of People’s War 
remains the most up-to-date strategic doctrine for China’s cyber warfare in the 
digital age. 
Compared with the ease of access to US military publications, the Chinese 
government’s lack of transparency in the field of cyber warfare makes the analysis 
of involvement of its state or non-state actors somewhat challenging. According to 
examinations in previous chapters, China’s cyber warfare is certainly guided by 
modern Chinese strategy, which in turn is deeply influenced by traditional Chinese 
strategic culture. In addition, the tenets of the significant inherited strategy of 
People’s War remain the same, although its context has shifted from the 
conventional land-based battlefield to cyberspace. The massive Chinese populace is 
a significant advantage for China to carry out cyber warfare without the traditional 
limitation of boundaries. In order to fit People’s War into the new context of 
cyberspace, the PRC has dedicated a great deal of resources within the past decade 
to observing the character of the transformation of the USA military and its national 
strategy. According to China’s 2002 National Defence white paper, the PRC 
officially proclaimed for the first time that the Chinese revolution of military 
strategy would focus on the development of information warfare and information 
operations. (PRC State Council, 2002) Furthermore, in the same year, a US 
governmental report officially stated that China’s military modernisation is 
combined with tactics of information warfare such as ‘computer hacking’, creating 
an irregular warfare in the domain of cyberspace. (US DoD, 2002:31) As 
Sevastopuloin and McGregor (2007) report, ‘The PLA has demonstrated the ability 
to conduct attacks that disable our [US] system . . . and the ability in a conflict 
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situation to re-enter and disrupt on a very large scale.’ However, China does not 
officially publish its endorsed doctrine in the same way as the US military. Only the 
writings of several Chinese military leaders and scholars can provide some basic 
ideas of China’s cyber warfare. Aside from referring to these documental resources, 
China’s cyber warfare can also be examined from several different perspectives 
such as China’s RMA, the national information infrastructure, the strategic logic 
behind the warfare, and military capabilities, and, finally, the implementation of 
People’s War in China’s cyber warfare. 
From Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Mao’s People’s War, it can be argued 
that the Chinese army has inherited a distinctive strategic style. In addition, the 
evolution of People’s War triggered a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in 
China and subtly modified the original concept of People’s War.135 The theory of 
People’s War was raised from a tactical level to a strategic level. In the present day, 
the latest strategic thinking of the Chinese military strategy, ‘Fight and Win Local 
Wars under Information Conditions’136, has been combined with the thought of Sun 
Tzu and Mao to become a critical guideline for warfare in the digital age. It is 
clearly indicated in the defence policy of the 2008 China National Defence report 
that the Ministry of National Defence still insists upon and consistently carries out 
guidelines adopting the concept of People’s War at a strategic level. (PRC Ministry 
of National Defence, 2008) Through examining its advantages and characteristics, it 
can therefore be concluded that the theory of People’s War has constantly remained 
behind critical strategy in the modern Chinese era.  
Furthermore, it is argued that the principles of People’s War provide a 
supportive framework of strategic guidelines for asymmetric warfare, such as cyber 
warfare, in the digital era. As cyberspace has become a potential battlefield, the 
possible combat zone has expanded from the battle zone of military conflict to 
include societal sectors such as the banking system and the public construction 
                                               
135 In Hu Jintao’s report at the CCP 17th National Congress in 2007, he announced: ‘We must implement a 
military strategy for the new era, accelerate the revolution in military affairs, ensure military 
preparedness and enhance the military’s capability to respond to various threats of security and 
accomplish diverse tasks.’ 
136 As the 2004 China National Defence report states, the PLA regards this guideline as an objective. The 
first priority is developing weaponry and equipment, followed by building joint operational 
capabilities, and then making full preparations for the battlefield. Meanwhile, the PLA adheres to the 
concept of People’s War in order to develop fitting strategies and tactics. For the requirements of 
integrated and joint operations, the PLA endeavours to establish a modern operational system capable 
of giving full play to the overall efficiency of the armed forces as well as the national war potential. 
(PRC Ministry of National Defence, 2004) 
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system. Due to this, the battlefield covers the domestic or even the international 
reach of a country, so that the features of People’s War can be perfectly applied to 
this virtual battlefield. The strategy of Chinese cyber warfare is thus in close accord 
with the theory of People’s War, combining the power of military troops and the 
civil masses in both visible and invisible areas. Regardless of whether the actions 
are offensive or defensive, it can be suggested that China’s strategy of cyber warfare 
is People’s War. In the potential battleground of cyberspace, creating a justification 
for war and then mobilising the people is an efficient way of defending China from 
any threat from other states, thereby establishing a virtual ‘hard shell’ for the 
purpose of national defence. In terms of asymmetric warfare, the mobilisation of 
people can also act as the active defence of cyber deterrence137 to deter the 
otherwise militarily superior. This strategy of asymmetric warfare is also developed 
based on the principles of People’s War, and its paradoxes138 have become an 
integral part of modern Chinese strategy. 
In terms of the tactics of People’s War, in the absence of a regular army, 
armed struggles, revolutionary riots, and even terrorist conflicts can simply be 
regarded as irregular warfare akin to guerrilla warfare. As Clausewitz (2001:466) 
states in his work On War, the power of the masses in waging war is fragile and 
limited, so they cannot carry out a decisive campaign against the opponent’s regular 
army. They can instead only attack the enemy’s transportation and supply lines 
which lie outside of their fortified position. On the other hand, Clausewitz 
(2001:467-470) also points out that the masses who wage war are like a ‘fog’; they 
do not assemble together in a particular area, but spread around everywhere in the 
battlefield. Consequently these armed masses are not a major core group which can 
be easily targeted by the opponent. This is therefore a good strategy for avoiding 
attack. Mao’s People’s War combines the assurance of justifying war and the feature 
of ‘fog’ with the use of regular armed forces. People’s War allows for irregular 
warfare to be conducted in the battlefield with the support of the people, but can also 
make use of regular logistics. People’s War efficiently provides strategic guidelines 
for information warfare as a type of asymmetric warfare in the digital age. Using 
                                               
137 In addition to offence and defence in a war, cyber deterrence has become another strategy in 
cyberspace. As Libicki points out, a capability needs to be developed in cyberspace to ‘do unto others 
what others may want to do unto us.’ (Libicki, 2009:27) 
138 Cassidy (2003:7) claims that there are six paradoxes of asymmetric conflict, which are ‘strategic goals,’ 
‘strategic means,’ ‘technology/armament,’ ‘will/domestic cohesion,’ ‘military culture’ and ‘time and 
space.’ An asymmetric strategy can be depicted through evaluation of the six paradoxes. 
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asymmetric warfare through the strategy of People’s War may well mean that it is 
possible to defend against or even defeat a relatively superior adversary by 
consolidating the powers of people from all sectors – not only military or 
governmental sectors but also societal sectors and private industries. This is 
consequently an effective guideline for a defensive strategy.  
Briefly speaking, the strategy of China’s cyber warfare combines the aspects 
of evolving warfare and general modern Chinese strategy to form a new kind of 
warfare supported by the specific traditional principle of People’s War. In the digital 
age, as Damm and Thomas (2009:118) point out, the people are not just Mao’s 
‘renmin’ (人民, the masses) any more. The ‘people’ of People’s War does not refer 
only to the domestic populace, but in fact may indicate all global Chinese users of 
the internet all over the world. The mobilisation of this global population is 
accordingly not limited to Chinese geographical territory. 
4.3.1 Strategic ideas of People’s War 
In terms of the features of cyberspace, some principles which derive from 
People’s War can be applied to cyber warfare in the digital age. Vice versa, the 
features of cyberspace also lend themselves to the strategic concept of People’s 
War so that it can be carried out without any geographical limit in the virtual 
battlefield. The principles are as follows: 
1)  All-out defence/offence 
As ‘everyone is a soldier,’ the theory of People’s War primarily combines the 
people and the military forces of the state to reinforce the state’s power to 
defend against or defeat the enemy. It had been queried that this was no longer 
practical for China when the battleground changed from the domestic theatre 
to the international theatre, including cross-sea warfare. (Hong, 2007:25) 
However, the combination of people and military forces can function not only 
in a physical sense, but also in a virtual sense, for example by cultivating 
people’s thoughts to make them determined to defend against the enemy. 
(Hong, 2007:24) In addition, unlike conventional warfare or even nuclear 
warfare, regardless of whether they are civilian or military, every member of 
the population would potentially be able to defend against or attack the enemy 
on behalf of the state in cyberspace, no matter where they are. 
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2)  Defeating an enemy without fighting or massive numbers of casualties  
‘Subduing the enemy without fighting’ is one of the most famous principles of 
Sun Tzu’s strategic thought, and Johnston argues that this was referred to by 
Mao in his People’s War. (Johnston, 1995:255) It is suggested that this 
strategic principle is applicable to cyber warfare, since despite there being no 
physical fighting or casualties in cyberspace, cyber warfare is still able to wear 
down, deter or even defeat the enemy if a war is inevitable. Furthermore, the 
societal sector is a significant support for a state. As the societal sector, 
including private systems such as the banking system, public transportation 
service and supply systems, relies on cyberspace so heavily in the digital age, 
cyber warfare can be the most efficient military approach to attack the state 
societal sector and thus wear down a state’s power. 
3)  ‘Know the enemy and know yourself, and in one hundred battles you 
will not be in danger’ 
This is another principle taken from the chapter ‘Planning Offensives’ in Sun 
Tzu’s work, and Johnston argues that it, too, was referred to by Mao in his 
People’s War. (Johnston, 1995:255) In the digital age, unlike conventional 
documentary archives, most official documents are stored in one copy of 
electronic format in a computer system. Due to this, it is possible that not just 
public governmental information, but also the official documents or even 
intelligence material of a state can be intentionally hacked by other states via 
cyberspace. Vice versa, it is also possible that a state can spread false 
information through cyberspace to deceive its enemies, so that they may 
miscalculate. Thus, even in terms of cyber strategy, Sun Tzu’s (translation by 
Sawyer, 2007:158) maxims apply: ‘Warfare is the way of deception,’ and 
‘Although [you are] capable, display incapability to them. When [your 
objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant.’   
4)  Guerrilla strategy with swarm effect and sting effect 
Rosita Dellios (1989:205) claims that two effects appear as strategies of 
attrition warfare in Mao’s People’s War to wear and tear down the enemy. One 
effect is the ‘swarm effect’ and the other is the ‘sting effect.’ The former refers 
to taking advantage of plentiful manpower to exhaust the enemy on the 
battlefield; the latter is the use of mobile weaponry equipment to sneak up on 
the enemy. These two effects are applicable to cyber warfare, for example by 
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paralysing computer servers by spamming lots of junk requests and computer 
systems by transmitting viruses. 
In sum, as Xiong Guankai (2003:41) points out, the latest Chinese strategy 
is to win and fight local wars under information conditions through joint 
operations across the five dimensions of land, sea, air, space, and 
electromagnetism. These joint operations are conducted on the information 
platform of cyberspace. Therefore, implementing the strategy of People’s War by 
combining the people with military forces and by mobilising social resources is a 
feasible strategy to protect the state’s security in cyberspace. The ‘hard shell’139 
formed by the mobilisation of the people provides not only strong protection 
preventing permeability to enemy attacks in cyberspace, but also cyber deterrence 
to avoid the outbreak of cyber war in this potential battleground. 
4.3.2 Strategic logics of China’s cyber warfare 
The PRC reaction to US military transformation is mainly based on the 
requirement to maintain China’s national security and to therefore consider 
appropriate responses within China’s military strategy and tactics. With regards 
traditional combat capability, the PLA believes that it must evaluate every step 
very carefully in confrontations with enemies with high-tech military capabilities. 
According to the PLA’s Campaign Studies, the PLA divides armed conflict into 
three categories: war, campaign, and combat. A war is made up of a number of 
decisive campaigns and the nature of a strategy of warfare is directly associated 
with national politics, economics, and diplomacy. A campaign is carried out in a 
limited geographical area where armed actions relating to the needs of a state’s 
politics, economy and diplomacy are necessary. Combat is a tactical operation to 
achieve campaign goals. (Ye, 2001:239) Since the 1990s, in particular after the 
American Operation Desert Storm which drew to an end in 1995, the PRC has 
come to realise that the next war for the PLA need not be a total war, but was 
more likely to be a limited war with features such as a short duration, restricted 
environment and reduced objectives. In addition, future conflicts would certainly 
                                               
139 According to John H. Herz’s argument, in the Machiavellian system, a state was influenced by power 
politics, and international relations followed the higher law and higher authority. (Herz, 1962:39) At 
that time, states protected their own interests and territoriality by using military force or economic 
approaches to threaten one another. Upon the emergence of the modern state system, ‘international 
anarchy’ and ‘collective security’ appeared. Modern territorial states were protected by a so-called 
‘hard shell’, which acts like a cell wall protecting a small unit within a larger body. This ‘hard shell’ 
presents a state’s defensive features such as ‘impenetrability’ or ‘territoriality’. (Herz, 1962:40) 
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contain intensive use of cutting-edge technology, shown to improve the capability 
of reconnaissance, the precision of weapon delivery, and the speed of processing 
masses of information, in order to perform precise strikes on the battlefield and 
ultimately gain locational advantages. The PLA conceptualises this type of 
modern war as a local war under high-tech conditions. (Ye, 2001:240) Based on 
this analysis, a modern war, confined to smaller and limited objectives, must 
consist of high mobility and rapid weapons delivery capability. As a result, the 
PLA may only be capable of being involved in two or three campaigns at one time. 
In order to achieve victory in the modern era, the PLA must make decisions within 
a short time to cope with the fast pace of modern wars. As pointed out by a PRC 
analyst: ‘In a high-tech war, the pace of military action is fast, but time period is 
short; obviously, the speed and determination during the battles will be extremely 
important in a such war.’ (Lu, 2001) 
However, the characteristics of this future war put the PLA into a 
predicament, as it is difficult for the PLA to defeat an adversary whose military 
capability and technology is as advanced as that of the USA. The PRC has strived 
to accelerate the modernisation of its national defence and the construction of new 
weapon systems in recent years. However, it still remains uncertain that the 
capability of the PRC’s national defence has caught up with the military ability of 
the United States. Chinese military experts also believe that in the foreseeable 
future, regardless of further enhancements to the performance of conventional 
weapon systems, the PLA’s traditional weapons systems will still be inferior 
compared to those of the US military. (Peng, 2001)  Peng also states, ‘Using 
inferior weaponry to confront militarily advanced enemies is the very real 
situation that the PLA would face in future campaigns.’ (Peng, 2001:466-467) 
As a result, the PLA has no choice but to develop the strategic thinking of 
‘defeat military superiority by military inferiority’. This conceptual thinking may 
be converted into practical actions such as developing an asymmetric warfare to 
avoid direct engagement. The basis of the PLA’s strategic vision is to formulate 
the strategy and tactics necessary to be able to seize the initiative in a war. In 
accordance with previous analysis in Section 3.2, the development of China’s 
military ability must be under the condition of ensuring objectives of national 
security. This development must not affect the PRC’s regime, nor can it decrease 
China’s economic growth. There are thus some remaining possible options for the 
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development of China’s military strategy. As recent assessment indicates, the 
possible options include: 1) transformation of People’s War into local war under 
hi-tech conditions and 2) development of cyber warfare in order to carry out 
asymmetric and pre-emptive action140 in a war. Therefore, cyber warfare is likely 
to be adopted as the main focus of China’s strategic development. This cyber 
warfare will also consolidate China’s strategic logic of warfare, also reflecting on 
the features of cyberspace as well as People’s War, the constant principle of 
modern Chinese strategy, as follows: 
1)  Active defence 
Victory of local war under hi-tech conditions depends on whether military 
reactions are fast enough to dominate information in the initial stage of a 
campaign. As a recent study points out, attaining a dominating position 
through pre-emptive actions in a war makes subsequent military actions more 
flexible; in turn, military operations will be restricted if the chance for pre-
emption is missed. (Ye, 2001:150) For the militarily inferior, commencing 
military actions only after the militarily superior are prepared for deployment 
spells certain defeat.141 The PLA conceptualises pre-emption based on the 
logical thinking of active defence, which is one of the principles of People’s 
War, in line with Chinese military thought and opinions of warfare as 
examined in Chapter Three. In addition, according to ancient Chinese strategic 
thought, active attack should be the last resort to resolving conflict between 
nation-states. As a result, active defence is therefore considered the best pre-
emptive strategy for preparing to conduct necessary counter-attacks against 
enemies’ attacks at any given time. Recent research shows that one of the 
PLA’s ideas of active defence is to ensure attaining domination from the first 
strike to enable further military actions. (Cliff, et al., 2007:49) In addition, the 
PLA also believes that maintaining an aggressive mentality is a necessary 
condition for active defence. Therefore, the PRC not only trains their soldiers 
in this way, but also educates the people to be ready at any time for 
                                               
140 A number of Chinese authors describe pre-emptive attacks as a necessary and logical strategy for a 
less advanced country to utilise against a more powerful adversary. If future wars will be decided 
largely by the outcome of the initial engagement or campaign, attempting to take the initiative after 
hostilities have commenced seems a risky strategy, particularly for the weaker side. (Li, 2006:46-51) 
141 For example, as Lu Linqi (2003) points out, sources in the PRC commented that during the Persian 
Gulf War of 1992, had Iraq waged military attacks before the allied forces were completely assembled, 
Iraq may have defeated the US military and its allies. (Lu, 2003) 
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mobilisation. In this respect, cyber warfare perfectly matches aspects of 
strategic thinking for the attainment of active defence. 
2)  Defence by deterrence 
In addition to the strategic logic of active defence, the concept of the pre-
emptive strike is similar to the concept of deterrence in Western strategic 
thinking. As Gene Sharp (1990:3) notes, ‘The aim of deterrence is to convince 
potential attackers not to attack because the consequences could be 
unacceptably costly to them, including the failure to gain their objectives.’ 
Traditionally, the purpose of military strategy is to pursue operational victory 
in the battleground, so that a state’s security and its national interests can be 
maintained. However, this concept was drastically altered when the nuclear 
weapon was invented in the 1950s, as threats to a state shifted from 
conventional violence to an imagined fear prompted by possible massive 
destruction by atomic bombs. As Liddell Hart (1960:60) points out, the 
development of the nuclear weapon makes traditional strategy, wherein the 
purpose is to win victory on a traditional battleground, largely pointless. 
Deterrence therefore became a contemporary focus in International Security 
Studies.142 (Jervis, 1979) Furthermore, as Patric Morgan (2003) asserts, the 
existence of nuclear weapons is not necessarily the only concern of deterrence 
for states. In the digital age, cyber warfare also has the capability to be adopted 
as a strategy of deterrence, particularly as massive destructive weapons are run 
by control and command computer systems. (Libicki, 2009:27) As long as 
potential attackers resign their intent to attack as the result of any form of 
deterrence, the goals of defence are achieved. It is possible to employ cyber 
warfare to pose a significant threat to deter adversaries. Linking with the 
concept of ‘active defence’ explained above, China realises that this active 
defence could indeed be defence by deterrence. (Chen, 2009:32) The strategic 
logic of defence by deterrence may be performed through practical tactics such 
as anti-access and area-denial. 
 
                                               
142 However, in the post-Cold War era, critics argued that Strategic Studies had been focusing on false 
issues and the topic of deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, was to blame for its lack of 
testability. Under such circumstances, many scholars switched their research from Strategic Studies to 
Security Studies, adhering to the statement that the occurrence of major wars in international society 
was highly improbable. This has rendered both ‘deterrence’ and ‘defence’ studies peripheral fields 
under the umbrella of International Security Studies. 
-117- 
 
3)  Anti-access tactics 
The 2010 US DoD report to Congress, further to annual reports of previous 
years, declares that China is likely to use the strategy of ‘anti-access’ and 
‘area-denial’ to prevent other military powers accessing the areas of strategic 
importance for China’s military forces, which may include the Western Pacific 
region. (US DoD, 2010:29-30) As Cliff and other authors (2007:81-83) outline, 
anti-access is a strategic logic that the PLA has harnessed in order to wear 
down the advance or hamper the operational tempo of an opposing force in a 
theatre of military operations during wartime. In fact, ‘anti-access’ is not a 
formal Chinese military strategy. Rather, it is a way of summing up Chinese 
doctrine that addresses the problem of asymmetrically defeating a superior 
adversary. For example, in the case of the USA, that means recognising the US 
reliance on cyberspace, including information networks, as a significant 
vulnerability that, if exploited, could cause the USA to be bogged down in 
chaos and delay or even impel the suspension of any impending military attack. 
Cyber warfare is therefore one of the best strategies for the PRC. Targets could 
be computer systems built either inside or outside of an opponent state’s 
territory, as long as the computer systems in charge of command and control 
nodes, satellite intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and communications 
can be blocked or even damaged to achieve the purpose of anti-access and 
area-denial.   
4.3.3 Military capability of China’s cyber warfare 
Alexander Neil, the head of the Asian Programme at the Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI), predicts that countries will wage both offensive and defensive 
wars in cyberspace in the near future to crush the enemy before a conventional 
battle can occur. (DMJ, 2009)  According to the strategic value of cyberspace and 
information technology (IT) examined in Section 4.1, China’s cyber warfare is 
facilitated by the dual-use nature of IT and the growth of its civilian information 
infrastructure. The increasing defensive ability of cyber warfare will also likely 
enhance the comprehension of offensive approaches, and offensive abilities will 
almost inevitably be developed. The process of developing offensive abilities may 
include hacking governmental computer systems around the world in exercises of 
cyber warfare.  
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According to the analysis of cyber incidents investigated in section 5.6 of 
this chapter, no matter how low the threat level, all threats hailing from China are 
treated as a cause for concern. Recently, the US government has pointed out that 
the threat of China’s cyber warfare has been systematically underestimated. For 
example, Richard Lawless, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, believes that the PLA has already developed a mature 
warfare capability which would be able to cripple US network systems to achieve 
their purposes. He goes on to claim that the focus of China’s cyber warfare is to 
penetrate American computer networks in order to steal wanted information and 
develop conditions in which China is able to paralyse critical US infrastructure, 
such as power grids, financial systems and transportation services, if necessary. 
(Bruno, 2007) 
China’s cyber warfare doctrine is essentially a military dialogue that 
reveals the PLA’s primary position in cyber operations. Delving beyond that very 
generic assertion, however, reveals how little of the PLA’s actual cyber 
organisation and manpower capacity is actually actively employed. As recent 
research reveals, some military units in charge of cyber warfare have been 
established in the active-duty PLA sector; however, it is very possible that 
regional aligned reserve or militia units are also capable of conducting cyber 
operations.143 As Xia Yibing (1999) notes, the PLA has established cyber warfare 
departments within its headquarters.144 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment of 
China’s military capabilities points out that every military region of the PLA 
includes a ‘special Technical Reconnaissance Unit’ to wage both defensive and 
offensive cyber action. The mission of these specialised units is to conduct 
network defence, network exploitation/reconnaissance, data theft, and cyber 
counter-measures. (Jane’s Information Group, 2007:1-3) As part of the 
modernisation process, the PLA prioritises developing cyber warfare training, in 
keeping with the key importance that information warfare holds in the current 
                                               
143 As Liao Wenzhong points out, for example, there is a Centre for Modelling & Simulation in Jinan 
Theatre and a Centre for Information Operations in Beijing Theatre. Liao also indicates that a civilian 
‘cyber army’ is organised into local militia categorised as the ‘Reserve Information Division’, which 
includes the Electronic Warfare Group, Cyber Warfare Group, and Hacker Group. (Liao, 2007:266-
268)  
144 Xia also describes these units as ‘prepared to fight foreign attacks as well as to tamper with 
information in terms of order, time, flow, content, and form; deleting information in parts, in order to 
create a fragmented information; and inserting information to include irrelevant information in order 
to confuse and mislead.’ (Xia, 1999:64-67) 
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military establishment. As Thomas (2000:9) claims, PLA senior strategists believe 
that ‘Warfare is now about intelligence and resourcefulness, new temporal-spatial 
concepts, resolute decisiveness, and “soft science”145 technology located in new 
weapons.’ Different levels of PLA officers must be trained in these new concepts 
and their application. Thomas (2000) also indicates that some cyber training 
centres in China employ civil computer experts and professors to teach relevant 
theories and techniques of cyber warfare. The PLA leadership also recognises the 
need to restructure the officer corps training, including strategy, tactics, network 
technology, and use of information systems for command and control.  
Though China does not publish any doctrine of cyber warfare as the USA 
does, Shen (2005) has established that the PLA has incorporated cyber warfare 
into military training exercises since as far back as 1997. Shen (2005:167-198) 
cites the example of an exercise of simulated attack in 1997 in which a Shenyang 
Group Army sustained a computer attack that paralysed its systems. The Group 
Army countered with virus-destroying software, and the press described the 
exercise as an episode of ‘invasion and counter-invasion’. In 1999, the PLA 
conducted another simulation of cyber warfare that involved two Army Groups in 
the Beijing Military Region simulating a ‘confrontation campaign’ against 
computer networks. Network reconnaissance, network interference, network 
defence, air strikes and subsequent counter-measures were employed in this 
training exercise. (Thomas, 2004:129) In the 2003 US DoD report, it is noted that 
the PLA conducted a staggering forty-three cyber warfare training exercises in that 
year alone.146 Furthermore, the PLA formation of cyber reserves (militia) and 
forces is even more significant. As the 2006 US DoD report states, ‘Militia/reserve 
personnel would make civilian computer expertise and equipment available to 
support PLA military training and operations… by conducting “hacker attacks” 
and network intrusions, or other forms of cyber warfare, on an adversary’s 
military and commercial computer systems, while helping to defend Chinese 
networks.’ (US DoD, 2006:35) In terms of the mobilisation of the civil sector for 
                                               
145 According to Chinese academia, ‘soft science’ does not belong to the fields of the natural, physical 
sciences or computing sciences often described as ‘hard science’, but instead the social sciences and 
similar fields such as information science and behavioural science. 
146 This report also indicates that the PRC is ‘using academic exchange as a medium to train scientists and 
to develop ties between scientists.’ Several PLA units recruit members from college and universities, 
as well as from the information technology industries. That is to say, China develops cyber warfare 
through building up an informal science and technology network within civil sectors. 
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China’s cyber warfare, it is believed that the ‘PLA has created a reserve telecom 
forces structure with a reserve telecom regiment as the backbone, with an 
information industrial department as the base.’ (Thomas, 2001) Another capable 
approach of the PLA’s cyber warfare is to mobilise hackers to penetrate targeted 
computer systems, so that network servers can be controlled in order to conduct 
further actions once necessary. As Chinese Major General Dai Qingmin (2002) 
stresses in his book147, PLA cyber warfare units should seek and infiltrate target 
networks during peacetime. In addition, as Thomas (2004:59) describes, the PLA 
produces a document for the formation of a cyber arm of the military service in 
order to develop capabilities, refine tactics and techniques, and even execute cyber 
missions at a strategic level for the sake of China’s national interests. As a result, 
it could be said that China may be prepared and capable of conducting cyber 
warfare to achieve the ambition of ‘winning local war under hi-tech conditions.’    
4.3.4 Implementation of People’s War in China’s cyber strategy 
As Wen Jiabao, the current Chinese Premier, points out, ‘In China, there are about 
400 million internet users and 800 million mobile phone subscribers’, who are 
basically able to access the internet. (Wen, 2010) Significantly, this number is, for 
example, nearly seven times more than the total UK population of 61.8 million in 
2009. However, the Chinese internet user population is still only about 32% of 
China’s total population. With the present growth rate in internet access, it is 
believed that China will become the most networked nation. (Damm and Thomas, 
2009) With a population base of 1.3 billion and rising, China has tremendous 
advantages in implementing a cyber campaign. In a very primitive operation, 
China could utilise citizens’ computers to host a botnet and conduct a simple 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 148 attack. In addition, DDoS is a typical 
example of attack in cyberspace, where the ideas of People’s War could be carried 
out perfectly.  
As incidents of hacking are rapidly increasing, China has often been 
criticised for having a large, active civilian hacker community. A comprehensive 
interpretation of People’s War in China’s cyber warfare may therefore involve 
                                               
147 In Dai’s book, Direct Information Warfare, he points out that there are two ways to influence the 
adversary’s information functions: indirectly and directly. Indirect information warfare affects 
information by creating information, which the adversary will perceive, interpret, and act upon. 
Military deception and physical attacks have traditionally achieved their ends indirectly. 
148 Please refer to the Glossary. 
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both civilian hackers and the integration of the state’s information technology 
industry, cyber security police, and reserve forces in order to strengthen the 
capability of PLA – the regular armed forces – when conducting sophisticated 
cyber warfare. As such, this integration implements the strategy of People’s War 
in the Chinese military tradition. 
In addition, the concept of People’s War also draws on concepts of the 
ancient Chinese Thirty-Six Stratagems.149 Certain stratagems could be seen as 
examples of China’s cyber warfare, as follows: 
1)    Fool the emperor to cross the sea (瞞天過海, man tian guo hai): this alludes 
to lowering the enemy’s guard while masking one’s own intentions. A cyber 
scenario could be luring computer manufacturers into the Chinese market and 
thereby building back doors into the systems. Another cyber application 
could be using normal email traffic to insert viruses. 
2)    Kill with a borrowed sword (借刀殺人, jie dao sha ren): this implies using 
surrogates to attack an adversary. A cyber example would be to use botnets150 
of zombie computers, hosted around the globe, to conduct a network attack. 
Another application could be to use malware planted in opponents’ computers 
as sentinels to send back critical data or even disable the network without the 
operator’s knowledge.  
3)    Await the exhausted enemy at your ease (以逸待勞, yi yi dai lao): this 
refers to choosing the time and place of battle and encouraging the enemy to 
expend energy in fruitless endeavours. A cyber scenario may be to increase 
the number of hacking attempts by masses of Chinese civilian hackers to fully 
engage computer network defence teams and exhaust them while holding the 
most sophisticated virus/attack in reserve. This is also similar to the idea of 
‘lure the enemy in’151 from People’s War. 
4)    Borrow a corpse to resurrect the soul (借屍還魂, jie shi huan hun): this 
suggests taking an institution, a technology, a method or even an ideology 
that has been forgotten or discarded and appropriate it for your own purpose. 
                                               
149 The Thirty-Six Stratagems [三十六計, Sanshiliu Ji] are divided into a preface, six chapters containing 
six stratagems each, and an afterword that was incomplete with missing text. 
150 Please refer to the Glossary. 
151 ‘Lure the enemy in’ is a tactic of ‘strategic retreat’ from Mao’s military thought. Facing invasion from 
outside imperialists, it would have been unlikely to successfully prevent the enemy from encroaching 
on territory, and so it would in fact be better to let the enemy enter further into the territory where the 
CCP would be more likely to win struggles. (Wang, 1999:94)   
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Possible cyber applications include planting individuals or malware in 
unnoticed units or computers of the opponent, which alters them from within 
to facilitate outside control. 
4.3.5 The methods of discipline for ‘cyber warriors’  
According to the propositions generated above, China’s cyber warfare is a 
strategic warfare that adopts the principle of People’s War. In so doing, internet 
control and censorship are also likely to be an element of China’s cyber warfare, 
in order to prevent the masses from accessing politically sensitive information and 
to control and command civilians into disciplined cyber warriors for military 
purposes. However, once the massive Chinese populace is indoctrinated by the 
Chinese government into patriotism or even nationalism, political events could 
possibly be interpreted and discussed very aggressively in cyberspace by online 
users, whose opinions may not be merely anti-Western imperialism but also in 
opposition to the government itself. As Shen (2007:196) suggests, ‘Online 
platforms can be easily used to mount populist pressure in real life.’152 In other 
words, the combination of the indoctrinated nationalism of masses of people and 
the ease and speed of circulating political information due to the strategic value of 
cyberspace may allow a new formation of nationalism in the case of certain 
political triggers, which can be set off not only by the Chinese government but 
also by the people themselves. In addition, as James Leibold (2010:539) argues, 
online nationalism might particularly reflect ‘Han supremacism’ over the Chinese 
internet, reflecting ‘a complicated mix of emotions among Chinese youth’ in the 
modern era. (Leibold, 2010:541) 
As a result, in order that China’s cyber warfare, adopting principles of 
People’s War, can be performed securely, aside from technical measures to 
conduct internet control and censorship such as the Golden Shield Project, the 
factors153 outlined below may reveal how China disciplines ‘cyber warriors’. 
 Military significance 
Whilst China carries out cyber warfare by adopting the strategy of People’s War, 
the management and control of cyber attacks conducted by civilians may become 
                                               
152 As noted, ‘A significantly large critical mass of upset chat-room postings makes something an issue 
for everybody to take seriously.’ (Shen, 2007:196) 
153 Further empirical elaboration will follow in Section 5.6. 
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an issue. The military significance of this warfare must therefore be justified for 
the massive Chinese populace. 
Factors indoctrinating the Chinese people 
The justification of China’s cyber warfare above may be constituted by several 
causal factors, which are able to drive the Chinese massive populace into 
conducting warfare. These factors, such as the tenets of ideological education, 
concept of the century of humiliation, and all-out defence, are likely to be the 
fundamental measures of discipline for China’s cyber warfare. Empirical evidence 
of these factors will be collected and analysed in Section 5.5 in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Five: 
China’s cyber warfare – Empirical findings 
 
Chapters Two, Three and Four of this research engage with relevant literature in order 
to develop an analytical framework to now investigate empirically how China conducts 
cyber warfare. This chapter will present the empirical findings ascertained by following 
the research methodology laid out below, in order to articulate the theoretical 
propositions generated in the framework and work towards conclusions.  
The features of cyberspace154 have been theoretically interpreted in this research, 
demonstrating that cyberspace may be apt to become a potential battleground for both 
state and non-state actors. The concept of cyberspace has been carefully defined to 
facilitate identification of warfare conducted in this battle space. Furthermore, the four 
principles of cyber-territoriality155 have been discussed in order to possibly delineate the 
extent of cyber warfare; in the event that one of the four principles is compromised, it 
may be possible to justify defensive actions in cyberspace. In addition, these conceptual 
ideas may also be applied to China’s cyber warfare, which adopts the principles of 
People’s War as its strategic guideline. According to the analytical framework, certain 
theoretical propositions are: 
4.  The strategic values of cyberspace make it an intangible arena in which states 
contend for predominance over one another. 
5.  China’s cyberspace is constructed based on an integrated platform consisting of 
computer networks, telecommunications, and electromagnetic environments in 
order to enlarge the strategic value of cyberspace.  
                                               
154 The features are: the permeability of cyberspace; the military, government and civil society sectors 
sharing cyberspace; the asymmetry and vulnerability of cyberspace; and the anonymity of actors in 
this non-state space. These aspects are discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 
155 The first three principles are autonomy, cyber culture, and functional borders, which are respectively 
equivalent to sovereignty, [national] integration, and borders in the state territorial system. In addition 
to these three principles, the fourth principle of people refers to the population in cyberspace. Due to 
the features of the battleground, it is relatively difficult to define a war waged in cyberspace in the 
digital age. Thus, once cyberspace has a conceptualised territoriality, the four principles of cyber-
territoriality can make up a theoretical tool to identify a cyber war in order to legitimately conduct 
defensive solutions. The concept of territoriality was originally established upon the state territorial 
system, but the principles of territoriality may be applied to a territory no matter whether it is tangible 
or intangible. Thus, the principles of territoriality based on the state system can be borrowed to 
generate equivalent principles of cyber-territoriality, even though cyber territoriality is not in absolute 
accord with the state system. 
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6.  Cyberspace as a potential battle space is particularly suited to the tradition of 
People’s War. This means that this strategic tradition remains an up-to-date 
doctrine in modern Chinese strategy. 
7.  China’s cyber warfare is a strategic warfare that adopts the principle of People’s 
War. In so doing, internet control and monitoring are also likely to be an element 
of China’s cyber warfare in order to control and command civilians into 
disciplined cyber warriors for military purposes. 
5.1 Methodology 
As stated in the Introduction, this work falls into the category of Strategic Studies, 
which attempts to analyse how best to promote state security by preventing and 
managing conflict. However, this raises a methodological problem for Strategic 
Studies: unlike scientific research, for instance, one cannot create an actual war in a 
laboratory. Researchers do not have experimental cases in which to test their 
hypotheses and put their recommendations into practice.  Thus, in terms of selecting 
cases, this situation may impede high quality research on war. As Most and Starr 
(1982:854) point out, case selection is crucial for war studies since research on wars 
is of a ‘non-experimental design’. 
Primarily, the aim of this research is to investigate the relation between the 
growth of cyberspace as a potential battleground and the doctrine of modern 
Chinese strategy. I therefore employed a qualitative methodology, which is 
appropriate to reach this aim. In this research I developed an analytical framework 
to produce the propositions contained in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. In order to 
further delineate these propositions in light of the evidence, I also carried out a case 
study to present an empirical indication of how China develops cyber warfare. 
However, valid and reliable empirical data on China’s warfare is near impossible to 
collect inside China due to the sensitivity of studies on the PRC’s military. In 
Bryman’s view (2008:150-152), researchers need to be sensitive to whether 
respondents are reluctant to give socially unacceptable answers for fear of being 
judged, which can break down the validity of data collection. In the same way, 
conducting interviews inside China, particularly in this military-oriented research, 
may fail data validity, since respondents within the Chinese military could be 
extremely reluctant to be interviewed, let alone to give politically unacceptable 
answers, for fear of putting themselves at risk. Thus, on the one hand, China Studies 
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are thriving due to the attention garnered by China’s dramatic rise, but on the other 
hand, work on the Chinese military or Chinese warfare still remain largely sealed to 
the world’s public. As a result, conducting interviews from within China raised 
numerous problems for this research, including the possibility of a ‘looseness’ of 
data collection.156 Therefore, I felt that conducting fieldwork and interviews in 
Taiwan instead was an effective alternative measure to formulate empirical 
indications as to how China implements strategies in cyberspace.  
This is not only because China and Taiwan have inherited the same ancient 
Chinese culture and share the same language, but also because abundant resources 
of China Studies are located in Taiwan.157 In addition, following the conclusion of 
the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the PRC regime of Mainland China and the ROC 
government situated in Taiwan have been constant potential opponents, and so the 
ROC military continues to closely scrutinise the PRC military. In addition, many 
incidents show that Taiwan has been the likely primary target of mainland Chinese 
cyber warfare. The ROC military therefore has obtained plentiful experience of 
exercises against China’s cyber warfare.  
In addition, this research is premised on the evidential indication that China 
conducts cyber warfare as shown in Section 5.7. The case study of this research is 
therefore a means to collect data in order to comprehensively investigate the 
propositions generated through the analytical framework in Chapter Four. 
Interviews in Taiwan were also conducted based on the presupposition that China 
conducts cyber warfare. For this reason, rather than proving whether China conducts 
cyber warfare, the interviews were solely focused on the investigation of modern 
Chinese strategy and the methods of China’s cyber warfare; thus, the political 
confrontation between the two sides was not necessarily a causal factor to cause bias 
of conducting Taiwanese interviews for this research. 
                                               
156 According to John Gerring (2004:350), ‘For the looseness of case study research is a boon to new 
conceptualisations just as it is a bane to falsification.’ 
157 The advantage of this similarity is particularly large in this research, since, as examined in Chapter 
Three, Chinese ancient culture is a key factor guiding Chinese strategic culture as well as the strategy 
of cyber warfare. As Yang Kai-Huang (2000:71) investigates, China Studies resources in Taiwanare 
adequate as ‘China and Taiwan share the same culture, traditions and language,’ which is ‘a strength 
of Taiwanese academia.’ In addition, unlike the relations between North Korea and South Korea, the 
tense situation between China and Taiwan has been easing since the 1990s as martial law was lifted in 
Taiwan in 1987. Furthermore, the research methods employed in China Studies are becoming more 
mature in order to sidestep politically judgmental biases. (Yang, 2007:84-85) For this reason, any bias 
caused by the historical confrontation between the PRC and ROC may now be considerably reduced. 
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Moreover, as Alvesson and Sköldberg (2008:7-8) point out, qualitative 
research can be seen as ‘a fundamentally interpretive activity,’ and thus ‘[theoretical] 
assumptions and other elements of pre-understanding’ [such as the analytical 
framework of this research] can offer a ‘qualified methodological view’ to resolve 
the causal bias in a reflexive case study [such as the Taiwan-based interviews of this 
research].  As a result, the analytical framework developed from Chapter Two to 
Four offers a methodological view to help answer this potential bias. Furthermore, 
in terms of the Chinese strategic culture referred to in this research, according to 
Pierre Bourdieu, it is likely that the similarities158 between Mainland China and 
Taiwan could establish a condition of ‘homology’159 as a methodological tool. This 
allows for conducting interviews in Taiwan as way of understanding how Chinese 
strategic culture guides China’s modern strategy and the development of cyber 
warfare.  
However, despite contextualising these research rationales for methodological 
justification, I acknowledge that certain qualitative biases of this research could still 
exist.160 One might still argue that, even though conducting interviews for case study 
in Taiwan is a sensible approach to facilitate empirical elaboration in this 
research,161 it is still inevitable that the data collected from Taiwan may contain 
some blind-spots or even bias due to the military confrontation between Mainland 
China and Taiwan. For this reason, when designing my fieldwork in Taiwan, I was 
                                               
158 Despite the military confrontation, in terms of the research issues in this study, such as Chinese 
strategy and strategic culture, there is a certain level of similarity between the PRC and ROC military, 
which allows the generation of a methodological homology in order to complement the lack of 
information available on the PLA, as Mainland China and Taiwan historically share the same culture 
and language.  
159 Bourdieu’s central contention in his study of France’s cultural taste in the late 1960s is that tastes – for 
art, literature, fashion, film, sport, food and drink – can be divided into ‘zones of taste,’ each of which 
corresponds to particular social classes (Bourdieu, 1984: 16). This is what he calls ‘homologies of 
social space’ by which (relatively) homogeneous conditions of existence are translated in a particular 
lifestyle. This may be extended to the case of China and Taiwan due to the similarity of their ‘tastes,’ 
which also refers to their way of thinking. For instance, the notion of ‘worry mentality (憂患意識
youhuan yishi)’ often emerges from many Chinese policies designed to prevent further dangers. 
(Harvard, 2009:15) This notion is a common mentality of both the Chinese and Taiwanese people. 
Therefore, in accordance with the concept of homology, strategic thinking, comprising various cultural 
factors, may be the same though the regimes of China and Taiwan are different. 
160 As Karl Maton (2003:62) indicates, the way to avoid bias is ‘by seeing bias everywhere.’ For this 
reason, in this research I did not try to eliminate research biases completely. Instead, by understanding 
that these biases may inevitably occur, I tried to employ some research methods in order to lessen 
biases as much as possible in the stage of data collection. This is shown in the following Sections 5.1.1 
to 5.1.4. 
161 As Peter Burnham et al. (2008:89) point out, ‘methodological trade-offs’ are unavoidable when 
drawing up a research design. Choosing Taiwanese interviews in this research could be a 
methodological trade-off in order to collect sufficient interview data and produce valuable analyses.  
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aware of this inevitable situation, and thus balance the causal bias against the 
advantages of collecting data from Taiwan, in order to reduce potential bias as much 
as possible. In addition, with regards the validation of the interview data, according 
to Burnham et al (2008:333), ‘Triangulation can overcome the problems associated 
with single data [such as Taiwanese interviews]…’162 Therefore, though the 
interviews form the primary resource for data collection in the case study, I also 
consulted the collections of government documents and military doctrine from the 
PRC and the USA, as well as related media reports from various countries, using 
these as ‘different aspects of empirical reality’ to corroborate each other by ‘data 
triangulation.’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:454-455) In so doing, I have been able to 
ameliorate the situation caused by possible bias in order to ensure that the data is 
valid and reliable. Meanwhile, it may well be believed that every piece of research 
contains pros and cons. On the one hand, the fieldwork in Taiwan might have 
inevitable bias against Mainland China; on the other hand, the opposing position of 
the Taiwanese military may make their judgments conceptually critical once the 
judgments can be reflected through resources of the third party (i.e. the researcher in 
question). 
In addition, the purpose of this case study is to collect empirical evidence to 
comprehensively answer the research questions. However, the common contentious 
issue of a case study is to what extent it can be generalised. In Buzan’s (2010:14) 
view, the study of military strategy can be complementary to the concept of security. 
Furthermore, as Lawrence Freeman (1992:280) stresses, ‘For many the only reason 
to study war was in order to design an international order in which disputes would 
be settled without resort to arms.’ That is to say, even though the case study on 
China’s cyber warfare is a specific case, the arguments produced by this research 
could contribute to International Security Studies in order to prevent conflicts whilst 
the research into China’s cyber warfare can be seen as part of Military and Strategic 
Studies. More potential contributions of the study for the national security of states 
will be discussed in the Conclusion. 
This empirical chapter will be developed through a thematic analysis under 
the umbrella of each theoretical proposition outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter. The themes, emerging from data collection, will be analytically allocated 
                                               
162 Besides, in a case study, combining several methods, such as ‘interviews,’ ‘observations,’ and 
‘collecting documents,’ can form this ‘methodological triangulation.’ (Silverman, 2005:121) 
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into each proposition, with the fourth serving as a summary of this empirical chapter 
towards the conclusion which follows. This will link the analytical framework with 
empirical evidence. A diagram of the inter-relationship of these sections is shown 
below. 
 
Figure-5: Inter-relationship of the analytical framework and the empirical section 
5.1.1 Data Collection 
In addition to the literature reviews, documentary analysis, and archival analysis, 
which form the analytical framework, this empirical section relies on the use of 
three distinct types of evidence: interviews, analysis of recent cyber incidents, and 
documentary resources, which also can form a methodological validity of 
triangulation. These data collection are are described as follows: 
1. Interviews with Taiwanese military, government and civilian sectors presenting 
their perception on China’s cyber warfare. These interviews are analysed as 
shown as Section 5.2 to Section 5.5. 
According to the organisational feature of the armed forces in the ROC, under 
the General Staff Headquarters, defence strategy and approaches are deployed 
by three different services: the army, navy and air force. (ROC National Defence 
Report of Taiwan, 2008) Therefore, in order to collect complete data, the 
research includes eighteen interviews conducted with active or retired senior 
military officers in different ranks and from all three different services, as well 
as interviewees from the civil and government sectors, listed in the table below: 
        Interview 
                    sectors 
Interviewee 
Government 
Sector 
Military 
Sector 
Civil  
Sector Total 
Respondents 8 18 4 30 
Table-1: Statistical table of interview respondents 
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The 18 active senior military officers were based across the ROC National 
Defense University, War College, Army, Navy, and Air Force Command & 
Staff College, and other military units associated with the affairs of cyber 
warfare. Since I have worked in the military sector in Taiwan before, I was able 
to secure interviews with these active military officers who are suited to this 
research topic as a result of their decades of experience. Some details are briefly 
listed here as follows: 
 Seven active Army Colonels who were in relevant military positions and 
involved in cyber warfare-related projects at the time of interview. Some of 
these respondents also hold PhD degrees. 
 Four active Army Lieutenant Colonels who were in relevant military 
positions and involved in cyber warfare-related projects at the time of 
interview. Some of these also hold PhD or MA degrees. 
 Two active Navy Captains holding PhD degrees, who were in relevant 
military positions and involved in cyber warfare-related projects at the time 
of interview.  
 Three Air Force Colonels and one Air Force Lieutenant Colonel who were in 
relevant military positions and involved in cyber warfare-related projects at 
the time of interview. 
 One retired Navy Rear Admiral holding a PhD degree, who formerly 
supervised a Lab of Cyber Warfare Exercise at the Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) in the ROC. 
 One retired Army Lt. General who was formerly Chief of Staff in the ROC 
Army Command Headquarters, and one retired Major General who was 
formerly the Chief of Division of Communications, Electronics and 
Information at MND. Both now work for the Society for Strategic Studies, 
which is made up of retired Generals and sponsored by the ROC government. 
 Six respondents from the government sector who work for the Institute of 
PLA Studies or the Institute of Information Studies sponsored by the ROC 
government. 
 Four respondents who work for civil research institutions or private 
companies in the civil sector. 
2. Recent cyber incidents which suggest actual implementation of PRC cyber 
warfare strategy. This date collection is presented in Section 5.6. 
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3. Documentary evidence of China’s cyber warfare from the PRC, which also 
includes existing doctrines of military strategy associated with China’s cyber 
warfare. 
5.1.2 The process of conducting interviews 
I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews (Burnham, 2008). This was 
directed by questions and topics provided by the researcher, and accordingly 
articulated the theoretical propositions generated in the analytical framework. In 
addition to the primary research question, the interview questions designed in the 
case study were also based on the secondary research questions as addressed in 
the Introduction. Meanwhile, a range of document-based resources were 
comprehensively analysed, so that interview questions were able to be generated 
more precisely. 
As mentioned previously, this chapter draws on interviews with subjects 
from the military, government and civil sectors in Taiwan, as well as document-
based evidence, such as the PRC’s military doctrines and government documents. 
Regarding collection of interview data, the model of interview in this research can 
be regarded as the model of ‘interactionism’ as defined by Silverman (1994:98), 
since the interview data are authentic experiences collected from the interviewees 
and the interviews were conducted163 via open-ended interaction. As Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005:696) point out, ‘Interviewing is not merely the neutral exchange of 
asking questions and getting answers,’ and accordingly ‘conscious and 
unconscious motives, desires and feelings’ are unavoidable.  I was therefore aware 
of the need to avoid any possible interview biases when interviewing.164 
In addition, the interview questions are divided into three categories: 
cyberspace/Information Technology, Chinese strategy/warfare, and cyber warfare, 
which were put forward based on the respective areas of expertise of the 
interviewees. In the interview process, I asked a range of interview questions, 
some of which were follow-up questions to interviewees’ responses. There were a 
total of 16 planned interview questions. The categories of all the questions and the 
                                               
163 These interview questions are designed by the author of this research, who was also the interviewer 
and created the interview context; the respondents either complied with or resisted the definition of 
this context, according to Silverman’s qualitative research method. (Silverman, 1994:94) 
164 I was aware of interviewer bias whilst conducting interviews, since the interviewer may 
subconsciously give subtle clues with body language, or tone of voice, that subtly influence the subject 
into giving answers skewed towards the interviewer’s own opinions, prejudices and values. 
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sectors that a group of questions were posed to are displayed in the table below, so 
that it can easily be identified which sector was asked which category of questions. 
                             Sectors 
Question Category 
Government 
Sector 
Military 
Sector 
Civil  
Sector 
Cyberspace/IT Q1-2, Q9-12,   Q2-3, Q9-13 Q1, Q9-13,  
Chinese strategy/warfare Q1-2, Q4, Q7-8, Q14 -15 Q2-8, Q14-15 
Q1, Q4, Q7-8, 
Q14 
Cyber warfare Q1-2, Q4, Q7-12, Q14-15  Q1-16  
Q1, Q4, Q7-
14  
Table-2: Categories of interview questions165 
5.1.3 The validity of data collection 
As mentioned earlier, bias in qualitative research is inevitable. However, as Mats 
Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg (2009:111) point out, ‘A certain established bias – 
for instance, an ideological one – can, on the other hand, contain very valuable 
information from the perspective of ideology research: what message is being 
conveyed?’ Since the ideological doctrines of the PRC and the ROC usually run 
counter to one another politically, any inevitable bias of the interview data is 
therefore likely to be an ideological one. However, though data is collected from 
the opposition it can still contain very valuable information for this research, 
especially due to implementation of data triangulation as mentioned previously. 
Moreover, as Carolyn Baker discusses, the relation between the interview 
and the interviewee has to be understood. (Silverman, 1994:90) In line with Baker, 
I regarded the interviewees as experienced subjects who actively construct their 
in-depth observations. Even though the interviews were structured loosely on a 
framework of themes for exploration, following the semi-structured interview 
method, in order to generate data which gives an authentic insight into the 
interviewees’ experiences, the interactions of the interviews were open-ended. 
The interviews were also conducted in an interactive-relational manner. That is to 
say, I understood what my position in this research is and clarified the purpose of 
the interviews with the respondents. Meanwhile, I brought the attributes and 
values produced in the analytical framework to the interviews, and thus did my 
best to avoid masking personal views. 
                                               
165 Apart from this table, the list of interview questions can also be found in Appendix 1. 
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Moreover, according to Burnham’s view, the interviews in this research can 
be understood to be ‘elite interviewing,’ also known as interviewing the ‘target 
group,’ since it is appropriate to consider the interviewees as experts in this 
research topic. For example, many of the interviewees have earned PhD degrees 
in related fields. In addition, as Burnham points out, the semi-structured interview 
type adopted by this study is the best instrument for conducting ‘elite 
interviewing.’ (Burnham, 2008:231) For methodological reasons, I did not create 
any incentive for interviewees to be favourable to the arguments presented. 
However, I mentioned some arguments made in the analytical framework, such as 
the definition of cyberspace and principles of cyber-territoriality. This was not 
intended to encourage interviewees to demonstrate support for these arguments, 
but instead to reflect upon some answers given by respondents, as well as to hear 
further opinions to potentially elaborate upon the arguments and propositions. 
With the permission of the interviewees, interviews were conducted and recorded 
in Mandarin Chinese. On average each interview lasted 60 minutes, with the 
shortest interview running for 40 minutes and the longest for 90 minutes. A 
Chinese language summary was made of the interview content, which was then 
translated into English for the purpose of reference and quotation in this research. 
In addition, rather than citing the full names of the respondents, only their last 
names and ranks (where applicable) will be referred to in this study, as agreed 
with the interviewees at the time of interview. 
In order to help illustrate the validity and reliability of data collection, this 
research relies on Hammersley’s ‘subtle form of realism’, which consists of three 
epistemological elements, as follows: (Silverman, 1994:155) 
1. Validity is identified with confidence in our knowledge but not certainty. 
2.  Reality is assumed to be independent of the claims that researchers make 
about it. 
3.  Reality is always viewed through particular perspectives; hence though our 
accounts represent reality they do not reproduce it. 
In other words, according to the methodological judgment above, I argue 
that we can only know reality from our own perspective of it. Thus, the validity of 
the interviews in this research is established, in part, through the experiences and 
self reporting of the interviewees’ social world. 
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5.1.4 Data analysis 
The purpose of analysing the interviews and document-based evidence was to 
make critical judgements in light of the four theoretical propositions generated in 
the analytical framework. Analysis of the interviews was in part guided by the 
questions raised in the existing literature, but was also inductive, in that new 
findings generated in the early interviews were used to challenge and develop 
understandings of these issues in the later interviews. The analysis of the 
interview data was therefore designed to seek themes emerging from the 
respondents’ content. Through critical and reflexive reading of the rich 
description gathered in the interviews, commonly occurring points of view 
emerged as strong themes. These often concerned the material and non-material 
values of the development of China’s cyber warfare. 
However, as mentioned previously, this research is necessarily limited by 
the general characteristics of Military and Warfare Studies since a war cannot be 
artificially created in order to test conclusions. The background of the interview 
samples mentioned earlier may also cause a possible limitation of this research. 
As a result, through a series of methodological steps above, a balanced integration 
of theoretical propositions, data collection, and data analysis can be ensured for 
this research to aim to uncover new findings.  
Ultimately, no matter whether or not the emerging themes166 of interviews 
are supportive of theoretical propositions, the interviews are valuable for the 
analysis of each proposition, as they are real and practical in accordance with the 
experiences of interviewees. Under the frame of each analytical proposition, a set 
of themes emerge from both the interviews and the PRC government documents, 
which will be laid out in full in each section through critical interpretations and 
primary source quotations.  
5.2 The strategic value of cyberspace for China 
This section will reflect Section 4.1 of the analytical framework through analysing 
themes emerging from the data collection to reveal empirically how China employs 
the strategic value of cyberspace. As examined in Section 2.2, the features of 
cyberspace form a strategic value, which may shape this space into a potential 
                                               
166 These emerging themes can be found in the subtitles of each of the following sections in this chapter. 
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battlefield.167 In addition, these features may cause perceived insecurity as a result 
of people’s heavy reliance on cyberspace in the present day, caused by concern that 
the daily functions of cyberspace will not operate securely as normal. Thus, due to 
the fact that states’ critical infrastructures rely heavily upon cyberspace, as shown in 
Section 2.2, it is imperative to provide protection for this space to ensure perceived 
security and retain normal functionality in national politics, the economy, social 
public services, and even the military sector.  
In China, as stated previously, the national infrastructure includes the internet, 
communication satellites, and nationwide cable infrastructure. China is striving hard 
to develop this national information infrastructure yet further. As a result, the 
population of China’s ‘netizens’168, virtual ‘habitants’ of cyberspace, has also 
increased exponentially.  
As Joseph Nye (2011:3) states in Cyberspace Wars, ‘Unlike atoms, human 
adversaries are purposeful and intelligent. Mountains and oceans are hard to move, 
but portions of cyberspace can be turned on and off at the click of a mouse. It is 
cheaper and quicker to move electrons across the globe than to move large ships 
long distances through the friction of salt water. The costs of developing multiple 
carrier taskforces and submarine fleets create enormous barriers to entry and make it 
possible to speak of US naval dominance. In contrast, the barriers to entry in the 
cyber-domain are so low that non-state actors and small states can play significant 
roles at low levels of cost.’ (Nye, 2011) This statement by Nye succinctly 
demonstrates that cyberspace presents a strategic value for states contending for 
predominance over one another. The more advantages cyberspace offers, the more 
vulnerable states’ security will become. On the one hand, the strategic value of 
cyberspace can be harnessed by any state, but on the other hand, states must 
consider the vulnerabilities of cyberspace caused by the advantages of the same 
strategic value to others. As shown in Section 2.2, the key features of cyberspace 
potentially simultaneously cause the vulnerability of this space as well as the 
reasons behind its strategic value for actors in cyberspace, including both states and 
non-states. For example, the shared cyberspace links together civil society, 
government and even, possibly, the military sectors. Though this enables states to 
                                               
167 Please refer to Section 2.2 for more detail on the features of cyberspace. 
168 According to the PRC’s ‘27th Annual Report China Internet Network Information’ (2011) concerning 
China’s internet status, the population of China’s netizens is 457 million, and additionally 303 million 
people connect to the internet via mobile phones. 
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rely on cyberspace, this strategic value also makes it an attractive target for 
adversaries. Meanwhile, cyberspace’s feature of asymmetry also offers actors a 
tempting strategic opportunity to carry out attacks in order to accomplish certain 
political purposes. In addition, due to the anonymity of cyberspace, adversaries 
conducting cyber attacks are unlikely to be identified in this intangible space. 
However, according to the investigation presented in Section 2.3, cyber-territoriality 
could potentially be recognised through mapping between the Domain Name 
System and TCP/IP in cyberspace. The characteristics of cyber-territoriality must 
therefore be typified in order to trace back the origin of hostile attacks. 
The conceptual analysis of this research suggests the theoretical proposition 
that the strategic value of cyberspace shapes it into an intangible arena in which 
China is likely to contend for predominance over other states. The following 
sections will elaborate this theoretical proposition empirically through data collected 
in the case study.  
5.2.1 The strategic value 
This section will explain exactly how China realises the strategic value of 
cyberspace. When asked in interview how China regards the protection of 
cyberspace as part of its cyber warfare, ROC Navy Captain Chang (2011) 
responded: 
‘[According to Chinese ideology] I think whatever space human 
beings can reach will inevitably turn into space for human struggle. 
Consider the following formula: human beings engage in a space’s 
activities thus creating a space’s interests. As the space’s interests 
cannot satisfy all parties involved in such activities, the space’s 
struggles naturally appear in human society. We, the human being, 
may subsequently develop intellectual concepts of the space’s control 
or the space’s security in order to secure its freedom of choice as a 
policy formulation, and freedom of action in policy implementation: in 
other words, secure total dominance of the space. This is the general 
rule of human nature, no more, no less.’ [In Captain Chang’s view, 
this can also be applied to other domains such as sea, the 
electromagnetic spectrum, air, and outer-space, though the PLA 
defines cyberspace as including the electromagnetic spectrum.] 
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In Captain C. (2011) view, China may value cyberspace as a potential 
battleground similar to the traditional battlefields for ‘human struggle.’169 In so 
doing, the value of this cyberspace for China is beyond the various functions of 
banking, transportation, and public services used by civil society, but instead is 
suited for military purposes. As a result, China’s cyber warfare may be deployed 
via embedding military actions into the civil sector. 
However, one might argue whether China is capable of dominating the 
strategic value of cyberspace. In the view of ROC Air Force Colonel Liu (2010), 
‘Fairly speaking, I think that the USA might be the state which is able to dominate 
the field of cyber warfare on a global scale rather than China. This is because the 
major hardware, software, and databases, such as Intel CPU (Central Processing 
Unit), OS (Operating System), Windows, Linux OS, and Oracle database, were 
originally invented and produced in the USA. These techniques are the 
fundamental facilities used to control computer systems in cyberspace and are 
indispensible for developing cyber warfare.’ In other words, other states may have 
to follow in the wake of the US military due to US technological dominance. The 
related argument that China learns warfare from the USA will be thoroughly 
considered in Section 5.3.2. 
5.2.2 The national information infrastructure 
Professor Ding (2011), an expert on the Chinese military, evaluates the 
aforementioned Chinese National Defence report in his interview: 
‘In terms of interpretation of the Chinese National Defence report 
2010, I do believe that the PRC constantly espouses the strategy of 
cyber warfare in order to fulfil its strategic thinking, which is the 
defeat of the militarily superior by the militarily inferior, through the 
feature of asymmetry of cyberspace [as you argue in your research]. 
In addition, the development of China’s cyber warfare not only 
involves securing China’s own cyberspace but also contending 
dominance in cyberspace. China therefore will never give up 
developing cyber warfare, and this is stated without any evasion in the 
PRC official report, despite the fact that this report is published in 
order to earn the trust of other states. Moreover, this military 
                                               
169 See Chapter Two for a further examination of this idea. 
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development is built on the civil information infrastructure, as the 
report notes.’  
According to interviewee ROC Army Lieutenant Colonel Xiu (2010): 
‘Taiwan has been the target of China’s cyber warfare exercises for 
many years, so I have had many experiences with tackling China’s 
cyber attacks. In cyberspace, unlike on the traditional battlefield, there 
are no limitations such as time or weather conditions to prepare 
defensive measures [like traditional military fortifications], or to 
counter-attack your enemies in this battlespace, so actions can be 
carried out 7 days a week and 24 hours a day on a massive scale. 
China has also realised this potential strategic value, and there is 
some documental evidence of this, so it is not necessary to evade the 
fact of China’s cyber warfare development.’ 
This discourse reflects the argument that warfare in cyberspace may 
contain strategic value, as the boundary between offensive strategy and defensive 
strategy in cyberspace is also indiscernible. As identified in Section 2.2.2, one of 
the features of cyberspace is that a state’s military and government sectors share 
the same electronic information infrastructure, namely cyberspace, with its civil 
society. In other words, as cyberspace has become a potential battleground, a 
pertinent issue is whether a state’s military capability in this battleground could be 
enhanced in order to increase its ability to secure the civil information 
infrastructure contained therein. As a result, cyber warfare, an issue of the military 
sector, can be established through the information infrastructure, part of the civil 
sector. Therefore, based on this strategic value, it is very likely that China’s cyber 
warfare will be developed through reinforcement of the civil information 
infrastructure, not necessarily through the military sector.170 
According to interviews, it can be argued that China harnesses the 
strategic value of cyberspace via its national information infrastructure, 
particularly that of the civil sector, in order to develop cyber warfare. Meanwhile, 
                                               
170 This concept may also apply to other weapon technology development of. Technology has long 
influenced the development of military warfare, particularly since the industrial revolution. However, 
as examined in earlier chapters, the scope of information technology is on a relatively large scale, 
meaning its strategic value is consequently more influential than other technologies. 
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as PLA’s Major General Wang Baocun (2010) asserts171, ‘Propelling the military 
via civil industry [以商促軍, yi shang cu jun]’ is the key purpose behind 
reinforcing China’s civil information infrastructure, thus strengthening the PLA’s 
capacity for cyber warfare. Chinese Major General Wang states: 
‘The concept of “propelling the military via civil industry” is based on 
the idea of societal or national informationisation promoting military 
informationisation. There are three main reasons: firstly, the Chinese 
national information infrastructure was constructed earlier than that 
of the armed forces, and therefore the former can provide a point of 
reference for the latter; secondly, the extent of informationisation of 
local businesses is generally higher than that of the Chinese military, 
and therefore the former  can have an ‘infiltrative’ function for the 
latter; thirdly, the development of civil information technology is more 
rapid than military information technology, which sets the technical 
conditions of “civilians driving the military”. The PLA’s 
informationisation should be guided by the strategy of national 
informationisation as well as relying on the foundation of the national 
information infrastructure, in order to achieve the goals of 
“combining peace with wartime; combining the military with civil 
society; military use of civil technologies, and embedding the military 
in civil society”.’ 
Furthermore, practical evidence further validates this viewpoint. On 31st 
March 2011, the PRC officially published the 2010 China National Defence 
Report.172 This report clearly proclaims that China’s civil information 
infrastructure is a vital construction of the national defence. This government 
report primarily addresses the strategic guideline of ‘speeding up the construction 
                                               
171 Major General Wang made this assertion in an article entitled View of PLA’s Informationisation 
Construction (我軍信息化建設管窺, wo jun xinxihua jianshe guankui) which can be found in the 
Chinese monograph China’s Information Warfare, acknowledged as a critical guideline of China’s 
cyber warfare doctrine. The hard copy was located in the archival collection of the ROC National War 
College in Taiwan. (PLA, 2010:116-137) 
172 In general, the motivation behind the publication of this white paper is to provide information on 
China’s national defence in order to remove any concern about China’s threat to other states. However, 
this report stresses that the development of information/cyber warfare remains a key element in 
China’s national defence, implying that China may be expending great effort in developing cyber 
warfare.   
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of [China’s] informationisation’, in order to connect the civil information 
infrastructure and China’s cyber warfare in the military sector. 
‘People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops must closely embrace the 
construction of an informationised military to achieve the strategic 
aim of winning information war [cyber war][…] constructing a civil 
information infrastructure to realise aims of rapid, striding 
development. The total length of optical fibre available for 
communication is much more than a decade ago, creating a new 
generation information transmission network based mainly on optical 
fibre communication, and supplemented with satellite and shortwave 
communication. This rapid developmental route is principally led by 
informationisation, driving modernisation through preparation for 
military struggle in order to reinforce defensive capabilities under the 
conditions of information warfare. [….] To confront the new 
developments and changes in national security requirements, the PLA 
has to strengthen the construction of new operational ability [cyber 
warfare] in order to meet the requirements of “winning local under 
information conditions”173.’ 
5.2.3 The military task of reinforcing the civil information infrastructure 
In addition to the benefit to the military produced by the civil sector, in turn, the 
development of China’s cyber warfare not only seeks strategic warfare in the 
military sector but also facilitates the protection of China’s civil information 
infrastructure. As the features of cyberspace create the condition that any actors 
may possibly pose a threat in this civil information infrastructure, China regards 
protection of cyberspace to ensure its strategic value as a military task. The 
purpose of cyber security is to prevent the threat caused by the inherent features of 
cyberspace. Normally, these threats need not be dealt with by the military alone. 
However, in China, any issues relating to cyberspace, regardless of whether they 
occur in the military or civil spheres, fall under the umbrella of cyber warfare. 
Further to this, according to ROC retired Lieutenant General Deng (2010), 
‘Though China is a country that has been developing rapidly in terms of 
“informationisation,” the extent of this development is unbalanced [between the 
                                               
173 This is the latest military strategic guideline, in place since 1992. Please refer to Section 2.2.3 in 
Chapter Two for more information. 
-141- 
 
military and civil sectors]. Therefore, the rule of developing the national 
information infrastructure may be different to that of other developed countries.’ 
In Deng’s view, China’s informationisation targets the development of cyber 
warfare in the military sector rather than cyber security in the civil sector. In 
addition, this guideline may be based on the evaluation of the strategic value of 
developing warfare in cyberspace, meaning that the deployment of military 
actions in the civil sector could be justified as ‘protection’ of the military. 
Moreover, in terms of China’s cyber security ideology, as Adam Segal (2011), a 
member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), points out, ‘I think the way 
that the United States, the United Kingdom, and most other Western countries use 
it [cyber security] is for defence of computers and communications networks [in 
the civil society]. The Chinese, like the Russians, also use the term “information 
security,” which includes content. They are not only concerned about attacks on 
[civil] networks, but which information is being carried on them – which could 
affect national security.’ In other words, for China all matters associated with 
cyber security are not only regarded as an issue of national security, but also 
specifically as an issue of military strategy, demonstrating that China’s cyber 
warfare may even include the deployment of military actions in civil society. 
5.2.4 Gaining strategic value through non-military approaches 
Aside from embedding strategic value in China’s national infrastructure, 
interviewees suggest that there is another approach, known as Military Operations 
Other Than War174, in which China pursues strategic value for military purposes 
via non-military operations. 
Since the 1980s, the PRC has proclaimed that China’s rise is peaceful, and 
that China would not carry out any military operations unless necessary. However, 
after the idea of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), involving 
aspects such as humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and rescue of societal 
emergencies, was introduced to the world, it can be believed that the Chinese 
military ‘put out feelers’ to test the possibilities of employing the non-traditional 
                                               
174 The term MOOTW was introduced in the US Joint Doctrine JP-3-07. It focuses on deterring war, 
resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. 
MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and 
war situations.  MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same 
characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat 
capabilities. (US Joint Doctrine, 1995) 
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military circumstances of MOOTW to achieve certain military goals for the PLA, 
such as the exercise of logistics and long-distance troop deployment. This may be 
homologous to China developing cyber warfare through non-traditional military 
actions. Some existing Chinese MOOTW actions could be explained in terms of 
the strategic thinking of using non-traditional military actions to reinforce military 
capabilities, demonstrating that the PRC intends to adopt the strategy of Military 
Operations Other Than War to exercise and shape its military capabilities.  
ROC military officer Army Colonel Lien (2010) provides his empirical 
experience in military logistics to state:  
‘Based on the PRC’s Constitutional Law amended in 2004 and the 
PRC’s Regulation of Measures for Contingency amended in 2007, it 
can be seen that the idea of “Military Operations Other Than War” 
has been noted in these laws, so that the Chinese armed forces can get 
involved in many non-military actions, such as rescue from natural 
disasters or societal accidents and international humanitarian aid in 
order to exercise military abilities and cooperate with private sectors. 
For example, the Chinese navy sent three battleships to join the anti-
pirate activities in Somalia in December 2009 to practice the military 
logistics of long sailing, and also carried out some domestic joint 
exercises between the military and civil sectors in many local regions 
by reason of homeland security in order to reinforce the cooperative 
relations between the two sectors for later occasions.’ 
In Lien’s view (2010), the PLA has used the term ‘diversified military 
tasks [多樣化軍事任務, duoyanghua junshi renwu]’ appearing in China’s 
National Defence reports since 2006, to represent the same tasks and goals as 
MOOTW. Further evidence corroborates China’s intention of conducting 
MOOTW. Since 2010, the PRC has created new opportunities for cooperation 
with other states, including peacekeeping efforts, humanitarian and disaster relief, 
and counter-piracy operations, in order to carry out military practice, such as 
logistics, and reinforce China’s military modernisation. For example, in March 
2011, many nation-states sent emergency rescue teams to help Japan recover from 
a massively destructive earthquake and tsunami. China attempted to take this 
opportunity to send supplies to the damaged area, but as the supplies would be 
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carried not by a civil ship but instead by a Chinese Navy ship, the offer was 
therefore declined by the Japanese government.175 
An additional strategic thought behind China’s adoption of the strategy of 
cyber warfare may be that similarities between civil technology and military 
technology are very extensive. Thus, both military defence and offence can rely 
on the civil sector to stealthily develop China’s cyber warfare without drawing the 
attention of other states, particularly in areas such as research and development 
and expenditure. In terms of this strategic pattern, the interviewee ROC Air Force 
Colonel Huang (2011) states: 
‘From reliable sources in my military experiences, I have accessed 
evidence showing that China has merged a few military academies 
into the PLA Institute of Technology, where a Research Centre for 
Cyber-Technology was established in 1998. More than 400 civil IT 
experts have been recruited to develop the critical techniques of cyber 
warfare, and some technical cooperation between military and civilian 
universities has also been carried out. 
In Colonel Huang’s view, both the professionals and the advanced 
techniques of the civil sector are incorporated into the military sector via the PLA 
Institute. Thus, the research and development of China’s cyber warfare is not 
necessarily carried out by the military sector alone, but also involves cooperation 
with the civil sector. In addition, due to the similarity of IT in cyberspace in the 
two sectors, any outcomes of research and development in the civil sector can be 
easily transferred to the military sector. 
5.2.5 The principles of cyber territoriality 
It is necessary to create principles for actors to deal with the strategic value of 
cyberspace. However, due to the inherent anonymity of cyberspace, it is hard to 
define a cyber war and identify attackers to confer responsibility for any damage 
caused by cyber attacks. As a result, the four principles of cyber-territoriality 
generated in Section 2.3 of the analytical framework may offer cyber-actors, both 
state and non-state, the justification needed to seek possible solutions to deal with 
cyber attacks. 
                                               
175 Japan also ruled out China’s emergency rescue team. According to Japanese officials, this was because 
the Japanese airport open to landing for foreign rescue teams was the US military base during the 
Korean War. (China News, 2011) 
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In an interview with Feng, based on his experience involving cooperative 
investigations, Feng (2010) points to empirical evidence showing that cyber 
warfare was often applied by China as a method of espionage: 
‘On 7th March 2011, François Baroin, the French Minister of Budget, 
indicated that the computer system of the French Financial 
Administration Department was extensively hacked into, by hackers 
whose IP addresses were situated in Mainland China, and that this 
hacking caused roughly ten thousand computers to be shut down. 
Patrick Pailloux, the Chief of the French National Agency for 
Information Technology Security, claims that these large-scale attacks, 
the likes of which France had never seen before, were intended to 
retrieve documents related to G20 as France was the host state at the 
time. In addition, Xin Heyoung, a congressman and member of the 
National Defence Committee in the Congress of South Korea, 
indicated that Chinese hackers invaded the computer system of the 
Ministry of National Defence of South Korea in order to access some 
information relating to a weapon acquisition of the USA Global Hawk 
UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle].’ 
Further to this, the interviewee ISP General Manager Yan Fang-Bin in 
Taiwan evaluated, from his experiences of dealing with China’s information 
industry, that: 
‘Firstly, normally it would not be an important point that Chinese 
civilians hacked the email accounts of Chinese rights activists, unless 
they were encouraged by the government. Secondly, this attack was on 
a large scale and highly complicated. Some IT experts used the 
technique of “Reverse Engineering” to deconstruct the computer 
programme of the attacks, and then discovered that the primary codes 
contain a unique algorithm which has been introduced only in Chinese 
technical reports.’ […] ‘In addition to the dispute, the USA 
government reports might be trustworthy, since 13 of the most 
advanced machines of the Domain Name System server in the world 
are supervised by the USA so that they are able to trace attacks 
through logs on these servers.’ 
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However, some offer differing points of view. One of the interviewees, 
ROC Navy Captain Chang (2011), argues: 
‘Even though the Taiwanese military has had many empirical conflicts 
with Mainland China, I have to state fairly that distinguishing 
boundaries in cyberspace remains uncertain, since all states are linked 
together creating a certain level of dispute over benefits. Besides this, 
though Domain Names and IP addresses can be linked to states, this 
still cannot represent the boundary of states’ territories, and lacks the 
meaning of sovereignty. Like traditional wars which are based ex soli, 
offensive and defensive military actions can be identified according to 
the boundary of territories. Therefore, it is necessary to offer the 
equivalent concept in cyberspace in order to further recognise the 
purpose of cyber attacks.’ 
This infers that whether China conducted the cyber attacks on Google or 
not still remains contentious. Navy Captain Chang’s (2011) critiques that ‘It is 
impractical to view that cyberspace possesses the essence of territoriality as a real 
territory does [since cyberspace is not physical].’ As Captain Chang further 
conjectures, many transnational cyber-attacks take advantage of the difference 
between the network Domain Name and their true physical location.176 As stated 
by Captain Chang, a state’s sovereignty is closely associated with ‘judicial 
jurisdiction’. Most of the time, this jurisdiction is limited to the physical territory 
of the state itself. However, though there is a difference between the Domain 
Name of a website and its real geographic location, it is still possible to trace an 
attack to a geographical location via its digital TCP/IP address, rather than its 
Domain Name or the website address. In an interview, ROC Army Lieutenant 
Colonel Chang (2010) corroborates: ‘According to my experience of dealing with 
cyberspace, I have to say that the Domain Name System and TCP/IP addresses 
give this cyberspace the feature of regionality since the distribution of IP 
addresses is based on the regionalisation of cyberspace. Thus any computer in 
cyberspace can be traced back to a geographical location.177 China’s cyberspace is 
                                               
176 For example, some website’s domain names end with co.uk, but the servers are not necessarily 
physically located in UK territory. 
177 Lt. Colonel Chang also demonstrated how to trace IP addresses via a real web-based system: 
http://www.ipaddresslocation.org/. If you input an IP address, the system will show its geographical 
attributions, such as country, city, latitude, longitude, local time, and the IP’s Host and organisation. 
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no exception as well.’ In other words, based on the technique of the DNS and 
TCP/IP mapping system, every computer in cyberspace represents an IP address 
which links up to a geographical location; this may delineate an intangible space 
possessing the metaphorical concept of territoriality if one of the potential four 
principles – the functional borders of cyberspace – can be recognised.  
In addition, as the incidents of cyber attacks examined in Section 5.6 later, 
it illustrates that the IP addresses of some cyber attacks have been traced to 
geographic locations within China’s territory. Nevertheless, one might argue this 
cannot prove whether these attacks were supported by the Chinese government or 
the military sector, or were simply from civilian hackers. In addition to this, the 
cyber attack on Google in 2010, apparently carried out by actors inside China, 
may be regarded as the most significant case178 of cyber attack, as despite the 
huge costs, the Google company even considered pulling out of China and giving 
up the huge Chinese market in response. Moreover, in unprecedented 
circumstances, the US government also became involved, urging China to respond 
to Google’s investigations of a sophisticated hacking attack into the Gmail 
accounts of Chinese rights activists.  
However, whilst the PRC continued to rebuff the claims that some of the 
cyber attacks could be traced back to geographic locations in China’s territory179 
due to the controversy, in late 2010, an apparent state secret was surprisingly 
revealed by WikiLeaks180 in its publication of a classified diplomatic cable. 
According to the released cable, the Google attack was very possibly an approved 
operation by Chinese government officials. The cable summaries that: 
                                               
178 The seriousness of the issue could be seen by Google’s response to the hacking and their threat to pull 
out of China altogether, and also from the US State Department’s involvement in the issue. The fact 
that the State Department and even someone as high up as Hillary Clinton got involved in the issue 
shows how important this single hacking event was (not just because Google is the current market 
leader). 
179 For example, in terms of the US government urging Beijing to investigate Google’s complaints that 
cyber attacks had originated in China, the PRC’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said the US 
should ‘respect the facts and stop making groundless accusations against China.’ The rough timeline 
of events is below: (BBC News, 2010) 
 12 January 2010: Google’s Chief Legal Officer, David Drummond, announces Google may leave 
China after cyber attacks and calls for an end to censorship of its search results. 
 22 January 2010: China rejects US criticism as ‘groundless.’  
 22 March 2010: Google announces it will redirect its Mainland China customers to an uncensored 
Hong Kong-based site. 
 29 June 2010: Google says users inside Mainland China now have to actively click on a link 
before accessing unfiltered search results. 
180 WikiLeaks is a non-profit media organisation dedicated to bringing important news and information to 
the public. 
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 ‘A well-placed contact claims that the Chinese government 
coordinated the recent intrusions of Google systems. According to our 
contact, the closely held operations were directed at the Politburo 
Standing Committee level’181 […] ‘Another contact claimed a top PRC 
leader was actively working with Google competitor Baidu against 
Google.’ [The Chinese private sector would be willing to cooperate 
with the Chinese government in certain cases since their relations are 
very close.] 
This well-known incident of cyber attack has more relevance to this 
research than just this. Without the leaked cable information, it may be impossible 
to assign responsibility for the Google attack. In Section 5.5 of this chapter, 
further investigation relating to the Google case will be analysed to provide 
arguments for other propositions.  
Furthermore, on 16th July 2011, China Central Television 7 (CCTV-7), 
China’s official channel for military and agriculture issues, broadcast a 20 minute 
programme called ‘網絡風暴來了 (Wanglu fengbao lai le, Cyber Storm Is 
Coming),’ in which it was inadvertently revealed that a PLA institute was 
developing cyber attacks targeting certain websites situated inside US territory.182 
It is highly possible that this is the first visual material released from a unit in the 
Chinese government sector that significantly presents China’s cyber warfare. As a 
report further evaluates, this incident is likely to lead to international tension. 
(Erickson and Collins, 2011) As a result of incidents such as these, it is now 
imperative to generate certain rules to identify which kinds of act constitute an act 
of war and which do not. 
However, as yet, there is no international legal framework or rules to build 
up a solid set of evidence for assigning responsibility. As Christopher Hughes 
                                               
181 The cable of 18th May 2009, entitled ‘Google China Paying Price for Resisting Censorship,’ goes on to 
quote a well-placed source clearly indicating that two members of China’s toping ruling body, the 
Politburo Standing Committee, Li Changchun (李长春) and Zhou Yongkang (周永康), issued 
approvals of  the hacking of Google. This cable is likely to provide a patchwork of detail about cyber 
attacks originated in China. (WikiLeaks, 2010) 
182 In the programme, a web-based system of cyber attack was demonstrated in order to explain to 
audiences how cyber warfare works. This web-based system showed a list of attack targets users could 
select, inadvertently demonstrating the attack source and the system designed by the PLA Electronic 
Engineering Institute with the system title showing on-screen. As soon as the mistake was reported, 
the programme was pulled from the CCTV-7 website on 24th August 2011. Nevertheless, the 
programme can still be found via a web blog (http://xlolix.com/bujieshi.html#comments), and was 
also reported on by China SignPost. (Erickson and Collins, 2011) 
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(2010:22) points out, ‘It has still been impossible to identify specific computers 
without cooperation from Chinese authorities.’ As a result, due to the anonymity of 
cyberspace, it is theoretically difficult to identify attackers. According to Lene 
Hansen (2009), it is therefore highly necessary that networks and cyber actors be 
identifiable or linked to a nation-state or a regime, so that responsibility for a cyber 
attack can be assigned once an actor is attacked in cyberspace. This links with the 
four principles of cyber-territoriality (autonomy, cyber culture, functional borders, 
and people) proposed in Section 4.2.183 To resolve the difficulty of defining a cyber 
war, if cyberspace had a conceptualised territoriality, the four principles could 
combine into a theoretical tool to identify cyber war to allow for the legitimate 
conduct of defensive solutions. Even though the concept of territoriality was 
originally established upon the state territorial system, the principles of territoriality 
can be applied to a domain regardless of whether it is tangible or intangible. The 
principles of territoriality based on the state system can be borrowed to generate 
equivalent principles of cyber-territoriality even though cyber territoriality is not in 
absolute accord with the state system. 
If physical locations of cyber attacks can be linked to state’s sovereignty, as 
proposed by Hansen (2009), the principles of cyber-territoriality may grant either 
state or non-state actors in cyberspace the justification necessary to arbitrate or deal 
with disputes in the event that the principles were compromised. For example, the 
infamous Google incident could represent an ideal case for a private company to 
assert its own cyber-territoriality, in line with the four conceptual principles. Firstly, 
the principle of ‘autonomy’ can apply to the company’s authority over access to its 
servers and data. Secondly, the principle of ‘cyber culture’ reflects the norms, 
behaviours, and communications carried out via Google’s websites, which form a 
global community. Thirdly, the principle of ‘functional borders’ can imply 
functional servers, such as filters, firewalls and proxy servers, used to scrutinise and 
countercheck any malicious intrusions in much the same way as a territorial state’s 
borders. Fourthly, the principle of ‘people’ would refer to the users of Google; 
Google has the obligation to protect its ‘people’ from misuse or theft of their 
accounts or information. As such, if these principles became accepted rules 
recognised in the international framework, Google would be able to resort to 
                                               
183 This proposition is also based on the metaphorical territoriality of cyberspace examined in Section 2.3. 
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justifiable measures if any one of the principles is violated. Finally, if every state or 
regime were responsible for the IP addresses located geographically inside its 
territory, rules of engagement of cyber warfare could be introduced to function 
similarly to those of traditional warfare in international politics. 
5.3 How China establishes its cyberspace as an integrated platform 
This section empirically reflects Section 4.2 of the analytical framework through 
analysing the themes emerging from data collection. As defined conceptually in 
Section 2.1, the development of China’s cyberspace is particularly based on an 
integrated platform consisting of computer networks, telecommunications, and 
electromagnetic infrastructure. 
According to the interviews in this section, the tactics of China’s cyber 
warfare include a combination of operational methods of electronic warfare, which 
may demonstrate integration with the electromagnetic environment. In this way, the 
extent of China’s cyber warfare is relatively wider than the warfare of other 
countries, as it is not merely limited to the internet and computer-based network 
systems. Analysis in this section is carried out via the themes emerging from 
interviews and related government documents. 
5.3.1 The PRC’s one-party government and China’s informationisation 
China’s cyber warfare is developed on an integrated platform which has been 
constructed efficiently by the PRC government as a result of China’s one-party 
political system. As ROC Army Colonel Zhou (2010) points out, it is very 
important for any state to have a reliable and trustworthy private Information 
Service Provider (ISP) to build up its national information infrastructure. This is 
true not solely for the military sector, but also for cyber security in general, since 
all sectors in a state – civil society, government, and the military – rely on a cable 
system normally provided by private industries. According to Zhou (2010), ‘There 
is no doubt that this issue would be the same for the construction of China’s 
cyberspace in order to develop cyber warfare.’ 
However, since China is ruled by the CCP government in a one-party 
regime, it is possible that the development of this integrated platform, consisting 
of computer networks, telecommunication, and electromagnetic infrastructure, 
may be easily accelerated. As Army Colonel Lien (2010) argues in interview, 
‘Because of the one-party dictatorship in China, budget planning, equipment 
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procurement, and policy-making have enabled a faster development of network 
communication infrastructure than that of other countries. The most evidential 
example is that of the construction of the National Cable Infrastructure by 
following the model “Eight Railway Lines from South to North and Eight 
Railway Lines from East to West”184 in China.’ In fact, according to a PRC 
government report, this construction of the National Cable Infrastructure, starting 
from 1998 and finished within only five years, is named ‘The Communication 
Network of Eight North-to-South and Eight East-to-West Optical Fibre Routes’ 
(八縱八橫光纖通信網, ba zong ba heng guangxian tongxin wang). Currently, 
optical fibre makes up more than 90% of the long-distance transmission network, 
which covers more than 85% of all Chinese counties and cities. The total length of 
the 23 main fibre cables is about 37,000 kilometres.185  
In other words, this massive cable construction makes it possible for 
people everywhere in China to connect to cyberspace and act as a cyber warrior if 
necessary. However, despite the fact that China’s national cable infrastructure is 
huge and covers very wide areas geographically, the ports connecting to the 
global WWW (World Wide Web) are relatively few within China’s territory. It is 
thus easier for the Chinese government to set up censorship mechanisms on these 
ports to control and monitor the extensive cyberspace. 
In terms of mobilising civil professionals to develop this integrated 
platform, ROC Army Colonel Zhou (2010) stresses that in addition to deploying a 
state’s military troops, every state should have its own laws regarding 
mobilisation of civil resources to allow the government to assemble functional 
units engaging in rescue activities in war or natural disasters if necessary: ‘I 
therefore believe that China is no exception in doing so. In addition, China is able 
to accelerate this mobilisation on a large scale because of its one-party 
                                               
184 The idea of ‘Eight Railway Lines from South to North and Eight Railway Lines from East to West’ 
refers to the main railway lines into which increased effort of construction and upgrading was put 
during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001-2005). The ‘Eight Railway Lines from South to North’ 
are the railway lines between Beijing and Harbin; Beijing and Shanghai; Beijing and Jiulong; Beijing 
and Guangzhou; Datong and Zhanjiang; Baotou and Liuzhou; Lanzhou and Kunming; and the east 
coast railways lines. The ‘Eight Railway Lines from East to West’ are the railway lines between 
Beijing and Lanzhou; the Northern Channel for Transporting Coal; the Southern Channel for 
Transporting Coal; railway lines between Longhai and Lanxin; railway lines between Nanjing and 
Xi’an; railway passage along the Yangtze River; railway lines between Shanghai and Kunming; and 
railway passage to the sea in the Southwest. 
185 The key points of the report are noted in Appendix 2: China’s National Telecommunication Network: 
Eight North-to-South and Eight East-to-West Optical Fibre Routes. 
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dictatorship.’186 Moreover, Colonel Zhou (2010) states that ‘A reliable source 
indicates a few of China’s private IT companies engage in certain tasks assigned 
by the Chinese government and military to indirectly strengthen the capability of 
China’s cyber warfare during peacetime.’   
In general, using search engines to look for key words that the Chinese 
government regards as sensitive may ultimately turn up no results. For example, 
in May 2011, Baidu, the biggest internet search engine company in China, was 
accused of compromising internet freedom in cooperation with the Chinese 
government, which was the first case in which an internet search engine was sued. 
(The Economist, 2011) However, this cooperation is likely inevitable due to laws 
made by the one-party authority. This may thus explain how the Chinese 
government is able to efficiently control and monitor cyberspace activities inside 
Mainland China. 
5.3.2 China’s ‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare’ 
Following the discussion of the construction of China’s national information 
infrastructure, it can be believed that electromagnetic environments are integrated 
into China’s cyberspace. This section explains that China also characterises its 
cyber warfare as Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW).  
In ROC Army Colonel Lu’s (2010) view, it is likely that China’s cyber 
warfare will draw from the US military’s idea of ‘Network-Centric Warfare’, 
which fits well with China’s integrated cyberspace. According to Colonel Lu 
(2010), Network-Centric Warfare refers to warfare applied in ‘the electromagnetic 
environment.’ This warfare enables the employment of a variety of resources in 
the environment, the flexibility of carrying out a variety of tasks, the command 
and control of resources in electronic warfare, ‘control of the electromagnetic 
spectrum’ and a gain in advantage in ‘combat space.’  
From a technical perspective, as interviewee Zhang (2010) indicates, 
‘Seven Layers’187 is currently the global standard for network transmission 
architecture. The first and second layers are used for communication; the third 
layer and above are used for networks. ‘Based on this bedrock, network and 
                                               
186 Colonel Zhou also mentions the opinion of a US senior military officer that the US military would 
recognise China’s authority to mobilise its people if they needed to do so. 
187 This is a standard of the Open System Interconnection Reference Mode published by the International 
Organisation for Standardization (ISO). For the concept of ‘Seven Layers,’ please refer to Section 
2.1.1. 
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communication should be regarded as an integrated platform, where 
telecommunication bears any packages transmitted.’ 
In addition, as ROC Air Force Lt. Colonel Hao (2010) notes from his 
working experience with military intelligence, ‘Regarding the collection of 
electronic information, the principle of sending and receiving information is the 
same for wireless networks and electromagnetic waves, and both require the use 
of coding and encoding.’ He also believes that cyberspace is characterised by the 
feature of networks and electromagnetics. Lt. Colonel Hao stresses that the basic 
military tactics of ‘countermeasure’ and ‘anti-countermeasure’ are therefore made 
possible by the long-distance transmission of low-frequency electromagnetic 
waves in the air and analysed through the combined application of the cable 
network and wireless network on the ground. That is to say, in modern, 
technology-based warfare, wireless networks and electronic waves are auxiliary to 
one other. 
Apart from that, as ROC Air Force Colonel Huang (2011) reveals from his 
experience of China’s cyber warfare against Taiwan, ‘China’s cyber troop 
includes an air/space unit, an information warfare unit, an electronic warfare unit, 
and a psychological warfare unit, all of which together form the basis of China’s 
cyber warfare.’ China’s cyber warfare is thus carried out in cyberspace and 
electromagnetic environments. Colonel Huang’s view also echoes the concept of 
an integrated platform consisting of computer networks, telecommunication, and 
electromagnetic infrastructure. In fact, in January 2002, the PRC issued the 7th 
edition of ‘The Guideline of Military Training and Evaluation’. This document 
notes that China has established research and testing troops to meet the strategic 
need of ‘Local War under Hi-Tech Conditions’188 in the 21st century. This 
guideline concludes that INEW, containing various forms of tactics, is the focus 
of cyber warfare.  
Furthermore, as ROC Air Force Colonel Yao (2010) corroborates, the 
PLA has possibly already put Integrated Network Electronic Warfare into action, 
even though this term has not yet been published in any official government 
documents. In Yao’s view, this warfare can be regarded as a ‘Chinese version’ of 
USA cyber warfare, which means that, as the field of electromagnetic operations 
                                               
188 Please refer to section 3.3.3 in Chapter Three on Modern Chinese Strategy.  
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is additional to US cyber warfare, the same goes for China’s cyber warfare.189 In 
one review, as PLA Major General Dai Qingmin (2008) states, the PRC considers 
it necessary to launch a ‘人民网路战 ren min wang lu zhan [People’s Cyber 
Warfare],’ which divides cyber warfare into six categories (operational security, 
military deception, psychological warfare, electronic warfare, computer network 
warfare and destroying entities), in which the ideas of People’s War can be 
effectively implemented. According to Dai, ‘“Integrated Network Electronic 
Warfare” refers to the action of disturbing the enemy’s battlefield system and 
protecting one’s own battlefield system through a series of electronic warfare and 
computer network warfare so as to gain an advantage in information.’ (Dai, 2008) 
In Dai’s (2008) view, the core of this warfare is to ‘seize and defend the control of 
cyberspace in order to disturb the enemy’s information handling at different 
levels.’ To enhance efficiency, electronic warfare has become the major method 
for use in the cyberspace information system and information weapons system. 
Dai (2008) also argues that as the information system is the centre of the warfare, 
in the information warfare battlefield, ‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare’ is 
an indispensible weapon. Any disturbance to the system would lead to enforced 
separation of warfare participants and weapons. Accordingly, ‘Integrated Network 
Electronic Warfare’ especially emphasises incorporating Command, Control, 
Communication, Computer, Intelligence and Surveillance (C4IS), and integrating 
the phases of combat vehicle and combat system, which all help achieve certain 
tasks. The effectiveness of the combat vehicle and combat system phases is 
proportionate to the degree of integration. In other fields, the effectiveness of 
integration is greater than the sum total of the individual systems’ effectiveness. 
This can also explain why China’s cyber warfare is developed based on an 
integrated platform. 
In terms of Chinese documentary evidence, an interior PLA document190 
of 2009 shows that the PLA carries out the concept of ‘Network-Centric 
Electronic Warfare,’ similar to the Network-Centric Warfare cited above, as a 
directive of military operations. As this document notes, ‘Network-Centric 
                                               
189 This argument reflects Chinese thinking represented by the idiom: 以子之矛攻子之盾 (yǐ zǐ zhī máo, 
gōng zǐ zhī dùn, attack [an adversary] with what one has learnt from them.) 
190 This interior PLA document, produced by the PLA’s General Staff Headquarter s 53rd Institute, is 
entitled ‘Transformation of Electronic Warfare,’ and was not officially published. It was investigated 
by a researcher from the PLA Archive Room at the ROC National Defence University in Taiwan. 
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Electronic Warfare makes use of the powerful information network and electronic 
warfare data link to assemble a number of interconnected electronic warfare 
equipments into an adaptive network.’ Various electronic warfare equipments 
with different spectrums, functions, and locations can access the electronic 
information network via special terminals and nodes. Internet-based electronic 
warfare is used to carry out tasks, receive supervision, and benefit from internet 
resources and services. It integrates the electronic reconnaissance system, 
command and control centre, interference system and fire system into a whole on 
the internet in order to achieve the sharing of information, optimisation of 
resources and an effective use and control of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Equipment from different platforms can thus work together on the same integrated 
platform. This network can adapt to the constantly changing environment, and 
further enhance responsive abilities and threat situation awareness. In addition, as 
this document states, Network-Centric Electronic Warfare encompasses precise 
situation awareness and the capability of target acquisition. Both can operate 
simultaneously, providing ‘a platform for coordinated electronic warfare on the 
land, at sea, in the air and in space.’ To make the enemy’s command and control 
ineffective, electronic methods are used to intercept, attack and countermeasure 
enemy spies, and for target acquisition and tracking. Additionally, the advanced 
navigation and information network known as ‘Worldwide Military 
Communication System’ (or ‘Public Communication System for Military 
Purposes’) can be called into use. Furthermore, the supporting function of 
electronic warfare, its combat identification, precision engagement and close 
coordination make it possible to carry out various operational proposals, such as 
supporting the information-based weapons attacking an enemy’s anti-aircraft 
guided missile sites, command posts, electromagnetic radiant points or other 
military targets. 
5.3.3 The integration of outer space  
In addition to the network system on the ground and electromagnetic transmission 
in the sea and air, which together form the integrated platform, this section moots 
that integration additionally includes the dimension of outer space. 
ROC Air Force Colonel Liu (2010) argues, ‘I believe that China’s 
integrated platform, a potential battlefield, also includes the dimension of outer 
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space. This is carried out by integration of this platform, cyberspace, via satellite 
communication.’  According to PLA Army Major General He Lei191, the combat 
capability of a three-dimensional battlefield mainly consists of the power of that 
space to comprise a fourth dimension, in order to securely carry out information 
transmission and protection for campaigns. Power in space is thus an 
indispensible capability in modern Joint Operations. Major General He further 
indicates that, ‘So far, in the PLA’s Joint Operations, this power is a critical 
element with the aim of providing different services with accurate information 
support and protection.’ As a result, the harnessing of space as a battlefield could 
assist other battlefields in terms of investigation, surveillance, communication, 
location, navigation, warning, command and control, allowing for the deployment 
of the combat system of ‘controlling the land from the air,’ which could include 
attacking an enemy’s large and important targets in the air, on land and at sea. 
‘Though the integrated network-electronic battlefield is neither visible nor 
tangible, it does exist,’ states PLA Major General He (2010). There is no definite 
boundary in this battlefield, and there is no division between the front and the rear 
line, or military and public use. Wherever network or electromagnetic equipment 
exists, there may be an integrated network electronic battlefield. In this battlefield, 
warfare takes place without the use of traditional weapons, but it can be extremely 
fierce, and the result of the warfare in an integrated network electronic battlefield 
has a decisive influence on other battlefields. Thus, apart from the network 
systems of the land, sea and air, China’s cyber warfare is developed based on a 
four-dimensional battlefield, with outer space constituting the fourth dimension. 
 
 
5.4 How cyberspace as a potential battleground is suited for People’s War 
According to the proposition of Section 4.3, the potential battleground of cyberspace 
is particularly suited for China’s tradition of People’s War. As a result, China 
develops its cyber warfare in the digital age through the adoption of this tradition. In 
addition, the concept of People’s War can arguably be considered an inherent 
                                               
191 His view can be found in the interview ‘Beyond armed forces services: who controls the digital 
battleground in the future?’ given on 9th September 2010 via China Military Online, sponsored by the 
PLA Daily of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. (China Military, 2010) 
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‘Chinese characteristic’ due to its extensive reach in China’s strategic culture. The 
following sections will empirically analyse this proposition in accordance with 
evidence given in interviews. 
5.4.1 People’s War and the potential battleground of cyberspace 
As investigated in Section 3.3, the two primary aspects of People’s War are: 
mobilisation of the masses to achieve a political goal and the defeat of superior 
adversaries by the militarily inferior. According to the interviews carried out in 
this study, cyber warfare is not only suited for the first aspect; is also very likely 
that cyber warfare represents the best chance for China to achieve the second 
aspect in the digital age. 
1)  Cyberspace facilitates the mobilisation of the masses 
What’s more, the role of people remains paramount in high-tech warfare. As 
ROC government researcher Chen (2010) indicates, in terms of weapons, not 
only should a ‘trump weapon’ be developed, but methods to employ modern 
equipment to defeat the enemy through asymmetric warfare should also be 
considered. Meanwhile, as any weapon would still be operated by humans, the 
leading role of people in modern warfare will not be changed by the 
application of high-tech weapons. People are still the creators of warfare 
resources. Since combat ability relating to the information system of command 
and control has become a fundamental element of war, the expertise of the 
people involved has become an extremely important factor; high-tech weapons 
can only be made full use of by high-tech experts. 
One might thus argue that mobilisation need not be mass mobilisation, 
but instead ‘targeted mobilisation.’ In interview, Shen (2010) pointed out that, 
according to Mao’s strategic thought ‘you fight in your way and we fight in 
ours,’ under the circumstances of informationisation, the core concept of 
asymmetric warfare involves making best use of advantages and bypassing 
disadvantages. Specifically speaking, one must fight the enemy at a favourable 
time, in a favourable place and with a favourable method. Therefore, 
influenced by the rapid development of modern technology, the CCP’s concept 
of People’s War has been modified from merely mass mobilisation and a 
‘human wave attack’ (swarm effect) strategy to a ‘targeted mobilisation’, 
whereby more attention is paid to trained high-tech experts and intellectuals. 
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However, it can be argued that China’s online nationalism discussed 
previously in Section 4.3.5 is likely to be manifested in two types: internal and 
external. The Deng Yujiao incident192 of 10th May 2009 is an example of 
internal online nationalism. Discussion of this incident spread nationwide via 
cyberspace, and masses of cyber users decried the government, some even 
setting up websites to support Deng. Incidents such as these make the Chinese 
government truly aware of the concentrated power of virtual netizens. 
An example of the external type of online nationalism is the response to 
an attack on a Chinese ship in the Mekong River in Southeast Asia on 5th 
October 2011, which resulted in the murder of 12 Chinese crew members.193 
This incident set in motion a wave of online nationalism as the news spread 
rapidly in cyberspace. Chinese netizens strongly urged the government to get 
involved in the international investigation of the incident. In addition, one 
online comment stated ‘This incident may represent contempt and derision of 
China due to her weakness for a long time.’ (BBC Chinese News, 2011) This 
shows that Chinese nationalism may have shifted to the medium of cyberspace, 
creating the phenomenon of online nationalism. 
2) The defeat of superior adversaries by an inferior military: 
ROC retired Rear Admiral Liu (2011) senses that the concern of the superior 
side in modern warfare is that: ‘Information technology has produced a 
contradiction where the openness of information is a disadvantage whilst rapid 
information communication is an advantage.’ This contradiction means that 
democratic countries might have a higher possibility of being attacked by cyber 
warfare. In fact, their reliance on information technology, as well as the 
existence of many IT weapons, is an existing dilemma that worries those world 
powers possessing the most advanced technology. Any state that overlooks 
such a predicament will very likely make itself defenceless in the initial stage 
of a battle no matter how powerful its military may be. 
                                               
192 This incident occurred on 10th May 2009 at a hotel located in Badong County, Hubei Province, China. 
Deng Yujiao, a 21-year-old female pedicure worker, tried to rebuff the advances of a local official, 
who had come to the hotel seeking sexual services. She allegedly stabbed her assailant several times 
trying to fight him off, resulting in his death. Badong County police subsequently arrested Deng 
Yujiao and charged her with homicide, refusing to grant bail.  
193 This incident has been discussed extensively by Chinese ‘virtual netizens.’ According to online 
discussions, even though this Chinese ship was suspected of smuggling illegal drugs, some 
commenters still strongly urged that the Chinese government use its growing power to forcibly 
intervene in the case. (BBC Chinese News, 2011)  
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Professor Lin echoes this point of view. In Lin’s (2011) opinion, the 
increased openness of information systems offers invaders a better chance for 
success, which in turn threatens the security of confidential information, 
information transmission and information assurance. That is to say, since states 
have begun to focus on the possibility of ‘controlling a war,’ information 
systems, in particular those based on the internet, have revealed the 
vulnerability of cyberspace. Besides, even if measures in a war are adopted 
only by the military, the security of information transmission would still be 
very important in civil society for economic reasons. Any weapon or armed 
force has both strong and weak points. Asymmetric warfare focuses on making 
use of this dialectic, exploiting one’s own advantages and targeting enemy 
troops’ weak points through active attacks, potentially cyber attacks. In other 
words, cyberspace indeed offers asymmetric features facilitating the ‘defeat of 
the superior by an inferior military’. This is due to the fact that in information 
warfare, the reliance of advanced countries on high-tech information weapons 
leads to deficiencies, which is advantageous to the inferior side as it can launch 
a fatal attack on the superior side. Under such circumstances, the superior 
side’s weakness brings benefit to the inferior side. 
Furthermore, China’s cyber warfare is unique in its emphasis on ‘soft 
kill’ (non-physical destruction), which is characterised by the idea of an 
inferior military defeating a superior adversary through attacks on the enemy’s 
information systems and computer systems in asymmetric warfare. According 
to ROC Lt. Colonel Chang (2010), this strategy is suitable for a military 
fighting a more powerful enemy. In fact, the concept of the militarily inferior 
defeating superior adversaries is often associated with ‘computer-based 
weapons’ (cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, information and communication 
systems, and advanced satellite operations). Though ‘soft kill’ sounds non-
lethal, in reality, it also includes ‘hard kill’ (physical destruction) through the 
control of destructive weapons, such as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and 
nuclear weapons. 
Interviewee ROC Army Colonel Liang (2010) questioned how deeply 
China’s cyber army has penetrated into the military logistics system of the 
USA. Though probably no one knows the precise answer at the present time, 
the Economic and Security Review Commission of the USA Congress is 
-159- 
 
concerned that ‘Globalised economics and the low price of Chinese computer 
products make it possible that more and more US military weapons would be 
made of raw materials or products from China.’ In addition to the fear of a 
heavy reliance on Chinese products, the US military is concerned about the 
possibility of spy products. The Lenovo Incident in 2006, in which the USA 
suspected that computers from Lenovo, a significantly sized Chinese computer 
product company, might have been implanted with a Trojan horse virus which 
could be executed remotely without notice. The incident caused a heated 
debate between the USA and China. In Liang’s view, this incident revealed the 
possibility that the tactical deployment of China’s cyber warfare could 
potentially occur through the dissemination of computer products with viruses 
embedded into the hardware. 
5.4.2 Asymmetry: a corresponding feature of both cyberspace and People’s War 
In the view of Army Colonel Yu (2010), one key feature of People’s War is that 
resistance is everywhere. He points out that, though potentially on a small scale, 
resistance repeatedly takes place, making enemies feel that it is elusive and 
difficult to handle. People’s War is naturally an idea of irregular warfare, which 
can be echoed through the methods of ‘swarm effect’ and ‘sting effect’ as 
examined in Section 3.2.1. This means People’s War contains the feature of 
asymmetry. Colonel Yu (2010) takes the Chinese Civil War in the 1940s as an 
example: ‘In many areas, the proximity between homes was far. Such 
circumstances are good for carrying out the idea of People’s War because hiding, 
and using guerrilla tactics are easier.’ According to the military principle 
‘concentration and dispersion of forces,’ the regular army represents 
concentration, while the armed masses take on the form of dispersion. Complete 
destruction of the latter is consequently not an easy task. Initially in People’s War, 
the area and scale of the armed masses was quite restricted. However, when faced 
with the potential excessive dispersion of forces, one might argue that the 
opposing army will not concentrate its own forces further to cope with the armed 
masses. In the case that the regular army disperses into small-scale, scattered 
forces as a response, the armed masses may have a chance of victory by making 
use of numerical superiority. Through such small triumphs, the morale may be 
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greatly boosted and this, in turn, may determine the final result of the war. 
Another respondent, Colonel Lu (2010), also of the ROC Army College, argues: 
‘People’s War is a kind of irregular warfare but it is not all-powerful 
as there are limitations to its application. First of all, the militia and 
the armed masses cannot compete with the regular army in terms of 
organisation and equipment. Therefore, they cannot fight with the 
enemy’s main force or a large force. They can only be used to destroy 
the enemy through damaging the transportation and the supply line in 
the periphery. But in cyberspace, this limitation does not exist.’ 
In summary, People’s War was originally suited for the battlefield in 
certain circumstances, but still remains ideal for the potential battlefield of 
cyberspace in the digital age. 
Furthermore, in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the US army not only 
controlled battlefield information and deployed its troops with ease by means of 
high-tech electronic equipment, but also prevented Iraqi forces from using 
electronic equipment. The Persian Gulf War was a high-tech war in which the US 
army gained absolute control and victory. The American army successfully won a 
big victory at a small cost in this war, and it later also used high-tech electronic 
equipment in the Kosovo War, the Afghan War and the 2003 Iraq War. However, 
according to observations by ROC retired Major General Chai (2010): 
‘Informationised weapons are not omnipotent, and sometimes, more high-tech 
weapons may be more vulnerable and more easily damaged.’ This suggests that 
the more heavily an army relies on high-tech weapons, the easier it would be for 
the enemy to mount a countermeasure. As Major General Chai (2010) believes, 
this advantage of cyberspace has been grasped by the PRC to achieve ‘the 
asymmetric strategy’ of People’s War through cyber warfare. 
Meanwhile, ROC retired Navy Rear Admiral Liu (2011) points out that 
China covers a large geographical area, has a large population, rich information 
resources, and many IT talents, and also that the popularisation and development 
of the internet are continuing at a rapid pace. However, ‘The military’s reliance on 
the internet is very low, which is an advantage for the PRC military.’ Networking 
in society, the government, and the army remains at a low technological level. 
Rear Admiral Liu explains ‘Some core techniques in the information industry are 
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still at a low level. In particular, the updating of new concepts is very slow, which 
is a disadvantage.’ The former advantage demonstrates that there is great room for 
potential in China’s cyber warfare, whereas the disadvantage determines that 
cyber attacks and defences may not yet be very efficient, and could easily be 
controlled by opponents in the initial stage of a battle. 
In addition, one might consider that, for many developing countries, cyber 
attack could also constitute an asymmetrical approach to a ‘profitable’ military 
action. As ROC Army Lt. Colonel Yang (2010) notes: ‘In fact, cyber attack does 
not necessarily mean to cause network paralysis; it can also involve stealing or 
falsifying information through backdoor or Trojan-horse viruses. If information 
mistakes occur on several occasions, a user’s trust in the whole information 
system would significantly decrease. Once any packages of important intelligence 
are intercepted, this would bring immense harm to a campaign.’ To put it another 
way, as ROC Army Colonel Lu (2010) points out, ‘Just as every coin has two 
sides, the US army’s heavy reliance on high-tech weapons has both advantages 
and disadvantages. On the one hand, the information technology of cyberspace 
exerts a great and unprecedented effect on weapon systems; but on the other hand, 
any deficiencies of the IT would attract much attention and these might be the 
points where the enemy would attack.’ In their development of cyber warfare, the 
PLA’s strategists are thus focused on these pros and cons so as to maximise the 
potential effects of asymmetric strategy. 
According to Huang (2010), the Chief of the ROC Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT), ‘Nowadays, advanced countries are developing towards 
digitalisation, cyberisation, and informationisation. Once a war breaks out, cyber 
warfare would be different from traditional warfare in both form and connotation.’ 
Huang indicates that in this hypothetical war, both sides would spare no efforts to 
attack the other side’s information system, and this strategy, the purpose of which 
is to ‘protect one’s information superiority,’ would play a leading role in future 
warfare. The USA’s high reliance on information technology leads to serious 
deficiencies, and China’s cyber warfare aims at making use of those deficiencies. 
In such warfare, electronic devices and computer equipment would be the main 
targets for China’s cyber warfare. 
Regarding the units engaged in this asymmetric warfare, according to 
investigations by ROC Army Colonel Liang (2010), the PRC’s cyber army is 
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possibly distributed across the government, military and civil sectors. The cyber 
army’s main tasks, assigned by the Ministry of Information Industry and the 
Ministry of Public Security194, are focused on the security and defence of China’s 
cyberspace. The PLA and the Chinese State Security Bureau are, however, 
ultimately responsible for conducting cyber attacks. This takes the form of the 
‘hidden and distributed way’, which implies that attackers hide themselves 
secretly inside various organisations and departments without official unit titles. 
In addition, achieving the goal of the ‘human wave attack’195 strategy on the 
internet is a core value behind the establishment of China’s cyber army, 
emphasising the launch of a new form of ‘asymmetric warfare.’ 
Just as the computer and the internet were invented, so was the by-product 
of the computer virus. In ROC Army Lt. Colonel Wu’s (2010) view, ‘In cyber 
warfare, the participants fight with each other furiously in cyberspace, and often 
the computer virus would be a powerful weapon to attack the enemy.’ Sending 
mêlée computer viruses into the opponent’s ‘cyberspace’ could cause the enemy 
to lose control of information and undergo a failure in this potential battlefield. 
For example, the strategic plan and military actions of the USA’s Network Centric 
Warfare, mentioned in Section 5.4.2, have enabled the US army to enhance the 
effectiveness of warfare and to reduce the time needed for information 
transmission. According to US military doctrine, under such circumstances, 
traditional weapons could also be used with more efficiency in urgent crises and 
in the nearest battlefield. However, such a system, in which every part is closely 
interconnected, has a higher possibility of suffering virus and cyber attack. In fact, 
because of such military deficiencies, even the USA, the world’s superpower, 
considers hacking attacks arising from all over the globe to be highly problematic; 
there can be no total insurance against such attacks. As a result, the potentially 
                                               
194 As Colonel Liang (2010) also observes, in March 2003, the Information Regiment of the PLA General 
Staff Department stated that an Information Mobilisation Office should be set up under the National 
Defence Mobilisation Committee. Its main job would be information mobilisation, which would play 
a role in the protection of national security in the digital era. This demonstrates that the PRC is 
actively building up a cyber army. In addition, to ensure the combat effectives of the cyber army, the 
National Security Mobilisation Committee is involved in synchronising manpower and material 
resources, liaising between the military and the government, and coordinating between warfare and 
the economy. To date, the PRC possesses a substantial militia which could carry out cyber warfare as 
investigated in section 4.3.3. 
195 This term refers to an offensive infantry tactic, in which an attacker conducts an unprotected frontal 
assault with densely concentrated infantry formations against the enemy line, intended to overrun the 
defenders by engaging in mêlée combat. There must be a massive amount of soldiers or people to 
make up this ‘wave.’ 
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fatal vulnerability caused by advanced countries’ heavy reliance on information 
technology lays the theoretical basis for the PRC to develop cyber warfare, 
allowing an inferior military to defeat superior adversaries, in accordance with the 
asymmetric concept featured in People’s War.  
5.4.3 Mass mobilisation to convert China’s cyber warfare into total warfare  
China’s cyber warfare could arguably be converted into a total warfare once the 
People’s War strategy of mobilising the massive populace is applied. 
In ROC Air Force Colonel Yao’s (2010) view, local wars under modern 
high-tech conditions cover various fields, just like a ‘total war’, even though the 
war is ‘local’ in name. Colonel Yao believes that China’s cyber warfare has never 
been restricted to competition in just the military field. Instead, the competition is 
actually spread amongst the fields of politics, the economy, culture, and 
diplomacy, consituting a form of total warfare. The content of the warfare thus 
extends with the development of society. In addition, the information age can be 
regarded as an age of total warfare; Colonel Yao claims that ‘In such total warfare, 
there is no difference between peacetime and wartime’. Thus, cyber warfare can 
be total warfare, which may be developed and conducted in both peacetime and 
wartime. Cyber warfare means far more than just armed struggle. 
As Feng (2010) also argues, cyber warfare could threaten the 
infrastructure of a state, society or even an international region. Thus, the strategic 
planning of the warfare has to include ‘not only preparation for waging the 
warfare, but also for ending the warfare and reconstructing the peace.’ 
China’s cyber warfare would inevitably become total warfare with the 
application of People’s War. According to ROC retired Major General Chai 
(2010), not only does warfare pose a threat to a country’s territorial land, sea and 
air, but in addition, other forms of warfare, such as psychological warfare, 
information warfare, and electronic warfare, could also be carried out in 
cyberspace. Cyber warfare is therefore likely to change the traditional concept of 
the ‘front line’ and ‘rear line’ and would indeed become a total warfare once the 
idea of People’s War is applied. Total warfare would involve Joint Operations 
amongst different armed services; China’s cyber warfare certainly involves 
cooperation between all kinds of armed forces and even non-armed forces, 
potentially creating a form of total warfare in cyberspace. 
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5.4.4 The tactics of China’s cyber warfare 
This section will illustrate that tactics of Chinese cyber warfare, in which civilian 
hackers and computer viruses are deployed, may be presented through a set of 
existing patterns. 
According to ROC Air Force Colonel Huang (2011), in order to Win 
Local Wars under High-tech Conditions, which is the latest guideline of China’s 
national defence in the modern era, the PRC is enthusiastically developing the 
military doctrine of cyber warfare, which may also be associated with the concept 
of Integrated Network Electronic Warfare. Colonel Huang also points out that 
‘The University of National Defence Technology in Beijing is playing a leading 
role in the research on military theory and practice of China’s cyber warfare.’ 
(Huang, 2011) 
Air Force Lt. Colonel Hao’s (2010) experience of working in the field of 
operational command reveals that any military action would be based on an 
operational ‘directive/instruction’ and ‘This directive/instruction would form the 
basis of military manoeuvres and would become the code of conduct in future 
warfare.’ Therefore, it is likely that ‘Even if official instructions for the PRC’s 
cyber warfare do not exist, there must be a handbook or some materials.’ 
However, ‘We do not know whether the PRC would disclose such information as 
the US army has done. Even the doctrines of the ROC’s armed forces are 
classified as restricted reading.’  
However, Colonel Liu (2010) states: ‘I do not think the development of 
China’s cyber warfare is “sophisticated” enough to have a set of directives or 
instructions, but I believe that it has a “set of patterns” instead.’ He also stresses 
that ‘We can learn from China’s doctrine of Joint Operations, modelled on the US 
army’s doctrine of Joint Operations, that the five core capabilities in China’s Joint 
Operations are electronic warfare, cyber warfare, psychological warfare, 
operational security, and military deception.’ According to Colonel Liu, the CCP 
regards cyber warfare and electronic warfare as the main forms of warfare to 
achieve the latter three core capabilities. 
Though the official instructions of China’s cyber warfare remain uncertain, 
in this study’s interview, ROC Air Force Colonel Huang (2011) further illustrated 
that research into China’s cyber warfare carried out by the University of National 
Defence Technology in Beijing contains three major tactical elements which 
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could constitute a ‘set of patterns’: ‘cyber attack’, ‘prevention and control of 
hackers’, and ‘virus attack.’ The approaches for each element are laid out as 
follows: 
1)  Cyber attack:  
When it comes to cyber attack, the main goal of the PRC is to paralyse the 
enemy’s C4IS system through the methods of network overload, release of 
viruses, and stopping the nodes. The PRC’s research reveals ‘Five Ways to 
Defeat the Enemy in Cyberspace’ (power failure, precise attacks, network 
overload, release of viruses and hackers’ penetration) and ‘Methods for 
Cyberspace Confrontation’ (cyber snooping, stopping the nodes, cyber 
interception196, cyber attack and paralysing the internet). This demonstrates 
that the PRC has a clear plan regarding methods to use in the case of cyber 
warfare. 
2)  Prevention and control of hackers:  
In terms of anti-hacker methods, isolation of entities197, safety protection and 
deceiving the enemy are central. In addition, having examined hackers’ 
methods of attack in other countries, the PRC has come up with an anti-hacker 
doctrine, the main seven methods of which are transformation and isolation; 
distinguishing between the real and the fake; flexible organisation; information 
leakage prevention; ambush and circumvention; deceiving the enemy; and 
disturbing and destroying. 
 
 
3) Virus attack:  
The doctrine of the PRC’s virus attack puts an emphasis on pre-planting the 
enemy’s computer system with viruses and manipulating the time of initiating 
the viruses. This is mainly achieved through paralysing the network system 
with destructive viruses that can be replicated and distributed. The main four 
methods include ‘feed-forward latency’, ‘indirect attack’, ‘planting the viruses 
through the interface’, and ‘sniffing attacks’. 
                                               
196 The action of intercepting information on the internet. 
197 This refers to the action of isolating hardware, including cutting off power supply, disconnecting the 
internet, and removing the connection between computers. 
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Thus, in terms of combining attack and defence, cyber offence mainly 
takes the form of electronic warfare, cyber warfare, psychological warfare, 
military deception and destroying entities. These forms can stop, disturb, weaken, 
make use of, deceive and destroy the enemy’s critical information system; vice 
versa, cyber defence refers to a variety of actions to protect one’s own critical 
information infrastructure from damage. 
In addition, as ROC Army Colonel Hsieh (2010) points out in his 
interview, ‘The doctrine of China’s cyber warfare combines ‘specific 
professionals’ and ‘common professionals’ into an integrated force.’ The former 
refers to PLA soldiers working in the units of cyber warfare and military weapons, 
including electronic warfare troops and weapons with high precision, such as laser, 
nuclear power, or magnetic pulsation. The latter refers to professionals of the civil 
sector who could pose a threat to important systems of the enemy. 
According to ROC researcher Chen (2010), the patterns of China’s cyber 
warfare include ‘cyber attack, cyber defence, and cyber spying.’ Regardless of 
whether the PRC holds any specific instructions regarding cyber warfare, the PLA 
has considered it the key to gaining the war initiative and ensuring 
‘electromagnetic dominance’ in the initial stages of a war. It is also seen as an 
effective weapon in the destruction of entities and the fight against the enemy’s 
C4IS to damage information systems on the battlefield. The PLA has therefore 
raised the importance of cyber warfare in military manoeuvres. Early training was 
centred on improving the army’s defence capabilities, but now recent military 
manoeuvres have introduced offensive operations, expected to be the major 
method of attacking an enemy’s network. 
In addition, the PRC believes that the optimum time to take advantage of 
the enemy’s (especially the US army’s) weakness in war is during its operational 
deployment. The US relies heavily on computer and communication systems, in 
both the military and non-military fields. Its logistical network is the weakest, and 
most vulnerable to attack. Although penetrating the command post and 
information links may achieve a larger-scale outcome, penetrating the logistical 
network seems to have a better chance of success. The primary task of the PRC’s 
cyber warfare seems to be preventing the US army’s operational deployment as 
soon as possible and then cutting the connection link between the decision makers 
and the combat vehicle and combat system phases. This method perfectly reflects 
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the PRC’s traditional emphasis on staying clear of the enemy’s main force and 
attacking vulnerable spots. As ROC retired Major General Chai (2010) sums up in 
three points, the main reasons for China to develop cyber warfare are therefore: 
1.  Cyber warfare has become the most effective way to win even if one’s side is 
weaker and outnumbered. 
2.  Cyber warfare could be used to deter the enemy. 
3.  Cyber warfare has a longer attack range than other warfare where the army 
possesses long-range control and precise, strong and long-range attack 
capability.  
5.4.5 Summary  
In summary, the concept of People’s War was originally considered a military 
thought suited to the traditional battlefields of Mainland China, involving 
mobilisation of the massive populace in order for the inferior CCP forces to defeat 
a superior adversary. However, in the past few decades, this tradition of People’s 
War has not merely been useful for developing military strategy, but has also been 
applicable to many other national developments, such as economics, social 
modernisation, and government and public affairs, as a vital ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
guideline to garner a certain consensus from the Chinese people in order to carry 
out the policies that the Chinese government wishes to accomplish. In particular, 
this tradition can be perfectly applied to China’s cyber warfare in the digital age, 
as the strategic value of cyberspace has removed the restriction of traditional 
geographic barriers and borders between states. Thus the potential masses of 
Chinese ‘cyber warriors’ can carry out attacks geographically unhindered in 
cyberspace. 
      In addition, regarding whether such warfare can successfully 
accomplish its political purpose, the quality of soldiers, for example in terms of 
professionalism and loyalty, is a vital element to consider. Due to a lack of regular 
discipline, civilians are unlikely to follow commands and orders as the regular 
armed forces would, even if they are very professional. A potential concern for the 
Chinese government is thus whether or not the masses of civilians might in fact 
carry out cyber warfare against the government whilst simultaneously conducting 
attacks against the state’s external adversaries. In general, it is an inevitable, 
though rare, possibility that states’ own military may choose to conduct revolution 
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against their government. In comparison, the masses of cyber warriors adopted by 
the application of the strategy of People’s War to China’s cyber warfare could 
prove even more problematic. The details of this issue will be further examined 
via analysis of the relevant interviews and document-based evidence in the 
following section 5.6. 
5.5 How China disciplines ‘cyber warriors’ whilst adopting People’s War 
According to the propositions of Section 4.3, China’s cyber warfare is a strategic 
warfare that adopts the principle of People’s War. In so doing, internet control and 
monitoring are also likely to become a crucial element of China’s cyber warfare in 
order to control and command civilians into disciplined cyber warriors for military 
purposes. 
As set out in the analytical framework, the concept of People’s War can 
primarily be defined as the strategy of mobilising the populace to achieve a strategic 
aim, whilst also allowing an inferior military to defeat a superior opponent.  
Furthermore, as examined in Section 3.2, China is in fact still likely to insist on the 
legitimate heritage of People’s War. Historically, People’s War, a term coined by 
Mao Zedong (Mao Tze-Tung) in 1927, would be conducted on geographic 
battlefields located in Mainland China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
employed the strategy of People’s War to drive the massive populace, mainly 
comprising the Chinese proletariat, into wearing down the CCP’s militarily superior 
opponent, to ultimately gain victory during the Chinese Civil War in the first half of 
the 20th century. Subsequently, since the founding of the PRC in 1949, People’s War 
became and has remained a key guideline for China, not only in terms of military 
strategy but also for national development. The concept of People’s War 
incorporates the ideas of active defence, asymmetric warfare, protracted warfare, 
and guerrilla warfare198; thus, those with inferior military capability are able to deter 
and even defeat those superior to them. When the PRC’s opponent, the Republic of 
China (ROC), governed by the Chinese Nationalist Party, retreated across the 
Taiwan Strait during the civil war, the CCP was forced to accept that People’s War 
was actually restricted by conditions of geographical territory.  
                                               
198 Please refer to Section 3.2.1 
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The three stages199 of Chinese strategic guidelines in recent decades were 
identified in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 the most recent of which is guiding the 
development of China’s cyber warfare in the digital age. People’s War has remained 
a constant core principle of modern Chinese strategy throughout these three stages. 
This section will touch upon this empirically through evidential points of view 
emerging from interviews concerning ideas of civilian-based defence, the Chinese 
militia, and Chinese ideological education. 
Therefore, this section will firstly summarise how China’s cyber warfare 
effectively channels the principle of People’s War into a strategic level warfare. 
Secondly, it will be argue that China’s internet control and monitoring are actually 
an element of China’s cyber warfare. This will be approached through an 
examination of China’s censorship of Google, which is not solely to prevent 
politically sensitive information from reaching the Chinese internet populace, but 
also to gather critical information in a tactical approach of cyber warfare. Thirdly, 
the investigation of certain ideas, such as China’s nationalism, ideological/patriotic 
education, and all-out defence, will illustrate how China can manage to discipline 
masses of internet users to facilitate ‘control and command’ of civilian ‘cyber 
warriors’ as military sentinels in the virtual world of cyberspace. 
5.5.1 Military significance: supporting China’s cyber warfare 
ROC Navy Captain Chang (2011) explains that ‘The idea of a chain of military-
political relevance is a critical guideline for waging wars.’ In his view, each war 
or warfare must have ‘military significance’ in order to achieve political influence. 
In other words, coherence amongst warfare, military significance and political 
influence must exist in order to measure and control the scale of damage caused 
by a war. This coherence can help keep a war organised and may provide political 
purposes for legitimate violence. Otherwise, warfare may be overused, creating 
unnecessary damage or even causing conflicts between states in world politics.200 
In Captain Chang’s (2011) view, this concept is highly relevant for China’s cyber 
warfare. As examined in Section 4.3.5, China’s cyber warfare strategically aims to 
                                               
199 The three stages are: 
   1927-1977: People’s War 
   1978-1991: People’s War under Modern Conditions 
   1992-present: Local Wars under Hi-Tech Conditions 
   Further details can be found in Section 3.2 
200 For example, the use of bio-weapons in warfare may spiral out of control, ultimately causing 
unexpected damage which may far exceed its original political purpose.  
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mobilise a massive amount of people which may easily give rise to situations 
outside of the authorities’ control. Thus, a hypothetical question to China’s cyber 
warfare is how precisely to discipline cyber warriors in order to prevent this 
warfare from being overused as Chang explains. In other words, the tactics of 
China’s cyber warfare may include internet control and monitoring in order to 
securely measure the extent of its military significance. 
Further to this, there is another aspect which may justify the military 
significance of China’s cyber warfare.  From the view of ROC retired Lieutenant 
General Deng (2011), in a traditional sense the CCP would still believe that the 
‘justice of a war’ is a determinant of modern warfare. Therefore, the concept of 
justice in People’s War and the inclination for a just war still remain a necessary 
prerequisite for China’s cyber warfare, further facilitating the mobilisation of the 
people. The victory of People’s War may rely on converting political advantage 
into military advantage, and vice versa, which can be leveraged against enemies to 
gain pre-emptive control in a war and earn the final victory. 
However, aside from the military significance of justifying China’s cyber 
warfare, one might ask what the PRC’s motivation of controlling its domestic 
internet could actually be. As ROC Major General Chai (2010) indicates, in China, 
the concept of ‘national defence’ can be ‘elastic.’ This means that many varied 
issues can be classified under the umbrella of national defence to provide the 
Chinese government with necessary military significance and subsequent 
justification of any actions to the Chinese populace. For example, in late 2010 
WikiLeaks revealed correspondence of the American embassy in China, which, if 
true, demonstrates that one of the tasks of China’s national defence is to seize 
global data in cyberspace. WikiLeaks, though the only source in this case, claims 
that it was officially informed that the order for Chinese hackers to attack the 
Google search engine was authorised by the Chinese political leadership. In 
addition, it may be that China has surpassed the USA by now possessing the 
world’s fastest computer; Chinese super computers are extremely powerful and 
able to decode and process any data collected. (Chai, 2010) According to Major 
General Chai’s experiences, reliable evidence shows that a large amount of very 
sensitive information was directed from American computer servers to servers in 
China’s territory. She reports that on 8th April 2010, it was revealed that the state-
owned company China Telecom re-routed the emails of the website of the US 
-171- 
 
Senate, the Department of Defense (DoD), and other government units to Chinese 
filter servers for 18 minutes. That is more than enough time for a super computer 
to filter incredible amounts of data. This illustrates that a potential approach of 
China cyber warfare is the seizure of valuable information by hacking database 
servers and global websites such as the Google search engine. 
5.5.2 Ideological education: driving those conducting China’s cyber warfare  
ROC retired Major General Chai (2010) states, ‘Whether it is seen as negative or 
positive, China’s nationalism is the most impressive in the world due to China’s 
huge populace and the ideological/patriotic education delivered through various 
systems.’ As ROC Colonel Yu (2010) suggests, two questions should be raised 
when exploring the factors driving People’s War in the modern Chinese era. The 
first is how the PRC can mobilise the Chinese people to develop China’s cyber 
warfare in order to defeat or oppose external enemies. The second is how, in the 
meantime, the government can discipline the huge amount of internal internet 
users into becoming ‘cyber warriors’, in order to guarantee that cyber warfare 
adopting People’s War is under control and consistent with its initial political 
purpose. Colonel Yu (2010) argues that in determining a common answer to these 
two questions, certain measures employed by the PRC, such as ‘patriotic 
education,’ ‘ideological cultivation,’ ‘internet control and monitoring’ should be 
taken into account.  
Moreover, as Navy Captain Lin (2010), a senior instructor in the ROC 
Navy College, argues, ‘in the process of Chinese economic reform, on the one 
hand, China is enjoying the fruits of Western capitalism; but on the other hand, 
China is unable to eliminate the nationalism caused by humiliation from Western 
imperialists in the past century, which still viciously resists anything Western.’ As 
a result, as one of the fundamental ideas of People’s War is to mobilise the 
populace to resist Western imperialism, it is possible to harness this nationalism to 
drive the people to support not only the government revolution of the Chinese 
Civil War but also a resistance of the entire Chinese nation; to turn from a solely 
geographical campaign to an all-out battle, including not only military aspects, but 
also political, economic, and cultural struggles. 
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In addition, according to Air Force Colonel Liu’s (2010) view, People’s 
War could be also driven by the ‘Chinese national character,’201 which can be 
regarded as one of the major reasons behind the long persistence of the concept of 
People’s War. As Liu (2010) states, ‘the century of humiliation’ and ‘a long 
period of poverty and weakness’ oppressed the Chinese in the past, and this 
oppression became a feature of the national character. Therefore, despite the fact 
that the PRC claims to be rising peacefully, the Chinese national character 
determines that China will inevitably compete tooth and nail with the USA’s 
hegemony, in order to symbolically wipe out past humiliations. Meanwhile, the 
feeling of oppression displayed in the Chinese national character makes it easier 
to incite the Chinese to a large-scale attack in boundless cyberspace. 
According to this study’s interviews, three points of view can be 
summarised:  
1.  Firstly, as the century of humiliation has become an unforgettable part of 
history for the Chinese people, this collective memory is one of the best tools 
to cement nationalism. The mobilisation on which the PRC’s People’s War 
places emphasis is driven by enthusiasm for this nationalism. It can therefore 
be argued that the century of humiliation is one of the motivations behind the 
launch and development of People’s War. 
2.  Secondly, based on the theory of People’s War, the anti-government 
movements during the late Qing Dynasty and the ten revolutions led by Dr 
Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China, are categorised 
into armed uprisings in the early stages of People’s War. At the time, the 
armed masses fought alone without cooperating with the regular army, and it 
was this lack of armed forces that led to their failure. This proves that an 
essential element of People’s War is the combination of both the regular army 
and the mobilisation of the people.  
                                               
201 The concept of the Chinese national character (中國民族性, zhongguo minzu xing) consists of various 
aspects. (Zheng, 2009) However, it basically refers to the general characteristics of the various Chinese 
peoples, significantly influenced by Confucianism and Taoism. In Colonel Liu’s (2010) view, 
according to a definition by China’s national father Sun Yat-Sen, the Chinese national character 
contains a particular mental tension, which is that, on the one hand, the character of the Chinese people 
tends to be negative and lacks the spirit of positive resistance to overcome Western invasion, but on 
the other hand, it contains a deep-rooted ideology of empire and ancient civilisation. This means that 
the Chinese want to surpass other countries, not least in making up for the century of humiliation. 
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3.  Thirdly, the CCP’s establishment of political power started from zero. The 
CCP has a ninety-year history, stretching from 1921 to today (2011).202 
During the CCP’s growth, People’s War has always been the most 
fundamental guiding principle for the PRC in terms of military affairs and the 
form of warfare. In Lin’s view (2010), the formation of People’s War was not 
based on the theories that already existed at the time, but instead was formed 
gradually alongside the development of warfare. 
In fact, evidence suggests that in 2010, the Chinese State Council 
officially proclaimed the guideline of patriotic education, which should be 
assimilated into university curricula in order to progressively ‘educate’ the 
students’ ideology. This ‘patriotic education,’ also known in China as ideological 
education (思想教育 sixiang jiaoyu), is a compulsory element in China’s 
education system used to formulate a unique political ideology. It is distinct from 
general citizenship education, and is not merely for military soldiers, but also for 
civilians, in accordance with the tenet of People’s War. The structure of the 
Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council’s 2010 guidelines on further 
strengthening and improving students’ ideological education can be summarised 
as follows: (People’s Daily, 2010) 
1.  An important and urgent strategic task is strengthening and improving 
students’ ideological education. 
2.  Outline of guiding thoughts and basic principles for strengthening and 
improving students’ ideological education. 
3.  Explanation of the mission of strengthening and improving students’ 
ideological education. 
4.  Maximise the guidance effect of lecture-style teaching in students’ ideological 
education. 
5.  Develop effective new methods of ideological education for university students. 
6.  Expand the important role of party groups and organisations in ideological 
education. 
7.  Build up teaching staff teams for ideological education of university students. 
8.  Create a beneficial social environment for the ideological education of 
university students.  
9.  Strengthen the guidance of ideological education and its teaching practices. 
 
                                               
202 1st July 2011 marks the Chinese Communist Party’s 90th Anniversary. The CCP is aiming to 
consolidating its rule by celebrating Mao’s legacy. 
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The following key notes of the government announcement may further 
elaborate the context of the guideline of patriotic education: (Chinese State 
Council, 2010) 
‘Ardently love the Party, the motherland and socialism; resolutely 
advocate the Party’s policies; strongly recognise Deng Xiaoping 
Theory and the “Three Represents”; fully trust the Party Central 
Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as Secretary General; have full 
confidence in resolutely following the path of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics and achieving the grand ambition of comprehensively 
building a prosperous society.’ 
‘Persist in using Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and the “Three Represents” as guidance; thoroughly 
implement the Party spirit of the 16th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China [16th NCCPC] and comprehensively put 
the Party’s education policy into effect… with patriotic education as 
the main focus.’ 
‘Persistently use Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and the “Three Represents” to equip the minds of 
students; thoroughly develop education of the Party’s basic theory, 
basic line, basic programme and basic experience; develop historical 
education of the Chinese revolution, construction and the “opening up 
and reform” policy... Establish the path of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics led by the Communist Party of China and achieve the 
common ideal and firm convictions of the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation.’ 
In other words, this guideline also focuses on the reflection of the latest 
achievements of contemporary Marxism. The document demonstrates the aims of 
comprehensively strengthening the development of the disciplines of the 
ideological course, its curriculum, teaching materials and teachers and further 
incorporating Deng Xiaoping Theory and the ‘Three Represents’ into teaching 
materials and lectures, and therefore students’ minds. The document also suggests 
integrating the ideas of Deng’s ‘opening up’ policy reform and the realities of 
socialist modernisation into students’ thinking; assimilating knowledge transfer 
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into ideological education; combining systematic teaching practice with thematic 
teaching practice; and closely combining theoretical knowledge transfer with 
teaching practices. Based on all of these measures, it can be argued that the 
ideology of Chinese people undergoes political cultivation through such measures 
of patriotic education, which may indoctrinate students into unequivocally 
supporting the government. The Chinese government can therefore implement 
People’s War strategy of mobilising the populace to achieve a political purpose, in 
particular concerning national issues opposing Western imperialism.This also 
applies to China’s cyber warfare. 
5.5.3 All-out defence: an ideal tenet for the ‘active defence’ of People’s War  
In addition to ideological education, in order to encourage the huge Chinese 
populace to espouse the necessity of mobilisation for a certain purpose, ‘all-out 
defence’ is likely to be an ideal tenet to indoctrinate the people. 
As Ding (2010), an interviewee in the civil sector, points out, ‘If we 
explore the origin of People’s War, we can see that it actually originated from the 
concept of “all-out defence”203, a concept introduced into China thousands of 
years ago.’ According to his investigations, in ancient China, kings would make 
use of the slack season in farming to train farmers in battlefield skills. For 
example, the ‘well-field system’204 of the Zhou Dynasty was invented based on 
the concept of ensuring a military reserve among the peasants; in the Spring and 
Autumn and the Warring States Periods, Guan Zhong invented the ‘Shi Wu 
System’205; in the Song Dynasty, Wang Anshi created the ‘Baojia System’206 
which is the predecessor of the militia system; the Ming Dynasty and the 
following dynasties all spent a huge amount of money on mobilising the masses to 
build the Great Wall to resist foreign aggression; also in the Ming Dynasty, Wang 
                                               
203 In fact, there is a similar concept in Western thinking. The American sociologist Gene Sharp 
advocated the concept of ‘Civilian-based Defence’ in the 1990s, which concentrates on deterring the 
enemy and protecting oneself. In the current Revolution of Military Affairs, the US army has come up 
with the concept of ‘Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance’ which aims at destroying the 
enemy’s morale and giving the enemy no choice but to act according to one’s own strategy. 
204 This was a system in which a square area of land was divided into nine identically-sized sections; the 
eight outer sections were privately cultivated by serfs and the centre section was communally 
cultivated on behalf of the landowning aristocrat. In this system, the peasants also practised some 
defence skills and would be organised based on this land system if war broke out. 
205 This was a system that prevented the flow of people. 
206 This was a community-based system of law enforcement and civil control. 
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Yangming suppressed the Revolt of Zhu Chenhao207; the ‘Tun Bing System’208 
was practiced in the Kingdom of Tungning; and in the Qing Dynasty, the Xiang 
Army and the Huai Army were made up of village militia forces. All of these 
ancient Chinese examples laid a historical foundation for the development of the 
concept of a military reserve among the masses of peasants in China. 
Consequently, the PRC believes that the best way to achieve the goal of 
‘all-out defence’ is through giving all citizens an education in national defence, 
which is a special educational activity aimed at resisting foreign invasion, 
preventing armed subversion, and protecting the country’s sovereignty, unity, 
territorial integrity and security. The PRC emphasises that national defence is 
indispensible for the survival and the development of China, since the century of 
humiliation must be washed away. In other words, this ‘all-out defence’ is a 
military action to prevent foreign invasion and subversion. Furthermore, the 
national defence aims to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national 
security, unity and development of China through military or military-related 
actions in the field of politics, the economy, science, culture, education and 
diplomacy.  
In addition, according to China’s ‘Outline of All-Out Defence Education,’ 
in order to carry out this education thoroughly, the PRC asks organisations at all 
levels to meet the following requirements. Firstly, they must organise extensive 
study and publicity to raise awareness of the importance of all-out defence in civil 
society; secondly, they must work out a plan to improve all-out defence education 
in practice; thirdly, they must take any measures possible to achieve the success of 
all-out defence education. The dogma of this all-out defence education is:  
‘Firstly, all-out defence education is an effective way to protect the 
country’s safety; secondly, all-out defence education satisfies the 
needs of perceived security and defence; thirdly, people should pay 
attention to the PRC’s action of legalising all-out defence education; 
fourthly, this education deepens the influence of freedom, democracy 
and human rights; and fifthly, carrying out the “Outline of All-out 
Defence Education” instils an imperceptible influence in citizens.’ 
                                               
207 Zhu Chenhao was a warlord leading a local revolt against the Ming dynasty. Wang Yangming, a Neo-
Confucian philosophical strategist, deployed very few regular troops but also mobilised local peasants 
to suppress the revolt. This was one of Wang’s historical significant achievements.   
208 This was a system in which soldiers served both in the army and in agriculture. 
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In other words, the concept of ‘all-out defence’ is likely to be a form of 
total mobilisation. Once a supportive consensus is achieved between the Chinese 
government and the masses, it would be easier to mobilise them into devotion to 
China’s cyber warfare with a certain degree of discipline. This mobilisation may 
also include political, economic and ideological mobilisation as a form of ‘total 
mobilisation’ in direct accordance with the idea of ‘all-out defence.’ This also 
echoes Mao Zedong’s thinking: ‘What is political mobilisation? First of all, you 
should tell the political purpose of warfare to soldiers and people. Then, you 
should elaborate on how to achieve that political purpose. In other words, you 
should tell them the procedures and the policies that would be adopted. After that, 
one mobilisation is not enough; political mobilisation should be frequently 
launched because it determines the victory of warfare.’ 
5.5.4 Chinese militia: implementing the concept ‘everyone is a solider’  
Apart from this all-out defence education, there is another practical application of 
People’s War: the Chinese militia. According to ROC retired Major General 
Chai’s (2010) observations, there are three major forces in China: the People’s 
Liberation Army, which is the regular armed forces, the People’s Armed Police,209 
and the Chinese militia, the scale of which is larger than the two former forces. 
Major General Chai also indicates the number of militia involved in Chinese 
cyber warfare as about ‘300 to 400 thousand, making up the main force 
developing China’s cyber warfare.’ 
In the view of ROC Army Colonel Chen (2010): 
The Chinese militia was first set up during the First Chinese 
Revolutionary Civil War. During that period, it was believed that the 
militia made a great contribution to liberating the nation, driving off 
the Japanese invaders and establishing the People’s Republic of China. 
The militia is therefore the country’s military reserves. 
According to the Chinese government document ‘Rules and Regulations 
of the Militia,’ the task of militia work is to ‘Organise the militia for war, supply 
the front, resist invasion and protect the country.’ The emergency detachment is 
already on the track to normalisation, achieving ‘weapons modernisation’ and 
                                               
209 The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is officially called Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF), 
which is different to the public security People’s Police. 
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‘communications modernisation,’ becoming a ‘well-qualified,’ ‘quickly-mobilised’ 
and ‘strong force.’ Meanwhile, the construction of the technical detachment has 
taken off. Currently, there are around ‘ten thousand militia units’ in China. They 
play an active role in production, construction, disaster relief work and military 
activities. 
Interviewee ROC Navy Captain Lin (2010) describes from his experiences 
of the Chinese militia how it works in practice: 
‘In principle, the training for militia cadres and primary militia is 
organised by the county’s (or the city’s, or the district’s) Department 
of People’s Armed Forces. According to the training programme, 
training time for cadres is 30 days, which is normally finished within 
the space of one year; training time for primary militiamen is 15 days, 
which should all be finished in one go. Through training, the cadres 
acquire certain military skills and the skills of organising and 
commanding. They should also improve the capability of carrying out 
their own work. The primary militiamen are expected to know how to 
use military weapons, grasp basic military skills and be able to fulfil 
some general combat missions. Militia cadres mainly receive training 
on instructional methods and commanding at their own level, while the 
primary militia mainly receives technical and basic tactical training.’ 
210 
For example, on December 25th 2010, Xu Qiliang, the PLA Chief of the 
Air Force, and political commissar Deng Changyou, issued an order to publish 
‘The Rules and Regulations for the Air Force Militia,’ which has since been 
enforced from January 1st 2011 onwards. (People’s Daily, 2010) The publication 
of this document indicates that the building of the air force militia has entered a 
stage of systemisation and standardisation.  In order to respond to new conditions 
and new tasks, and to improve the Air Force militia detachments’ capability of 
                                               
210 The period of training for professional technical militiamen is based on actual needs. Many county-
level militia military training bases have been established, where militiamen can receive intensive 
training. Based on necessity, myriad professional technical training centres have also been set up. 
These bases and centres can provide trainees with catering, accommodation and training venues. In 
terms of the training methods, electrical audio-visual instruction and simulation training are being 
actively promoted. As this kind of training is vivid and visual, the quality of the training has been 
dramatically improved. In sum, the training for militia cadres, emergency detachments and technical 
detachments has been improved. 
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rapid mobilisation and execution of tasks, the Air Force drew up the ‘The Rules 
and Regulations for the Air Force Militia’ in accordance with relevant laws and 
regulations and the realities of the Air Force militia. 
‘The Rules and Regulations for the Air Force Militia’ 211 clearly outlines 
the Air Force militia’s role, guidelines and basic tasks. It also systematically 
defines the mission of different governing units, improves the Air Force militia 
system, and stipulates the categories of Air Force militia detachments, 
organisational system of the militia and resource allocation for different armed 
groups. Additionally, it also states the content, procedure and requirements for 
army building during peacetime and mobilisation during wartime. Hence, the 
regulations are one of the military documents standardising and providing 
guidelines for the building of the air force militia, serving as the basis for 
authorities and army units at all levels to carry out militia work. 
In fact, a recent interview212 reveals that the Chinese military mobilises 
civilians into cyber militiamen. As Bai (2011) points out, since 2005 his company 
Nanhao Group has been home to a cyber militia unit organised by the PLA. He 
further claims that ‘All staff under the age of 30 belong to the unit.’ According to 
the interview, the tasks of the unit are mainly cyber attack and cyber defence. This 
could mean that even some of China’s best-known technology companies could 
embed cyber militia as part of a cyber warfare unit. 
Aside from the militia, the ROC government researcher Gu (2010) 
reinforces that two of the most important points in the argument of People’s War 
are ‘mobilising the masses’ and ‘an inferior military defeating a superior enemy.’ 
He indicates that, with regards the former, Lin Biao, the former intended 
successor of Mao Zedong, once said, ‘There is no special secret strategy, but most 
important of all is to mobilise the masses, depend on the masses, bring the entire 
nation to arms and launch People’s War.’ In Gu’s (2010) view, this practice of 
People’s War originates from peasants’ armed uprisings in the history of China. 
He explains Mao cultivated his military thought to form the concept of People’s 
                                               
211 ‘The Rules and Regulations for the Air Force Militia’ consists of 10 chapters with 101 items, which 
include general rules, responsibilities, regulations, political work, organisation construction, military 
training, logistical service, armament-related work, mobilisation and supplementary articles. It covers 
every aspect of the militia work, offers a clear-cut job responsibility, enables the procedure of work to 
be detailed, and clearly defines the time requirement. (China Org, 2011) 
212 Bai Guoliang, the vice president of the ordinary civilian technology company Nanhao Group, was 
interviewed by Kathrin Hille, a reporter for the Financial Times. Mr Bai confirmed that the cyber 
militia unit was led by the local PLA command and has ‘regular exchanges.’ (Bai, 2011) 
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War through reading many historical collections213 outlining such ancient 
incidents. This interview reinforces the historical origins of both the Chinese 
militia and of People’s War, mirroring the importance of historical factors 
outlined throughout Chapter Three. 
5.5.5 Internet control and monitoring: China’s censorship of Google 
Aside from the interview analysis carried out in this research, the dispute between 
China and the USA caused by China’s censorship of Google, a significant recent 
case, can be seen as empirical evidence of how China carries out cyber warfare in 
practice. The internet giant Google announced on 22nd March 2010 that it had 
transferred the information retrieval service of its search engine servers from 
Mainland China to Hong Kong, and would begin re-routing search queries to its 
Hong Kong-based site.214 The crisis began on 12th January in the same year when 
Google claimed that its users were frequently attacked by Chinese hackers, and 
Google asked the Chinese government to stop the censorship of search results. 
After that, the Chinese government, Google and the US government carried out 
negotiations and by 22nd March, the situation seemed to be considerably more 
stable. However, on 19th April 2010, the New York Times reported that in January 
2009 hackers located in Mainland China had stolen information from Google’s 
servers, and that the losses included one of ‘Google’s crown jewels’, a password 
system controlling access to millions of internet users worldwide. However, 
Google refused to comment on the news at that time and instead simply reiterated 
that hackers did not succeed in stealing any Gmail accounts. Following Google’s 
claims of 12th January, on 21st January Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged 
China to conduct a ‘transparent’ inquiry into the attack. She also called for an 
uncensored and free flow of information, saying that American companies 
consider internet use to be a very important aspect of business. This suggested that 
the censorship was influencing American companies’ interests in China. Clinton 
                                               
213 Mao’s favourite history books included ‘Er Shi Si Shi’ [二十四史], ‘Zi Zhi Tong Jian’ [資治通鑑], 
and ‘Gang Jian Yi Zhi Lu’ [剛鑑易知錄], which elaborate on various revolutions and dynasties in 
ancient Chinese periods. He also showed great interest in unofficial histories, such as ‘Zhong Guo Li 
Dai Tong Su Yan Yi’ [中國歷代通俗演義], ‘Dong Zhou Lie Guo Zhi’ [東周列國誌], ‘San Guo Yan Yi’ 
[三國演義], and ‘Shui Hu Zhuan’ [水滸傳]. These books are ancient Chinese folk novels which 
discuss how some historical heroes led the masses of oppressed peasants to oppose the empires in 
different Chinese dynasties. 
214 For the details of this Google incident, please refer to the news reports examined in Section 5.6.5. 
-181- 
 
also appealed to other networking companies in China for a rejection of any 
censorship. 
From another perspective, however, Google may simply be seeking 
dominance of cyberspace. Through investigation of technology marketing news, it 
can be seen that Google’s dominance may also be noted in the telecommunication 
systems of mobile phones and the Operating Systems (OS) of personal computers. 
In 2008, Google released Android, a mobile application, and announced that it 
would open Android’s platform. For other telecommunication companies, this 
posed a threat to their own markets. In 2010, Google released Chrome OS which 
broke Microsoft’s monopoly of OS. For customers and computer producers, this 
simply means one more option to choose from, but for Google, this presents the 
possibility of becoming more powerful than Microsoft and even becoming the 
world’s biggest Internet Service Provider, monopolising both the internet and OS. 
Fairly speaking, every country might have hackers inside of its territory. In 
addition, there may be many categories of hackers in the world, such as civil 
individual hackers, hackers from non-government groups, government-employed 
hackers and even military-employed hackers; however, China is the only state 
officially proclaiming a national strategy of People’s War, a theory which 
involves the indoctrination of the people in preparation for mobilisation. Though 
it is difficult to exactly clarify the sources of cyber attacks due to the feature of 
anonymity in cyberspace investigated in Section 2.2.4, it is clear that large 
database systems could be considered attractive targets for attack in order to 
achieve political or military goals. China’s censorship of Google can therefore be 
seen as one aspect of China’s fight with the USA for information control, 
facilitating China’s cyber warfare deployment in the future. In China’s view, such 
censorship is also indispensible for any future warfare. 
Meanwhile, one might argue that the attack on Google was part of the 
PRC’s new wave of blocking sensitive information for political purposes. Ever 
since Chinese net citizens’ strong response to the Deng Yujiao incident215 and 
condemnation of the Green Dam Censorware System, the latest censorship 
software introduced by the Chinese government, the PRC has been keeping a 
tighter control over the internet. According to ROC civil sector interviewee Yan 
                                               
215 Please refer to Section 5.4.1. 
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(2010), by the beginning of December 2009, around 7,000 internet cafes in China 
had been shut down by the government. However, this was not enough to satisfy 
the CCP. In the middle of December, another wave of blockades of certain 
websites was launched, which in essence turned the worldwide internet into a 
Local Access Net (LAN) to facilitate the maintenance of control. The PRC also 
monitors QQ, the most popular web-based communication application, bans 
private BT download websites216, prohibits any application for personal websites, 
has stopped providing registration services of ‘.cn’ Domain Names and uses 
‘blacklist’ and ‘whitelist’, which refers to the policy of first blanket blocking all 
websites and then lifting the blockade on the approved ones. With regards any 
request to connect to a computer server, as soon as a problematic request is 
suspected, the server will be completely shut down. In other words, the Chinese 
government applies the Chinese strategic concept of ‘rather kill a thousand 
innocent people than let off one guilty one’ as a measure of internet control. In the 
case of Google, the PRC also took its usual measure of recoursing to both rules 
and threats in order to maintain control. Through the blockade of sensitive 
websites, China aims to make not only Google accept its rules, but also other 
domestic Internet Service Providers like Baidu. 
A further example of China’s internet control was laid out in The Epoch 
Times (2011). It is believed that the PRC plans to conduct ‘physical disconnection’ 
on some selected network cables in order to reconstruct a restricted Chinese 
internet network, in which only a very few network ports can connect to the 
World Wide Web.217 As The Epoch Times (2011) notes, it has been argued that 
there are two reasons for the Chinese government to do so: ‘One is that the recent 
‘Jasmine Revolution’ triggered via the internet; and the second is that the US 
government has claimed to have invested 25 million dollars to support research 
into opposing the Chinese blockade of the internet.’ 
Furthermore, attacking Google can also be seen as a PRC military 
manoeuvre to conduct asymmetric warfare and unrestricted warfare. The Chinese 
military put forward the ideas of both asymmetric warfare and unrestricted 
                                               
216 This is a new Point-to-Point technique of file transmission. The more users that join the download, the 
faster the download will be. 
217 As the report points out, since 21st February 2011, some big cities in China, such as Shanghai, Beijing, 
and Chongqing, have occasionally encountered internet disconnection on a large scale, caused by the 
loss of DNS service due to ‘physical disconnection.’ 
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warfare many years ago. As the PRC cannot catch up with the USA in the field of 
high technology within a short time period, the Chinese army prefers to develop 
asymmetrical measures to offset US military advantages, and as this research has 
shown, cyber warfare is the most significant amongst these measures. As a result, 
it is very possible that the PRC chose to assess the effectiveness of its asymmetric 
strategy in cyber warfare, as well as its diplomatic response through attacking 
Google. 
Yet another reason for attacking Google might be to facilitate Baidu’s 
dominance of information services in China. The field of information services 
controlled by the PRC has two conflicting aspects. Firstly, the commercial action 
of searching for the truth directly clashes with the CCP Propaganda Department’s 
concealing of the truth; however, China still needs to learn from Google’s 
operation and technology, and may wish to take advantage of the just image of 
this Western company. 
In sum, it can be concluded from the Google case that censorship is a 
critical approach in China’s cyber warfare that attempts to gain dominance on the 
internet and control freedom of speech in order to discipline the masses of 
Chinese netizens. Whilst this warfare targets the governments of other states and 
foreign private companies in China, it also controls the domestic Chinese 
populace. This implies that it is not necessary to distinguish between carrying out 
‘cyber suppression’ – internal internet control and monitoring – and external 
cyber attacks. The Chinese government can entrust civil actors with the tasks of 
censorship and internet control. A challenge for the Chinese authorities is 
grasping the perfect balance between censorship and the Chinese people’s needs 
of being involved in the global internet community. Meanwhile, China as a whole 
is also seeking a balanced status between international cooperation and cyber 
attacks. For example, whilst the Chinese authorities and its hackers target global 
cyberspace, on 12th November 2010, Hu Qiheng, the chairman of the Internet 
Society of China, praised the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) for its 
‘candid culture’ on behalf of the host organisation at the 79th conference of the 
IETF in Beijing. (The Epoch Times, 2010) 
It is likely, then, that China’s censorship of Google’s search engine was an 
approach of cyber warfare, enabling the seizure of important information. In other 
words, it may be argued that censorship does not merely prevent the public from 
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accessing politically sensitive information, but is also a tactic of China’s cyber 
warfare, which includes ideologically controlling and commanding civilians into 
disciplined cyber warriors. As a result, the strategy of People’s War can be carried 
out securely without loss of control in the potential battlefield of cyberspace. The 
dictatorship of the Chinese one-party government offers a further unique 
advantage in this respect. 
5.6 A review of recent cyber incidents 
An increasing number of cases of cyber attack or even war have been revealed in 
public in the past few years. In order to present a common pattern of cyber attack for 
subsequent empirical analysis, a review of recent cyber attacks will be examined in 
this section. As recent reliable evidence demonstrates, states have begun to contend 
with one another in cyberspace, and a strategy of cyber warfare has been adopted 
not only by China, but also by other countries within the last decade. In a report to 
the US congress in 2009, it is noted that ‘President Obama labelled cyber attacks 
one of the most serious economic and national security challenges.’ (USCC Report, 
2009:167) An article appearing in The New York Times further states that the US 
plans to develop strategies of cyberspace warfare, not just for defence but also for 
offence, by enlarging the government budget to establish cyber units.218 Aside from 
official US reports, China’s official media responded to accusations that China 
conducted cyber warfare as part of national strategy by unveiling claims that the US 
military also puts a great deal of effort into the development of cyber warfare.219 It is 
thus apparent that there may be another wave of arms race between states, this time 
waged in cyberspace. 
5.6.1 Recent incidents of cyber attack 
                                               
218 The Pentagon will develop a new strategy of cyber warfare in order to fully comprehend and defend 
against potential attacks in which the adversary may ‘shut down the country’s power stations, 
telecommunications and aviation systems, or freeze the financial markets’. (Sanger, Markoff and 
Shanker, 2009) In addition, on 23rd June 2009, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates declared 
cyberspace to be ‘the “fifth domain” of military operations, alongside land, sea, air and space. It is the 
first man-made military domain, requiring an entirely new Pentagon command’; he set up the United 
States Cyber Command to respond to this. (Glenny, 2010) The United States Cyber Command was 
officially activated on 21st May 2010 and achieved full operational capability from 31st October 2010. 
This Command is at a level equal to Air Force Operation Command and Space Command, and is 
headed by a four-starred General. (McMichael, 2010) 
219As China’s Xinhua News reports, it is believed that the US military has 3,000 to 5,000 cyber experts, 
and 50,000 to 70,000 soldiers engaged in cyber warfare as ‘cyber warriors’. (Xinhua News, 2010) in 
addition, it is officially claimed that the US military will spend 17 billion dollars on the development 
of cyber warfare in a five year project starting from 2008. (Sanger, Markoff and Shanker, 2009) Thus 
it is clear that, if necessary, the US is able to carry out cyber warfare.  
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In April 2007, according to news reports, whilst Estonia relocated the Bronze 
Soldier of Tallinn dedicated to soldiers of the former Soviet Union who died in 
battle, the country was subjected to a three-week barrage of cyber-attacks, which 
disabled the websites of government ministries, political parties, newspapers, 
banks, and companies. (BBC, 2007) The cyber attacks inundated Estonia’s 
websites with ‘Denial-of-Service’ (DoS)220 attacks, overwhelming servers and 
forcing them to shut down for a few hours or even longer. The internet linked to 
the outside of Estonia was closed for a week. In addition, as Steven Lee Myers 
(2007) reports, the Estonian Defence Ministry pointed out the most crucial issue: 
‘If you have a missile attack against, let’s say, an airport, it is an act of war…If the 
same result is caused by computers, then how else do you describe that kind of 
attack?’ 
In June 2007, the Financial Times of London broke the story that Chinese 
hackers had penetrated the Pentagon’s unclassified computer network, which also 
served the office of Defence Secretary Robert Gates. It was labelled ‘the most 
successful cyber attack against the Department of Defence.’ (Sevastopuloin and 
McGregor, 2007) According to the report, this incident prompted Pentagon 
security experts to shut down unclassified email communication systems for a 
week. Although details remain classified, an unnamed source revealed that the 
hackers spent months exploring the network before finally penetrating it and then 
transmitting data and files to an outside IP address located in China.221 Though by 
all accounts the cyber attacks did not corrupt or destroy data, the actions did show 
the capability to penetrate the computer networks and deposit malware, and 
demonstrated the capacity to launch future actions. Not long after the Pentagon 
attack, in August 2007, the German magazine Der Spiegel reported that German 
security agencies discovered computers in Chancellor Merkel’s office, as well as 
other German ministries, infected with spying software traceable back to China. A 
top German internal official did not hesitate to point the blame at the Chinese 
government: ‘In our view, state Chinese interests stand behind these digital 
                                               
220 A ‘Denial of Service’ (DoS), also known as ‘Distributed Denial of Service’ (DDoS), attack is 
characterised by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of a service from using it. 
Attacks can be directed at any network device, including attacks on routing devices and web, 
electronic mail, or Domain Name System (DNS) servers. (Carr, 2009:27) 
221 According to this report, ‘Current and former officials have told the Financial Times that an internal 
investigation has revealed that the incursion came from the People’s Liberation Army [PLA].’ 
(Sevastopuloin and McGregor, 2007) 
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attacks.’ (Tkacik, 2007) December 2007 brought another round of Chinese-related 
cyber news: the Director of Britain’s MI5, Jonathan Evans, made an 
unprecedented public warning that China was spying on British corporate 
computer networks. Evans sent letters to over 300 British corporate chiefs and 
security officers warning that they were under attack ‘from Chinese state 
organisations.’ The recipients included banks, accountants, and legal firms: all part 
of Britain’s critical economic infrastructure. According to The Times, the MI5 
document warns that British companies conducting business in China were being 
targeted via the internet with the purpose of stealing privileged business 
information.222 These accusations do not directly point to the Chinese government 
or PLA. However, a list of IP addresses attacking the sites can be linked to 
locations in China. (Markoff, 2007) In 2009, Robert Gates, the US Defence 
Secretary, pointed out that the computer system at the US Department of Defence 
controlling military equipment and the air traffic control system had been under 
cyber attack, and the evidence showed the attack was traceable to China. (CBS 
News, 2009) Moreover, as the Director of the UK Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), Iain Lobban, states, the UK’s infrastructure, including 
such aspects as power grids and emergency services, has to face a ‘real and 
credible’ threat in cyberspace. He further stresses that the UK government 
network has previously been seriously attacked, and evidence shows that China is 
involved. (Shipman, 2010)223 
In fact, these cyber attacks are all strikingly similar in methods and tactics, 
even though the targets are different. A study shows that the attacker exploits a 
complex network of websites that ‘bypass traditional information security 
technology.’224 (Finjan, 2008) Trojans are embedded in the target computer, 
infecting other computers in the network and covertly directing the target 
computer browser to malicious websites. These attacks can be traced back to 
                                               
222 This can be found in the article ‘MI5 alert on China’s cyberspace spy threat.’ (Blakely, Richards,  
Rossiter and Beeston, 2007) 
223 The GCHQ governmental report indicates, ‘There are over 20,000 malicious emails on government 
networks each month, 1,000 of which are deliberately targeting them.’ (GCHQ report, 2010) In 
addition, as Tim Shipman indicates, ‘Chinese intelligence is engaged in a systematic attempt to steal 
UK industrial and military secrets, often with cyber attacks on defence firms.’ (Shipman, 2010) 
224 All of the attacks employed a Trojan virus, which is a small program embedded in seemingly 
legitimate emails, hacked trusted websites, links from spam email, copycat domain names, or infected 
content injected into websites. 
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locations situated inside China’s territory.225 Though the Chinese government 
always officially denies any accusations, these incidents still demonstrate that 
China would be easily capable of conducting cyber attacks in cyber warfare in the 
future if Chinese civilian hackers are systemically mobilised for a specific political 
purpose, regardless of their precise location within China. 
5.6.2 Cases of cyber warfare conducted during military conflicts 
In addition to incidents of cyber attack, some states have already conducted cyber 
warfare during military conflicts. According to Dunn Cavelty (2007), NATO’s 
intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999 during the Kosovo War, known as 
Operation Allied Force, is recognised as the first war fought in cyberspace. In this 
war, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia effectively employed methods of cyber 
warfare against NATO forces. The Yugoslav military implemented the military 
strategy of mobilising hackers226 to conduct cyber attacks and deploy a range of 
computer viruses. Some websites of the NATO military were blocked by spam 
information and some computer network systems were even paralysed as a result. 
NATO subsequently strengthened their network systems through protective 
measures against cyber attack. They also deployed their own cyber counter-attacks, 
in which they penetrated the Yugoslav Army’s computer networks and 
communication systems in order to plant a large number of viruses and deceptive 
information. The computer systems they destroyed dealt with command, control, 
and communications of the Yugoslav military troops and the combat systems of 
traditional weapons. Certain critical infrastructures, such as public services and 
power grids, were also paralysed. (Chen and Wang, 2009) In addition to the 
impact on military operations in the Kosovo War, the conflict also raised an 
important general issue: ‘the use of the internet in conflicts by a wide variety of 
actors,’ which may not necessarily be states. (Cavelty, 2007:75)  
In August 2008, during the Russo-Georgian War, Russian hackers 
successfully intruded into Georgia’s network systems, taking over many important 
                                               
225 Finjan, a global provider of internet security solutions, ‘investigated a very sophisticated attack that 
used zero-day exploits (malware for which there is no security patch) as well as other new hacking 
techniques and discovered a centralised group of activity based from China […]one of the websites in 
the group belongs to a Chinese governmental office.’ (Finjan, 2008) 
226 According to John Arquilla, ‘Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of cyber warfare in Kosovo came 
after the armistice and the Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo. A group of hackers known as the Black 
Hand did not have to withdraw, because they weren't in Kosovo. They began to wage a campaign, a 
cyber war, to try to prevent the reconstitution of [civil] society.’ (Arquilla, 2003) 
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web servers and thus paralysing certain parts of Georgia’s national information 
infrastructure. In so doing, Russia was regarding as having created a radical case 
of cyber war in the international system. In order to deploy military operational 
intrusion into Georgia, before the launch of armed actions, Russia first took 
control of Georgia’s network systems to cripple transportations, communications, 
media and financial network systems, as well as government websites.227 However, 
though Russia’s cyber warfare capability is indeed impressive, the core techniques 
still lie in US hands. (Chen and Wang, 2009)  
The Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza has also suffered cases of cyber attacks. 
In December 2008, cyber warfare occurred between Israeli and Arabic hackers 
during the Gaza strip conflict known as Operation Cast Lead. As Carr (2009:19) 
states, in this conflict nearly 10,000 websites were attacked within the space of 
only two weeks. As the websites of a few larger corporations were also targeted, 
the attacks had a financial impact too.  (Carr, 2009) It is believed that some critical 
state infrastructures were damaged. An important concept of cyber warfare raised 
during this conflict is the idea of using multiple zombie systems, or building 
zombie nets228, to achieve political gain or support propaganda claims. Viruses are 
employed as a weapon which can affect the digital state system in many different 
dimensions. 
5.6.3 Summary 
Regardless of whether a case can be categorised as a cyber attack or a cyber war, 
one might argue that, according to existing norms of international politics such as 
those proposed by NATO, it is unlikely that cyber attacks will be classified as a 
war which requires resorting to mediation from other states. For example, further 
to Libicki’s (2009) explanation of what constitutes an act of war, examined in 
Section 2.4, he also states that, though they did provide Estonia with some 
                                               
227 The website of Georgian President Saakashvili was simultaneously attacked from 500 IP addresses. In 
addition, the websites of the Georgian parliament, government, and foreign ministry also suffered 
malicious attacks. (Carr, 2009:16-17) One Georgian network provider counted a total of 128 attacks, 
including 36 on the websites of the government and parliament, 35 on the Georgian police and another 
35 on the finance ministry. Georgia’s financial institutions cancelled all online banking and 
transactions for 10 days. (Goetz, Rosenbach, and Szandar, 2009) 
228A zombie net, also known as a botnet, is a group of computers infected with a malicious kind of robot 
software, known as bots, which present a security threat to the computer owner. Once the robot 
software (malicious software or malware) has been successfully installed in a computer, this computer 
becomes a zombie or a drone, unable to resist the commands of the bot commander. It is estimated that 
‘One botnet of one million hosts could conservatively generate enough traffic to take most [targeted] 
500 companies collectively offline.’ (Carr, 2009:13)   
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technical help, NATO declared that the cyber attack on Estonia was not worth 
invocation of the treaty’s collective-defence clauses. Nevertheless, NATO has 
since actively advocated the development of an international treaty on cyber 
warfare. If it were established that a state actor was behind the cyber attacks, it 
would be a case of one state targeting another via cyber warfare. In fact, a cyber 
war involving sides with equal military capability has not yet occurred in the 
international system. Previous cyber attacks and cyber wars have thus far always 
been ‘one-sided’ asymmetrical attacks. In the present day, with continued 
advances in information technology, offensive and defensive activities in 
cyberspace will become all the more common. Previously, main concerns were 
merely hackings and virus planting, but as capabilities develop, a current key issue 
is how the different sectors, such as private information providers, civil society, 
and military forces, can be integrated into cyber warfare capacity at a state level.  
In addition, one might argue that incidents of cyber attacks should be 
treated merely as crimes, and that only some of them constitute military action 
justifying retaliatory attacks. As Brenner (2009:118) points out, in terms of the 
United Nations Charter, only an ‘armed attack’ allows a country to legitimately 
defend itself. It could be argued that any self-defence argument is irrelevant in 
many cases of cyber attack since they do not always constitute ‘nation-state on 
nation-state’ conflict. Regardless of the various debates involved in the issue of 
cyber warfare, one thing is clear: cyber warfare is an alarming issue at a state level 
of concern, because cyber warfare can cause a scale of physical destruction 
equivalent to that of a conventional war. In addition, cyber warfare can also boost 
states in enhancing their military operational capability. In terms of maintaining 
state military superiority, controlling cyberspace has become as critically 
important as dominating land, sea, air, and space. Moreover, in the digital age, 
both military and civil infrastructures, such as finance, transportation, supply 
services and telecommunication systems, have been bundled and embedded into 
cyberspace. Cyberspace is thus a vital factor for normal operation of a state.229 In 
other words, once vulnerabilities occur in cyberspace, many important state 
infrastructures may be paralysed, thus jeopardising national security. The very real 
                                               
229 For example, as Mikhail Tammet, the head of IT security in Estonia’s defence ministry, reveals, 
‘Estonia depends largely on the internet. We have e-government, government is so-called paperless... 
all the bank services are on the internet. We even elect our parliament via the internet.’ (BBC, 2007) 
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potential of the threat of cyber attacks and cyber wars reveals that states are, as yet, 
unsecured against them, which may in turn affect the international system. This 
has triggered states to begin shifting their attention to developing their own cyber 
capabilities in order to tackle the issue of cyber security or even potentially contest 
the global power of other states via cyberspace in the future.230 In so doing, 
militarisation of cyberspace has gradually advanced towards the stage of cyber 
warfare; cyber warfare can be conducted in cyberspace to achieve essentially the 
same results that states pursue through the adoption of conventional warfare, such 
as achieving advantages over a competing state or preventing a competing state 
from achieving advantages over them. In order to build up a collective defence 
strategy to prevent states from contending with one another, on 15th May 2008, 
eight nation states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, 
and the USA) as well as the Supreme Allied Commander of Transformation 
(SACT)231 signed an agreement to establish a jointly funded ‘Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence’ (CCDCOE), which aimed to enhance NATO’s 
cyber defence capability against cyber attacks, and seek a comprehensive defence 
strategy in cyberspace.232  
5.7 Documentary evidence of China’s cyber warfare 
As stated in Section 5.1, due to the lack of availability of official Chinese military 
doctrine, it is hard to definitively state how China conducts cyber warfare. However, 
some related materials may offer an indication of China’s cyber warfare, manifested 
in the integration of China cyberspace, even though official directives still remain 
uncertain. 
As ROC retired Navy Rear Admiral Liu (2011) points out, an indication of 
how China carries out cyber warfare on an integrated platform can still be drawn 
from Chinese military news and some interior PLA documents. According to the 
People’s Daily on 28th June 2011, Chinese Colonel Geng Yansheng, the Chief of 
                                               
230 For instance, in addition to China and the USA as already mentioned, a recent report notes, 
‘Germany’s military, the Bundeswehr, trains its own hackers and it’s not the only official effort to 
defend a nation from cyber attack, but also prepare for the future of war.’ (Goetz, Rosenbach, and 
Szandar, 2009) 
231SACT is in charge of NATO’s highest military authority, the Military Committee, for promoting and 
overseeing the continuing transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities. 
232 This research centre, located in Estonia, is in charge of research and training on cyber warfare and 
develops NATO standards and capabilities for cyber defence. In addition, it provides expert advice on 
a regular basis as well as in emergencies. It reached full operational capability in the second half of 
2008 with a staff of 30, half of them from the founding countries and half from other NATO member 
countries. (Socor, 2008) 
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the Public Affairs Bureau at the PRC’s Ministry of National Defence, disclosed that 
China’s PLA had established a ‘cyber blue team’ in order to conduct ‘cyber 
exercises’ to strengthen the ‘cyber security of the Chinese military.’ Geng also 
stated that China’s Guangzhou Theatre organised one of these ‘cyber exercises’ in 
April 2011, in which there was a cyber confrontation between an offensive blue 
team and a defensive red team. (People’s Daily, 2011) In addition, according to 
Deputy Commanding Officer of the Theatre Li’s view (2011), preparing exercises 
for cyber warfare takes the PLA’s cyber blue team less than ten days, and is 
relatively low cost. Cyber exercises are likely to contain three aims, which are 
‘controlling,’ ‘paralysing opponents’ network system,’ and ‘data filching.’ In terms 
of strategic considerations, controlling would be the optimum goal to achieve if 
possible. Paralysing would only be employed when controlling cannot or does not 
work. (China Economy, 2011) 
Moreover, according to a classified interior PLA document233, there are five 
methods of constructing China’s complex electromagnetic environment to 
formulate an integrated platform on which to develop and exercise China’s cyber 
warfare. These five methods are as follows: 
1.  ‘Strong Electromagnetic Interference Environment’ 
The communication countermeasure ability and radar countermeasure ability of 
the simulated blue team are used for interference in the military manoeuvre 
field. The purpose of this is to blind the radar of the drilling troops and cause 
failure of communication and malfunction. 
2. ‘Strong Electromagnetic Pulse Attack Environment’ 
The simulated blue team and engineer troops reduce the effect of the electronic 
equipment of the drilling troops through the instantaneous radiation of high-
power interference equipment and high-power electromagnetic pulse attack of 
microwave transmission equipment. To induce the drilling troops to carry out 
protective actions, flares, smoke, crackers and other forms of simulated nuclear 
explosion and electro-optical countermeasure environment are also employed. 
3. ‘Multi-faceted Network-based Attack Environment’ 
                                               
233 This interior PLA document, produced by the PLA’s General Staff Headquarter s 54th Institute, is 
entitled ‘Operational Training under Complex Electromagnetic Environments,’ and was not officially 
published. It was investigated by a researcher from the PLA Archive Room at the ROC National 
Defence University in Taiwan. 
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The Network-Based Attack Unit of the blue team makes use of all kinds of 
network access equipment and deception to secretly access the internet, mainly 
through connecting wires and wireless nodes. They can access the drilling 
troops’ wired and wireless LAN. Through multi-faceted and all-time internet 
attack and penetration, the enemy’s internet resources would be damaged and 
stolen, and the computer system would be paralysed, leading to the creation of 
an environment where cyber attack is everywhere and is impossible to prevent, 
and where it is difficult to distinguish between the fake and the real. 
4. ‘Natural Disturbance Environment’ 
There are three ways to set up such an environment. Firstly, through distributed 
written commands, the source and strength of interference are provided; 
secondly, organising the troops for drill in the places of mountains or mines 
where there is natural clutter, or during thunderstorms; thirdly, inducing the 
drilling troops to choose an appropriate location for their weapons and 
effective counter measures through the use of photoelectric equipment to 
simulate the effect of natural lightning’s interference. 
5. ‘Public Equipment Interference Environment’ 
Interfering with wireless communication by simulating local radio stations in 
the method of playing recorded tapes through short-wave radio set; simulating 
public electronic appliances’ clutter through high-power electric generators, 
automotive engines and other equipment with clutter radiation; inducing the 
drilling troops to take measures to protect the electronic equipment by making 
use of the strong electromagnetic field of the high-power jammer during the 
period of starting up the equipment. 
 
This complex electromagnetic environment may also be interfered with by 
computer viruses whilst regular electromagnetic systems are operated via computer 
systems. These regular electromagnetic systems include radar, transducers, the 
command and control system, communication and electronic combat systems and 
other electronic equipment. The communication system provides accurate 
connections and links between battalions and the highest commanding unit through 
the exchange of sound and data. The electronic combat system provides warning 
and supervision of the electronic spectrum, and interferes with the enemy’s 
interference system through use of the electromagnetic medium. Almost all of these 
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systems make use of complex software, and therefore computer viruses could 
rapidly damage an enemy’s computer systems through attacking the computer 
systems and network software, potentially ‘paralysing’ the enemy’s whole network. 
The electric systems for military use rely heavily on computer software, which 
increases the vulnerability to virus attack. For example, a new form of electronic 
warfare is to ‘plant’ the microcode of the computer virus into a computer system. 
Consequently, this section presents a clear indication that China does 
conduct cyber warfare. The empirical analyses in the earlier sections in this chapter 
are premised on this indication. In addition, the tactical methods deployed to 
exercise China’s military also indirectly give an indication of how China constructs 
this integrated platform as a potential battleground for developing cyber warfare. 
The tactics of China’s cyber warfare are combined with practical methods of 
electromagnetic warfare for implementation on this integrated platform as shown in 
Section 5.3 by evidence from interviews. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
Information technology (IT) plays a crucial role in determining the result of a modern 
war. The aim of a superior military is to concentrate its superior force to gain a pre-
emptive advantage through the application of science and technology. In terms of 
combat capability, a technology-intensive military holds an advantageous position in 
local wars involving high technology. Under such circumstances, a mere reliance on 
numerical superiority cannot win against a technology-intensive military. The 
fundamental prerequisite for People’s War is the justice of conducting a war. Only a 
feeling of justice for conducting a war can arouse people’s enthusiasm for battle and 
invoke confidence in its warfare. As examined in this research, the traditional concept 
of People’s War involves mobilising the masses to the greatest extent to create a 
ubiquitous resistance against the encroaching enemy. However, the basic form of 
modern warfare is long-range operations; it is rare that the enemy would deploy its 
armed forces for invasion. In the future, it is most likely that combatants will use tactics 
of long-range precise strikes. In the initial stage, large-scale electronic suppression 
techniques, constant air raids and blockades of coastal areas through attacking anti-
radiation missiles and cruise missiles can be expected. In the following stage, the Navy 
and Air Force would cooperate, and aircraft carrier formation would be employed to 
achieve the goal of air and sea blockade if possible. Surprisingly, sometimes warfare 
would only take place in the sea and air. In this form of warfare, traditional People’s 
War would produce little effect. The issue of improving the efficacy of People’s War 
against a technology-intensive superior adversary needs urgently to be solved. A new 
military strategy, which both maintains the traditional classic military strategy but 
which can also effectively beat the enemy under new conditions, is necessary in the 
modern era. As a result, under the conditions of high-tech warfare in the digital age, it is 
likely that China will opt for cyber warfare adopting the strategy of People’s War. 
As discussed in this research, the characteristics of People’s War involve a great 
number of participants on a large scale, but there are no main forces. People’s War 
draws on one’s advantages whilst avoiding any disadvantages, utilises one’s strong 
points to attack the enemy via its weak points, harnesses a variety of flexible tactics, and 
presents a ubiquitous resistance against the enemy. When the enemy fails to identify a 
main force and key objectives, it would not be able to defend and attack effectively, 
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eventually leading to losses in battle. In order to utility the leverage of the huge Chinese 
populace, cyberspace can provide a new platform for battles through the launch of cyber 
warfare. In addition, as investigated, China’s cyber warfare could include hostile 
operations aimed at attacking the enemy’s telecommunication network and information 
systems in order to influence or even change decision makers’ plans. In terms of 
military significance, China’s cyber warfare means that both sides in any warfare will 
attempt to control information as a way to gain the pre-emptive advantage in a war and 
weaken the other side. 
According to the procedure and effect of People’s War in cyberspace, it can be 
concluded that China’s cyber warfare could have five key characteristics, as follows. 
Firstly, China’s cyber warfare aims to deal a fatal strike to superior opponents, since the 
world’s economy, society, military and all other fields heavily rely on cyberspace. For 
example, the USA has set up as many as 20 large military networks. Once the command 
and control network is compromised, weaponry, no matter how powerful, cannot exert 
its influence and the whole military system may be paralysed. Secondly, China’s cyber 
warfare could achieve the goal of ‘subduing the enemy without physical fighting’. 
Cyber warfare does not begin with the appearance of missiles or other traditional 
weapons on the battlefield, but instead with antagonism in cyberspace. Once one side 
scores a key victory, the outcome of the war may be determined. Thirdly, the boundary 
between the battlefront and the rear does not exist in China’s cyber warfare. Wherever 
cyberspace is involved, cyber warfare may take place. Fourthly, in terms of defence 
acquisition, the cost of cyber warfare is respectively low as it does not require much 
equipment, as the cases of cyber attack investigated in Section 5.2 demonstrate.  
However, the fifth, most notable, characteristic involves the similarities and 
differences between cyber warfare and nuclear warfare. Just like nuclear warfare, cyber 
warfare also has a destructive force. Once it takes place, the side which is attacked or 
defeated may face the danger of a total collapse of the national economy. The potential 
of nuclear warfare has a huge effect on mentality, and likewise, cyber warfare could 
also shake the enemy’s morale. The moment a nuclear weapon is launched, the outcome 
of warfare may be out of human control; this also applies to cyber warfare. When 
computer viruses are spread in the global network of cyberspace, the consequences may 
become out of control, which might cause a ‘double sword’ effect. However, the key 
difference between cyber warfare and nuclear warfare is that for the former, victory is 
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not achieved at the cost of numerous lives and there may not be much physical damage. 
Therefore, execution of cyber warfare might be more easily justified. 
As a result, taking China’s human resources and computer technology into 
account, it is possible to argue that the strategy of People’s War is perfectly suited to be 
carried out in cyberspace if properly organised and precisely directed. 
This research relies on an extensive review of China’s military studies in order 
to reveal the significant addition Chinese cyber warfare has made to China’s military 
affairs in the digital age. China’s rise based on its own ‘Chinese model’ is tremendously 
impressive in terms of world politics, causing any potential military threats posed by 
China to be both widely influential and controversial. However, other than some limited 
government reports, there has been very little literature published to assist Western 
scholars in the formation of a body of related academic knowledge. (Zheng, 2011) Due 
to these resource constraints, this research cannot be so presumptuous as to attempt to 
resolve all the issues touched upon in this thesis. The goal is rather to explain why these 
issues must be discussed and to offer some modest suggestions regarding the direction 
and efforts of future research. 
This may not seem particularly enterprising, but in fact, as explained in the 
methodological self-identification in the Introduction, this research can be regarded as 
making a contribution to the field of International Security Studies (ISS) and its 
encompassing areas of Strategic Studies and War Studies. The primary research 
question in this study focuses on the relationship between the growth of cyberspace as a 
potential battleground and existing doctrines of modern Chinese strategy. The research 
aim is to address this question through an empirical case study of China’s cyber warfare. 
As the issue of cyber warfare is a relatively new agenda for Security Studies and 
Strategic Studies, this research must first establish a conceptual framework with which 
to approach the issue. This framework is developed throughout Chapter Two, Three and 
Four, and the propositions formed in these chapters inform the empirical case study 
analysis presented in Chapter Five. According to the analysis of these chapters, this 
research concludes that China’s cyber warfare is a particular warfare with Chinese 
characteristics that adopts the doctrine of People’s War. Each chapter raises some 
individual valuable conclusions for this research, which can be summarised in the 
following five points, representing the primary research outcomes of this study: 
1.    Chapter Two examines the nature of cyberspace through both physical and 
conceptual aspects. These features include permeability, a shared network platform, 
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asymmetry, and anonymity, allowing civil affairs and military action to regularly 
overlap and intertwine. Civil matters, such as IT research and development, are 
carried out in order to secure cyberspace for states; advanced information 
technology further reinforces a state’s military capacity in cyberspace. Thus, the 
features of cyberspace present a certain strategic value for both state and non-state 
cyber actors, leading to struggles for domination. This in turn has raised the 
potential of cyberspace as a battle space, in which the shared information network 
infrastructure links civil, government, and military sectors. Moreover, the boundary 
between defensive and offensive strategy in cyberspace is also largely indiscernible. 
The key issue for states is to extend their dominant capabilities in this battle space 
whilst simultaneously reinforcing their defensive ability to secure the civil 
information infrastructure contained therein. These features and developments have 
led to an inevitable and urgent need for investigation into relevant strategy; this 
research looks in particular into strategies of modern Chinese cyber warfare. 
2.    According to the examination of modern Chinese strategy in Chapter Three, the 
strategic doctrine of People’s War is a constant and crucial guiding principle of 
Chinese strategy in the modern era. People’s War mainly consists of two 
conceptual components. The first is the mobilisation of not only the massive 
Chinese populace but also all civil resources in order to achieve a planned political 
goal. The second is the defeat of a superior adversary by an inferior power. This 
doctrine is likely to contain the concept of asymmetry, which has remained an 
important principle within the doctrine since it was raised in 1978 from a tactical 
level concerning just the physical battlefield to a strategic level.234 Without the 
geographical limits of traditional battlefields, cyberspace offers the strategic 
doctrine of People’s War a potential battle space perfectly suited to asymmetrical 
actions. The principles of Chinese strategy best suited for cyberspace can be briefly 
listed as follows: 
2.1  Achievement of all-out defence, and even offence, espoused by the doctrine 
of People’s War, due to the potential for every citizen to act as a warrior in 
cyberspace. 
2.2  Defeat of the enemy without fighting or massive numbers of casualties in 
accordance with Sun Tzu’s strategic maxim: ‘subdue the enemy without 
                                               
234 For further information on the three transformations of People’s War, please refer to Section 2 in 
Chapter Three. 
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fighting.’ Most states’ facilities rely on computer network systems, and 
combat in cyberspace can target these facilities in a relatively virtual manner 
without physical fighting. This principle may also be applied as a measure of 
deterrence, allowing paralysis of the opponent’s critical information network 
infrastructure in order to discourage the adversary from taking any action 
during a potential conflict. 
2.3  Knowing the enemy and knowing yourself so that you will not be in danger – 
another of Sun Tzu’s guidelines. Dominating information in cyberspace is 
now vital for command and control of forces in any campaign. The Chinese 
PLA recognises that this ancient principle could thus be accomplished through 
cyber warfare. 
2.4  Mobilisation of the massive number of Chinese internet users in order to 
carry out guerrilla strategy through the tactics of swarm and sting effect: cyber 
attacks can be fast and numerous, crippling the opponent’s computer networks, 
including both civil facilities and combat systems. The manner of this 
mobilisation is investigated in Chapter Five. 
3.    Chapter Four presents a conceptual examination of the incorporation of the 
doctrine of People’s War into China’s cyber warfare. Concisely speaking, the 
strategy of China’s cyber warfare combines the aspects of evolving warfare and 
general Chinese modern strategy to form a new kind of warfare supported by the 
traditional principle of People’s War. Moreover, strategic principles of China’s 
cyber warfare may adopt aspects contained within the strategy of People’s War, 
such as ‘active defence,’ ‘defence by deterrence,’ and ‘anti-access.’ Theoretically, it 
can be claimed that the strategic value of cyberspace offers the strategy of People’s 
War a perfect battle space. The doctrine of People’s War also, in turn, ideally fits 
China’s cyber warfare due to its history as a guiding strategic culture with Chinese 
characteristics. Interestingly, in the digital age, China, particularly the Chinese 
military, is able to harness technical skills arising in the West, such as information 
technology, to potentially eliminate foreign interference into China’s affairs.235 
4.    The propositions of the previous analytical chapters are reflected through the 
analysis of the case study in Chapter Five. In this chapter, it is argued that China’s 
cyber warfare, which incorporates the doctrine of People’s War, aims not merely to 
                                               
235 This point of view also reflects a Chinese strategic thought from 1842: 師夷長技以制夷 (shi yi chang 
iì yi zhi yi), which means ‘To counter the West by learning from the West.’ (Liu, 2010) 
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achieve military purposes, but also to discipline the huge number of Chinese 
netizens via internet control and monitoring. China’s internet censorship is a 
fundamental measure of China’s cyber warfare, both gathering important 
information and also preventing the public from uncovering politically sensitive 
material. In addition, factors such as patriotic education and ideological doctrine 
drive the military significance and justification of China’s cyber warfare, further 
explaining how the Chinese government is able to mobilise the massive populace in 
line with People’s War. Based on all of the measures of patriotic education 
examined, it is possible to argue that the ideology of the Chinese people is 
politically cultivated, as these measures are able to indoctrinate people into 
supporting nationalism. The Chinese government can thus carry out People’s War 
strategy of mobilising the populace to achieve a political purpose, in particular 
concerning national issues in resistance to Western imperialism. This would also 
apply to online nationalism as part of China’s cyber warfare. 
5.    In order to seek a possible general solution for actors to cope with cyber conflicts 
and to make a contribution to the field of International Security Studies, this 
research suggests a set of principles of ‘cyber territoriality,’ namely: authority, 
cyber culture, functional borders, and people. As cyberspace contains features of a 
virtual territory, the idea of cyber territoriality metaphorically territorialises 
cyberspace in parallel with the three principles236 of the territorial state system. In 
so doing, possible rules of engagement in cyberspace as well as justification for the 
actions of cyber actors can be developed based upon these principles. Incidents 
such as the Google affair illustrate the potential useful application of the four 
principles of cyber territoriality. For example, once some Google email accounts 
were ‘stolen,’ the autonomy of its servers and the privacy of its users were 
compromised, effectively meaning the functional borders of the actor Google were 
intruded upon. If the principles of cyber territoriality could be converted into an 
accepted modus operandi for solving cyber conflict in world politics, actors such as 
Google may have a justification to carry out defensive measures. 
                                               
236 Sovereignty, integration, and borders.  
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 Appendix 1: 
Interviews in Taiwan 
Aim: to provide empirical indications of how the PRC carries out cyber 
warfare/strategy 
 
Opening greeting: 
(Briefly introduce myself and the research topic, and offer my thanks for the interview) 
 
Request interviewees to briefly introduce themselves and state how their background is 
associated with cyberspace/information technology, China’s cyber warfare, or Chinese 
strategy.  
 
Prepared interview questions: 
Relevant areas Interview Questions CI CS CW 
   
據報導，中共被 Google指控對 Google用戶進行攻擊 (是利用台灣
當做跳板主機)，您的看法如何？ 
Q1: According to some news sources, the PRC was recently accused 
of conducting attacks on the accounts of Google users (by using 
Taiwanese computers as a bridge). What do you make of this claim? 
   中國如何實施網路戰法與戰略？ 
Q2: How does the PRC carry out cyber warfare/strategy? 
   
當網路空間成為一個戰場時，對現有的軍事準則和戰略影響如
何？ 
Q3: How does cyberspace as a potential battleground challenge 
existing military doctrine and strategy? 
   
全民國防的概念如何可以應用於網路戰爭的防衛策略？ 
Q4: How does the idea of civilian-based defence apply to the 
defensive strategy of cyber warfare? 
   
網路戰與中國軍事事務革新之關係如何？ 
Q5: How is cyber warfare related to the PRC’s Revolution of Military 
Affairs?  
   
中共非對稱戰略及人民戰爭，與網路戰關係如何？ 
Q6: What relation do the PRC’s asymmetric warfare and People’s War 
have with cyber warfare?   
   
您認為台灣是中共網路戰的主要攻擊目標嗎？ 
Q7: In your opinion, does the PRC regard Taiwan as its primary target 
in terms of cyber warfare?  
   
接續前題，台灣目前的防衛措施如何應付中共網路攻擊？ 
Q8: Further to the previous question, what are Taiwan’s existing 
defensive measures/doctrines to cope with the PRC’s cyber warfare? 
   
中共資訊戰的發展是否受到民間資訊基礎建設的影響？為了達到
‘打贏資訊化的局部戰爭’，中共的資訊化建設如何軍民一體？ 
Q9: How does the PRC’s civil information infrastructure affect the 
development of PRC cyber warfare? How does the PRC’s 
infrastructure combine the military and civilian sectors to pursue the 
aim of ‘winning local wars under informationisation’?   
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   
對網路攻擊事件防衛或反擊措施的正當性如何重要？ 
Q10: How important is it to establish legitimacy in law and policy for 
carrying out defensive measures against cyber attack, or even counter 
attacks?  
   
在很多實際案例中，如何可以證明中共使用資訊戰攻擊手段？ 
Q11: How can previous related incidents demonstrate that the PRC 
already employs cyber warfare as an offensive approach? 
   您認為 DNS對網路空間的安全性措施有何影響？ Q12: How do you think the DNS affects security in cyberspace? 
   
台灣軍事網路與民間網路實體隔離的措施成效如何？ 
Q13: The Taiwanese military has a policy of physically separating the 
military net and the civil net. How effective do you consider this 
approach to be? 
   
中共控制網路的動機何在？是否擔心人民發動網路的人民戰爭對
抗中共政權？ 
Q14: What could be the PRC’s motive for controlling its domestic 
internet? In your opinion, is it possible that the motive lies in a fear of 
the populace carrying out ‘People’s War’ against the PRC’s own 
regime via use of the internet? 
   
中共為何要發展網路戰爭當成是一種軍事戰略？ 
Q15: Why and how does the PRC develop cyber warfare as a state 
military strategy? 
   
網路戰和所謂的指管通情軍事系統關聯如何？ 
Q16: How is cyber warfare associated with the C4ISR military 
system? 
Key: 
CI: Cyberspace/information technology 
CS: Chinese strategy/China Studies 
CW: China’s cyber warfare/strategy 
 
(These questions were not necessarily carried out one by one, but it was ensured that all 
the questions recorded responses.) 
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Appendix 2:  
China’s National Telecommunication Network: 
Eight North-to-South and Eight East-to-West Optical Fibre Routes 
 
In China, researches on optic fibre started from the mid 1980s. With thirty years of 
development, China’s optical fibre and optical cables industry is leading the world. In 
China, the six major telecommunication operators own 4,322,000 kilometres of optical 
cable, using 80,720,000 kilometres of optical fibre. Including radio and television, 
electricity, petroleum, and other industries, the whole country has a 5,772,000 
kilometres of optical cable, which uses 107,810,000 kilometres of optical fibre. In the 
1990s, the fast development of the communication industry spurred a rapid growth in 
the optical fibre communication market. Currently, optical fibre makes up more than 
90% of the long-distance transmission network in China. China has constructed the 
Communication Network of Eight East-to-West and Eight North-to-South Optical Fibre 
Routes, which covers more than 85% of all the counties and cities. 
China now owns the world’s widest information super highway. The WDM system, the 
information transmission capacity of which is terabit (namely 1×1012 bit), has self-
owned intellectual property rights. The first-class information route between Shanghai 
and Hangzhou (80×40Gb/s) can enable 40,000,000 people to make phone calls at the 
same time. The 2007 construction project of the state’s first-class information route, the 
1.6TDWDM high-end optical network equipment built by FiberHome 
Telecommunication, brought benefits to Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangzhou, Hubei, Jiangxi, 
Anhui and other provinces. 
Infonetics Research recently reported in ‘Optical Network Hardware in Asia Pacific: 
China, Japan, India, and the Republic of Korea’ that in 2007 China had the largest 
single-country optical spending in the Asia Pacific, which was more than double 
Japan’s and surpassed the total spending of other countries in the Asia Pacific. China 
represented 43% of the $3.4 billion spent on optical hardware in 2007 by Asia Pacific 
countries. 
 
The Communication Network of Eight North-to-South and Eight East-to-West 
Optical Fibre Routes 
The Eight North-to-South Optical Fibre Routes are: 
1. Harbin—Shenyang—Dalian—Shanghai—Guangzhou 
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2. Qiqiha’er—Beijing—Zhengzhou—Guangzhou—Haikou—Sanya 
3. Beijing—Shanghai  
4. Beijing—Guangzhou  
5. Hohhot—Beihai, Guangxi 
6. Hohhot—Kunming  
7. Xining—Lhasa 
8. Chengdu—Nanning 
 
The Eight East-to-West Optical Fibre Routes are: 
1. Beijing—Lanzhou 
2. Qingdao—Yinchuan 
3. Shanghai—Xi’an 
4. Lianyungang—Yining, Xinjiang 
5. Shanghai—Chongqing 
6. Hangzhou—Chengdu 
7. Guangzhou—Nanning—Kunming 
8. Guangzhou—Beihai—Kunming 
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